Anglo-Dutch relations in the age of Imperialism : three case studies focusing on Dutch perceptions of the Anglo-Dutch relationship by Mead, Yvette Maria
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL 
Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Age of Imperialism. 
Three case studies focusing on Dutch perceptions 
of the Anglo-Dutch relationship 
being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the University of Hull 
by 
Yvette Maria Mead, M. A. 
October 1996 
C0NTENTS 
Acknowledgements 
1 Introduction 1 
2 Dutch Foreign Policy and Anglo-Dutch 
Relations 18 
3 The Borneo Dispute 53 
4 The Nisero Question 164 
5 The Foundation of the Koninklijke 
Paketvaart Maatschappij 228 
6 Conclusion 265 
Maps: Map 1 - North Borneo 280 
Map 2 - Dutch Borneo, South and Eastern Division 281 
Map 3 - Sumatra: the coast of Teunom 282 
Map 4 - The Dutch East Indies with the lines 
of the Koninklijke Paketvaart 
Maatschappij 283 
Appendix 1: Foreign secretaries in the Netherlands 
and Britain, 1870 - 1914 284 
Bibliography 285 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This investigation began in 1988 when I was a research 
student at the University of Hull. During the initial stages 
of my research I was given constructive and helpful advice 
by Dr Nic van Sas and Dr Maarten Kuitenbrouwer. I am 
especially indebted to my supervisor, Dr Michael Wintle, for 
his patience and unstinting support, but above all for his 
painstaking comment and invaluable advice. I would also like 
to record my thanks to my parents, Eric van Es, Elizabeth 
Schächter and David Shaw, for their support and assistance. 
Nijmegen 
September 1996 Yvette Mead 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The last decades of the nineteenth century saw an explosion 
in imperial activity among the European powers. The 
increase took place on two levels: those countries which 
already had empires or colonies, like Britain and the 
Netherlands, either consolidated or extended their 
authority, while previously non-colonial powers, such as 
Germany, Belgium and Italy, now joined the race for the 
remaining colonial spoils. As a result, the existing 
colonial powers began to guard their overseas territories 
even more jealously, and this inevitably caused friction 
between two of the world's most established colonial 
powers: Britain and the Netherlands. As the eminent Dutch 
colonial historian, H. L. Wesseling has pointed out: 
The age of imperialism was an age of new 
possibilities, but also, and more importantly, 
of new dangers. ' 
Traditionally the Netherlands had looked to Britain for 
protection against the incursions of other European powers, 
both at home and in the colonies. Britain, in turn, had 
generally preferred the Netherlands as a colonial neighbour 
in South-East Asia to any of the other greater European 
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powers. Yet this comfortable situation began to change with 
the increasing colonial competition of the late nineteenth 
century. These circumstances highlighted the paradoxical 
nature of the Anglo-Dutch relationship: the two nations 
were simultaneously allies in a European context and rivals 
in an imperial context. Both elements have always been 
evident in Anglo-Dutch relations, with one or the other 
characterising Anglo-Dutch discourse according to external 
circumstances. Late nineteenth-century European colonialism 
again brought the rivalry in the relationship to the fore, 
and suspicion and mistrust characterised the Anglo-Dutch 
relationship to a greater extent than at any time since the 
Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 
The historiographical debate on what has come to be known 
as the Age of Imperialism is a multi-facetted one focusing 
on definition, periodisation and the very nature of 
imperialism. Wesseling has observed that 
After a century of use, the meaning of the word 
`imperialism' seems to have become more confused 
than ever. ' 
And, more recently, Andrew Porter has pointed out that the 
study of imperialism 
[... ] involves historians in attempting to both 
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define and disentangle a wide range of social, 
political or economic processes, in order to 
understand their distinct function and perhaps 
their importance relative to each other. ' 
The general debate on imperialism has broadly centred 
on two questions: first, the degree to which the new 
imperialism was the product of predominantly economic 
forces and, second, whether or not it was a necessary 
attribute of the capitalist system. In 1902 Hobson 
identified the driving forces behind imperialism: 
patriotism, philanthropy and the spirit of adventure. 4 The 
financial climate in the mother country allowed these 
impulses to be translated into imperialist expansion. 
Hobson believed that imperialism could be eliminated by 
social reforms within the capitalist system. For Lenin, 
imperialism was the highest state of capitalism. However, 
although he owed much to Hobson's theories, Lenin believed 
that only the overthrow of the capitalist system, to be 
replaced by socialism, would put an end to imperialism. 
Since the Eurocentric economic theories of Hobson and 
Marxist-Leninist imperial historians, the historiographical 
pendulum has moved in the opposite direction, namely 
towards non-Eurocentric peripheral theories and those 
seeking to explain imperialism in terms of some sort of 
collaboration between coloniser and the colonised. Thus, in 
1953, Gallagher and Robinson published their theories in 
3 
their seminal article `The Imperialism of Free Trade'. ' 
Robinson's and Gallagher's theories held sway for many 
years, challenging the orthodox theory of British 
mid-Victorian anti-imperialism, replacing this with a 
hypothesis of fundamental continuity in British expansion. 
There were, however, salutary reminders that economic 
factors could not be totally dispensed with. Hobsbawm, for 
example, commented that 
[... ] politics and economics cannot be separated 
in a capitalist society, any more than religion 
and society in an Islamic one. The attempt to 
devise a purely non-economic explanation of the 
"new imperialism" is as unrealistic as the 
attempt to devise a purely non-economic 
explanation of working-class politics. 6 
In the 1980s, according to the imperial historian D. K. 
Fieldhouse, imperialist historiography began to lose some 
of its intellectual validity, mainly because some of the 
claims made for it by historians had been too great. ' The 
historiographical swing from Eurocentric to peripheral 
theories meant that the imperialist historian of the 1980s 
faced a daunting task, which Fieldhouse describes thus: 
The modern imperialist historian [... ] has no 
territorial base or, for that matter, loyalties. 
He places himself in the interstices of his 
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subject, poised above the `era of interaction' 
like some satellite placed in space, looking, 
Janus-like, in two or more ways at the same 
time. It is his duty, as an in-between man, to 
give equal weight to what happens in a colony 
and in its metropolis, and to be intellectually 
at home in both. ' 
Since the late 1980s a new explanation of British 
imperialism has been advanced and developed by P. J. Cain 
and A. G. Hopkins: the theory of `gentlemanly capitalism', 
culminating in their most recent works, published in 1993.9 
Broadly speaking, a `gentleman capitalist' was essentially 
one whose wealth derived from an occupation or source which 
allowed a leisured lifestyle compatible with the 
gentlemanly ideal, as pursued by the traditional landed 
elite. In the nineteenth century in particular, industrial 
capitalists used their `new' wealth to emulate the 
`gentlemanly' lifestyle associated with `old' landed 
wealth, for example by acquiring country estates and 
sending their sons to public schools. The theory is further 
described in one major review as follows: 
By shaping economic priorities, a distinctive 
gentlemanly culture made its impact on the 
stratification of society and the running of the 
state. The gentlemanly order is related to the 
financial and service sectors of the British 
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economy, and closely bound up, in turn, with 
economic and political decision making. These 
cultural and social components tied in with the 
economic and political realms led Cain and 
Hopkins to develop the theory of gentlemanly 
capitalism. " 
Historians have tried to formulate theories of general 
imperialism from the unique British experience, but this 
has inherent risks, as Wesseling points out: 
After all, Britain was the imperial power par 
excellence. But for that very reason Britain was 
not the most typical imperial power. Rather it 
was a-typical. Therefore theories about British 
imperialism cannot by simple extrapolation be 
transformed into general theories of 
imperialism. " 
While much attention has been paid to European 
imperialism in general, and British imperialism in 
particular, discussions of Dutch expansion within the 
context of imperialism have - until comparatively recently 
- been sadly lacking. Nevertheless a Dutch debate has 
developed in recent years. While the debates on British and 
European imperialism in general have focused on the 
identification of causes, historians involved in the Dutch 
debate, which has evolved since the 1980s, have been 
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attempting to establish whether Dutch imperialism existed 
at all. Two of the main protagonists are Wesseling, quoted 
above, and M. Kuitenbrouwer, and the theoretical status quo 
is best expressed in the words of these two leading Dutch 
specialists. After a careful examination of Dutch colonial 
and foreign policy during the period in question, 
Kuitenbrouwer has concluded that `the Dutch case rather 
closely fits the more recent, non-Marxist theories of 
imperialism'. 12 Kuitenbrouwer agrees that there were 
particular factors, previously identified by Raymond F. 
Betts, which motivated European expansion. These factors 
were `pre-emption' and `contiguity', and in Kuitenbrouwer's 
view these can also be applied to Dutch expansion. He sees 
contiguity in Dutch expansion in Indonesia, and pre-emption 
in the outbreak of the Achin war, which in itself 
`reflected the rise of imperialism as an international 
phenomenon'. " 
While agreeing that there is nothing in 
Kuitenbrouwer's periodisations that differs greatly from 
other nations, Wesseling disagrees that the concepts of 
`pre-emption' and `contiguity' help to explain Dutch 
expansion. Wesseling argues that `pre-emption' 
(Torschlusspanik, or claiming territories in order to keep 
out other powers) is not typical of the Dutch. For 
Kuitenbrouwer `pre-emption' is something else, namely the 
occupation by the Dutch of territories within their sphere 
of influence over which they had not previously established 
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their authority. As far as contiguity (expansion into 
adjoining territories) is concerned, Wesseling claims that 
this was characteristic of the Dutch during the period of 
imperialism, which makes the Dutch case different from - 
not similar to - other cases, where contiguity was more 
characteristic of the preceding period. According to 
Wesseling: 
Dutch imperialism was not a matter of action but 
reaction. It was - and this seems to be unique - 
almost exclusively a function of international 
politics. In short, the only reason for Dutch 
imperialism was the imperialism of others. " 
The theoretical gap between the views of Kuitenbrouwer 
and Wesseling has narrowed somewhat over the years. In 1994 
Kuitenbrouwer stated that 
The only remaining difference of opinion between 
Wesseling and myself is his denial of 
autonomous, specifically Dutch causes of 
imperialism, like nationalism and economic 
expansion - metropolitan factors which are 
emphasized in my analysis for the turn of the 
century. In his playing down of autonomous 
factors, however, Wesseling is in good company. 
While Dutch historians increasingly accept the 
term imperialism for the case of the 
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Netherlands, most of them emphasize peripheral 
causes and forms. 15 
In the course of the Dutch debate on imperialism, Dutch 
overseas expansion has naturally been compared and 
contrasted with that of other European colonial powers, and 
inevitably most often with Britain. Comparing Dutch and 
British imperialism, Wesseling observes that the two 
countries shared the most similar attitudes: `defensive 
rather than offensive, reluctant and not enthusiastic'. 16 
But, at the same time, the two nations were also growing 
apart: 
Britain had become a superpower, the workshop of 
the world, an expanding society, invulnerable 
behind its naval defences. Holland was an 
extraordinary small nation at the expense of a 
united Germany. It was also an industrial 
latecomer, a country characterized by the spirit 
of Jan Salie, a nation of nincompoops. " 
Kuitenbrouwer also sees similarities. In both 
countries, the configuration of interests established by 
Cain and Hopkins was `embedded in a framework of free 
trade, the gold standard and a balanced budget,. " Yet he 
does not believe that Cain's and Hopkins' concept of 
gentlemanly capitalism can be fully applied to the 
Netherlands, since the Dutch aristocratic landed interest 
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was far less significant for the capitalist order than in 
Britain. 19 Neither, for Kuitenbrouwer, can the causes of 
imperialism be prioritised in the same way: 
[... ] one has to conclude that British 
imperialism was caused in the first place by 
metropolitan factors like gentlemanly capitalism 
and only in the second place by strategic and 
peripheral factors. Dutch imperialism on the 
other hand seems to have been caused by 
strategic and peripheral factors in the first 
place and only in the second place by 
metropolitan economic factors. 20 
Yet Kuitenbrouwer is aware that future research may 
modify these conclusions: 
[... ] this configuration of causes can be 
changed, along the lines of Cain's and Hopkins' 
analysis. Even then, however, no monocausal 
explanation will suffice, neither of British nor 
of Dutch imperialism. 21 
This study will examine both Britain and the 
Netherlands, but will concentrate on the relationship 
between the two countries and, in particular, the 
perceptions of that relationship. We shall be asking what 
perceptions existed and whether there were discrepancies 
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between expectations and reality, particularly on the Dutch 
side. If such discrepancies existed, how did they arise and 
how did they influence Anglo-Dutch relations? We shall be 
taking three case studies of the Anglo-Dutch relationship 
in the colonial theatre during the age of imperialism. The 
first of these case studies is the Borneo dispute, in which 
the division of British and Dutch spheres of influence on 
that island was hotly contested. The second case study is 
the Nisero question: in 1874 the crew of the British 
steamer Nisero was kidnapped by the Raja of Tenom in Dutch 
colonial territory. In Britain and the Netherlands there 
was fierce debate as to who was responsible and how the 
crew should be rescued. The Nisero question engrossed not 
only the British and Dutch governments, but also public 
opinion in both countries. The third case study is the 
founding of the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM, 
Royal Packet Company) in 1888, to unify inter-island 
transport in the Dutch East Indies and keep it under Dutch 
control. 
The study will also consider the significance of the 
case studies with regard to the imperialism debate. The 
Borneo dispute is clearly an exception to Wesseling's claim 
that Torschlusspanik (see above, p. 5. ) was not typical of 
Dutch imperialism; the threat to the Dutch from British 
expansion on North Borneo was not primarily an economic one 
since the Dutch had shown comparatively little interest in 
developing their territory on Borneo. On Borneo at least, 
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the Dutch made claims to the disputed territory because any 
physical intrusion by a foreign power on Borneo represented 
(for the Dutch) diminishing colonial prestige. As this 
study will show, this was also the reasoning behind the 
foundation of the KPM, the purpose of which was not 
primarily to protect shipping in the Dutch East Indies 
against the economic threat from foreign competition, but 
to safeguard Dutch political supremacy in those islands. 
This was, then clearly `not a matter of action but 
reaction' (Wesseling, quoted above); not economic 
imperialism but a matter of pride and prestige. Wesseling's 
claim that contiguity (expansion into adjoining 
territories) was typical of Dutch imperialism at this time 
cannot really be addressed by this study, since the case 
studies are not all purely territorial disputes. 
These three incidents have been chosen as the basis 
for this study for three main reasons. First, they are 
Anglo-Dutch incidents arising out of imperial rivalry: 
they are confrontations which might have led to more severe 
forms of conflict, and they constitute part of the imperial 
experience of two great colonial powers at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Second, they are incidents which, on 
closer examination, show Dutch expectations and perceptions 
regarding the relationship between Great Britain and the 
Netherlands to be wildly unrealistic. Third, these 
incidents represent `low points' in Anglo-Dutch relations. 
During these incidents relations deteriorated considerably, 
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and an atmosphere of suspicion and resentment clouded 
diplomatic relations. The `low points' in the relationship 
contrast markedly with the `high points' when the alliance 
was at its strongest: for example, Britain oversaw the 
unification (1813-15) of the Netherlands and Belgium into 
the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. The union created a 
buffer state designed to prevent further French incursions 
within Europe, but also gave two small powers, the future 
Netherlands and Belgium, the status of a middle power - 
albeit temporarily. A further `high point' was the 
conclusion of three treaties in the early 1870s whereby the 
Netherlands ceded the last of its Gold Coast possessions in 
Africa to Britain, while Britain consented to all past and 
future expansion of Dutch authority on Sumatra, and 
acquiesced in the emigration of workers from British India 
to Surinam. 
For each case study, sources will be discussed which 
inform us about perceptions of the Anglo-Dutch relationship 
within three different contexts, namely: in diplomatic 
circles, in parliament, and in public opinion. The 
diplomatic correspondence concerning the Borneo dispute, 
the KPM, and the Nisero question has been published, and 
will be examined in detail to establish the nature of the 
perceptions held by those in the Dutch Foreign Office. In 
order to establish how the Anglo-Dutch relationship was 
perceived in the Dutch parliament, parliamentary debates on 
the case-study subjects will be examined. Finally, the 
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reports and discussions in Dutch newspapers and periodicals 
will be examined to assess how public opinion saw relations 
with Britain. The establishment of the KPM is somewhat 
different from the other case studies in that it is not a 
bilateral dispute, but a unilateral anti-British action on 
the part of the Dutch. Therefore, in order to assess 
whether this action was based on accurate estimation of the 
situation with regard to Britain, the British reaction to 
the establishment of the KPM will also be assessed. 
The study will be arranged as follows: the following 
chapter sets the historical and historiographical context 
with an examination of Dutch foreign policy and received 
historical opinion on Anglo-Dutch relations over the 
centuries. Then will follow the central empirical studies 
on the Borneo, Nisero and KPM affairs, as case studies of 
the general themes, in chapters 3,4 and 5. The sources 
outlined above will be examined in order to establish how 
the Anglo-Dutch relationship was seen by the Dutch at the 
time of the incidents, whether their perceptions were 
accurate in relation to the reality of the situation, to 
what extent these realistic or unrealistic perceptions 
influenced the mechanics of the relationship at that 
moment, and whether unrealistic suspicions and negative 
perceptions hindered the solution of a particular problem. 
The conclusion and summary (Chapter 6) will set out the 
answers to these questions in order to provide further 
insight into the Anglo-Dutch relationship during the last 
14 
decades of the nineteenth century. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DUTCH FOREIGN POLICY AND ANGLO-DUTCH RELATIONS 
Dutch foreign policy trends 
The Netherlands is generally held to have entered the 
international arena in the year 1568, which saw the 
beginning of the 80 Years' War during which the Dutch 
fought to oust the Spanish. Peter Baehr, in his examination 
of Dutch foreign policy, sees it as the beginning of a 
golden age for Dutch foreign policy. ' J. Voorhoeve also 
sees 1568 as the year in which the Dutch made their entry 
onto the international stage. 2 In 1579 the Union of Utrecht 
created the United Provinces of the Netherlands, also known 
as the Dutch Republic, which lasted until 1795 when it 
collapsed under French invasion and a Dutch democratic 
revolution. 
Johan de Witt was Grand Pensionary of Holland from 
1653 to 1672 and the aim of his policies was to allow the 
Republic's trade and commerce to continue unimpeded in an 
atmosphere of peace and equilibrium. According to De Witt, 
The interest of the state demands that there be 
peace and quiet everywhere and that commerce can 
be conducted in an unrestricted way. ' 
And, as Israel points out, for De Witt the key to achieving 
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this was to improve relations with England and France. ' 
According to Baehr, Dutch foreign policy has ever since 
been based on De Witt's maxim. ' The state was seen as a 
function or instrument of society, which meant that foreign 
policy should be in accordance with the general interest of 
the state in the world. This policy, however, brought the 
Republic into conflict with England where trading and 
commercial interests also had to be protected. The English 
resorted to protectionism, characterised by the Navigation 
Act of 1651. There were four Anglo-Dutch wars, the last of 
which (1780-84) greatly accelerated the decline of the 
Dutch Republic which had begun in the late seventeenth 
century. This war had a particularly disastrous effect on 
trade by putting an end to profitable exports of Cape wheat 
to the Netherlands, and to many other forms of colonial 
trade. The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War also paralysed the ailing 
Dutch fishing industry. 6 
In 1795 Napoleon invaded the Dutch Republic and after 
what A. Vandenbosch has referred to as `approximately a 
century and a half of lusty participation in world 
politics', ' the Dutch Republic withdrew from international 
politics and adopted a policy which he describes as `small 
power neutralism'. 8 The reason for this policy was, 
according to Vandenbosch, `not so much their refined 
sensibilities as their limited national resources in 
Europe'. 9 The Napoleonic period ended in 1813 and the 
Northern and Southern Netherlands were united as the United 
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Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815 as a buffer state to 
curb further French territorial pretensions. The United 
Kingdom lasted until the southern provinces revolted in 
1830. 
Dutch foreign policy during the nineteenth century 
will be discussed in more detail below. The conclusions of 
the general authorities on Dutch foreign affairs with 
regard to Dutch foreign policy trends since the 
mid-sixteenth century are as follows. Vandenbosch concluded 
that during four centuries the Dutch had completed the 
cycle of power relations. While fighting for independence 
from the Spanish, the Dutch were fully participating in 
power politics. Then followed a period of withdrawal and 
neutralism. When the nation re-emerged, united with the 
Southern Netherlands after liberation from the French, the 
two countries enjoyed middle-power status for a short 
period. The failure of the United Kingdom of the 
Netherlands deepened the Dutch aversion to power politics 
and the policy of neutralism was followed even more 
intensely. In the twentieth century, the First World War 
caused the first major challenge to Dutch neutralist 
abstentionism, but this did not lead to a change in foreign 
policy. During the Second World War, however, that 
neutrality was violated by German invasion and occupation. 
In the post-war period, the Dutch became increasingly 
involved in European integration and NATO. 1° 
Baehr recognises three trends in Dutch foreign policy 
over the centuries. The first period he refers to as the 
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Golden Age, which lasted from the beginning of the Eighty 
Years' War until 1713 (the year in which the War of the 
Spanish Succession ended). The second period lasted from 
1713 until the end of the Second World War and is 
characterised by orientation towards neutralism. The third 
period, beginning after the Second World War, has been 
characterised by close western co-operation. 
J. Voorhoeve distinguishes three foreign policy 
traditions: the maritime-commercial, the 
neutralist -abstentionist and the internationalist- idealist 
traditions. " According to Voorhoeve, the 
maritime-commercial tradition dates back to the fourteenth 
century when Dutch maritime domination was beginning. This 
tradition, based on Dutch naval and commercial supremacy, 
lasted until 1830. This was the beginning of the 
neutralist-abstentionist phase, within which Voorhoeve 
distinguishes five sub-phases. The third tradition, 
internationalist-idealism, began after the Second World 
War. This foreign policy tradition was internationalist in 
the sense that it began to focus on international 
integration, and idealist in the sense that the Dutch 
perceived a new world (moral) role for the Netherlands as 
a model nation in terms of international relations. The 
Dutch foreign policy traditions identified by these authors 
are thus broadly similar, although their chronology and 
labelling may not always correspond. 
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Dutch foreign policy during the nineteenth century 
The revolt of the southern provinces and subsequent 
dissolution in 1839 of the United Kingdom of the 
Netherlands heralded a new era in Dutch foreign policy. 
Having been essentially `demoted' to the rank of small 
power once again, the Netherlands was forced to redefine 
its role in Europe, and the solution to this was to abstain 
from power politics. Strict non-alignment was central to 
this policy, and policy-makers concentrated instead on 
colonial affairs, domestic reform, and international trade 
and finance. Generally speaking, this policy was 
successful, despite occasional forays into international 
politics as in, for example, the Luxembourg Question 
(1867), which profoundly affected the position of the 
Netherlands in Europe. " It had now become apparent that 
France was no longer a potential threat to the security of 
the country; the threat came instead from Germany - now 
unified and in the throes of its own industrial revolution. 
For the remainder of the nineteenth century, Dutch 
foreign policy reflected the Netherlands' status as a 
European small power with a vast colonial empire. As 
competition for the remaining potential colonies in Africa 
and Asia intensified, the Dutch were forced to take stock 
of their colonial status. Colonial policy came to the fore 
as Dutch authority in the Netherlands' overseas territories 
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was either consolidated or extended. The Dutch colonies had 
to be protected from the other great powers. While it could 
use force to `pacify' Dutch territories in the Indies (for 
example in the Achin war, 1873-1904), the Netherlands could 
not afford such belligerence in Europe. The Danish war in 
1864 led many to fear for the security of the small powers 
in Europe, and the Netherlands remained strictly neutral in 
an effort to avoid antagonising the great powers, in 
particular Germany. The realisation grew that, in the 
foreign policy of a small power such as the Netherlands, 
there was no longer a place for power-politics. This 
neutralist-pacifist tendency, which had developed since the 
late 1830s, manifested itself even more strongly at the 
very end of the nineteenth century, with the international 
Peace Conferences of 1 899 and 1907 held at The Hague. These 
were followed by the establishment of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration at The Hague, a direct result of the Peace 
Conferences. Many became convinced that the Dutch had a 
particular calling to become peacemakers and international 
arbiters. In the words of E. H. Kossmann: 
A small power could win universal respect by 
strengthening its defences, by supporting the 
development of international law, and by being 
ready to act as a mediator in the interests of 
peace .'3 
In this way the Netherlands had found an alternative 
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means of preserving its international position, without 
having to rely on `allies' who might later prove to be 
untrustworthy or fickle. The Dutch had always felt betrayed 
by the British government when it failed to act decisively 
to preserve the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in the 
1830s. 
Anglo-Dutch relations 
Having outlined the general trends in Dutch foreign 
policy from the sixteenth to the twentieth century, and in 
more detail in the nineteenth century, we shall now 
consider the Anglo-Dutch relationship, which has always 
been a consistent and important element in the foreign 
policies of both countries. As Neville Chamberlain reminded 
us, 
The development in aeronautics has further 
impaired our insular security and given fresh 
force to the secular principle of British policy 
that the independence of the Low Countries is a 
British interest, that their frontiers are in 
fact our frontiers, their independence the 
condition of our independence, their safety 
inseparable from our own. It was to secure the 
independence of the Low Countries that we fought 
Spain in the sixteenth century, and that we 
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fought Germany in the twentieth. 14 
A close - if not always amicable - relationship between 
Britain and the Netherlands has always been inevitable, 
given their proximity and the strategic position of the 
Netherlands as a possible springboard for an invasion of 
Britain. As Charles Wilson put it: 
The nightmare of our rulers for centuries has 
been the possession of the Dutch and Belgian 
coasts by an enemy. In 1940, in a matter of 
days, nightmare became grim reality and to the 
hazards of war at sea was added the bombardment 
of the cities of Britain from the airfields of 
the Low Countries. 15 
As Chamberlain pointed out, Britain first helped the 
Dutch Republic fight for its independence from Spain in the 
sixteenth century. The two countries were allied against 
the oppressor but despite the united struggle Anglo-Dutch 
relations were undermined by two factors: Dutch resentment 
of Elizabeth I's reluctance to become directly involved, 
and finance (the Dutch were slow in repaying a large loan 
from Elizabeth). Furthermore, the Dutch were unwilling to 
take on the financial responsibility of the Southern 
Netherlands which was equally indebted but now under 
Spanish rule. 
After a long period of alliance against the Spanish 
25 
there followed, after the Treaty of Münster (which ended 
the Eighty Years' War in 1648), an era characterised by 
Anglo-Dutch commercial rivalry and wars. The English became 
jealous of the Republic's worldwide naval and commercial 
supremacy and under the influence of writings by Thomas Mun 
and others, who propounded the balance-of-trade theory, 
became convinced that the English economic system was 
subservient to that of the Dutch. The First Anglo-Dutch War 
broke out in 1652 (four years after the Treaty of Münster) 
and lasted until 1654. The war followed a period of tension 
after the 1651 Navigation Act which sought to exclude the 
Dutch from English sea trade by, for example, prohibiting 
Dutch shippers from acting as middlemen in English trade. 
Further tension had been caused by English attempts to 
unite the Dutch against the House of Orange and the 
Stuarts. Earlier generations of historians have, broadly 
speaking, attributed this war either to economic causes 
The (Charles Wilson)" or to political ones (Pieter Geyl)17 
Second Anglo-Dutch War was fought between 1665 and 1667, 
when it was ended by the Treaty of Breda. It was different 
from the first war, as Simon Groenveld points out: 
While it was true that the Dutch fleet, though 
greatly strengthened, was not impregnable, the 
Dutch maritime potential worldwide still proved 
stronger than the English. At the Treaty of 
Breda in 1667, the English were even forced to 
make a number of economic concessions. 18 
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For Wilson the year in which this Second Anglo-Dutch 
War ended was the beginning of a new phase in Anglo-Dutch 
relations. Yet, on the whole, there is a strong case for 
believing that 1667 marks a real turning-point in 
Anglo-Dutch relations. At this time the English began to 
realise that the second war had done more harm than good. 
Nevertheless a Third Anglo-Dutch War was fought between 
1672 and 1674. Charles II, having joined with Sweden and 
the Northern Netherlands against France in the Triple 
Alliance of January 1688, then proceeded to sign a treaty 
with France in 1670: the Treaty of Dover. The provisions of 
this secret treaty granted Charles a subsidy, and obliged 
him to declare himself a Catholic and restore the Catholic 
Church in England. The treaty also obliged him to declare 
war upon the Northern Netherlands, which he duly did in 
1672. A further fundamental change occurred at this time, 
according to Wilson, namely that by the end of the third 
Anglo-Dutch war, English hostilities towards the Dutch 
diminished while those towards France grew. t9 
The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War followed almost a century 
later and lasted from 1780 to 1784. It was fought within 
the context of the American War of Independence. Britain 
was angry at clandestine trading agreements between the 
Dutch and the American rebels, and at a proposed alliance 
between the two parties. According to K. H. D. Haley, 
The moral that the British drew from the war of 
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1780-84 was that they must ally with a party in 
the Dutch Republic to restore the alliance. "' 
Today, several decades after Wilson, historians of the 
Anglo-Dutch wars are even more reluctant to attribute the 
wars to a single cause, whether it be economic or 
political. In the words of Groenveld: 
This brief summary [of historiographical inter- 
pretations] makes it clear enough that labelling 
the Anglo-Dutch wars as trade wars is at the 
very least open to discussion. The same applies 
if the wars are described as purely political 
conflicts. Can these wars in fact be explained 
on the basis of a single cause? 21 
Groenveld concludes that 
This analysis of the causes leading up to the 
First Anglo-Dutch War shows with sharp clarity 
that this conflict cannot simply be labelled a 
trade war, nor yet a political conflict. [... ] 
The First Anglo-Dutch War was a multi-facetted 
conflict, which does not lend itself to a 
monolithic explanation. In fact this applies 
equally to the two subsequent wars as well; 
further research will be needed, however, in 
order to ascertain whether it is correct to 
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describe the second war primarily as a trade war 
and the third as a mainly political conflict. 22 
Anglo-Dutch relations had been damaged by the last 
Anglo-Dutch war, but the situation had improved again 
sufficiently by 1788 for both governments to enter into a 
triple alliance with Prussia. When French troops invaded 
the Dutch Republic in 1795, British troops arrived to 
defend William V and the stadholder's system of government. 
The Dutch stadholder William V fled to England with his 
family and subsequently handed over Dutch colonies to the 
British for `safe-keeping'. This is indicative of the 
closeness of the dynastic relationship at that time, and is 
in sharp contrast to the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, when the Dutch government did everything in its 
power to protect its colonial possessions from Britain and 
the other European colonial powers. Even at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, Britain was seen as a threat both 
in a European context and a colonial one. Queen Wilhelmina 
herself stated that 
The Netherlands must protect itself against 
England, France and Germany; in defence of our 
colonies we must reckon with England, the United 
States of North America, and perhaps later with 
Germany. " 
However, in 1795, the intense colonial jealousies of the 
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age of imperialism did not exist, and Britain could be 
trusted to help prevent the French from occupying her 
strategic colonies. Further proof of the closeness between 
the Netherlands and Britain at this time is the fact that 
Britain oversaw the union of the Northern and Southern 
Netherlands in 1815. Anglo-Dutch relations rapidly soured 
when Britain failed to prevent the dissolution of that 
union. Van Sas's analysis of the Anglo-Dutch `special 
relationship' in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century is divided into five chronological stages, each 
corresponding to a different phase in the relationship. The 
periods are as follows: 
1813 to 1815 - the `patron-client' stage 
1815 to 1818 - the `adjusting to peace' stage 
1818 to 1823 - the `emancipation of the Netherlands' 
1824 to 1830 - `great power-in-spe' 
1830 to 1831 - `England's European responsibility'. 24 
The remainder of the nineteenth century is marked by 
a succession of `ups and downs' in Anglo-Dutch relations. 
In 1819 (still during the period of the so-called special 
relationship), Sir Stamford Raffles, the British East 
Indian Administrator, bought Singapore from the Sultan of 
Johore, who was not (according to the Dutch) in a position 
to sell it, having recognised the overlordship of Batavia 
over all the islands of the Riau archipelago. This crushed 
Dutch hopes of making Batavia once again the centre of a 
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trading empire as had appeared possible when Java came back 
into Dutch hands in 1816. A new Treaty of London (17 March 
1824) was concluded in order to establish the British and 
Dutch spheres of influence. Under the terms of the treaty 
Britain ceded Bangkulu (Benkoelen) and claims on Billiton 
in return for Malacca and the recognition by the Dutch of 
Singapore as a British possession. In signing the treaty 
the Netherlands was, according to C. Fasseur, `accepting 
the inevitable,. 25 Furthermore, Britain undertook not to set 
up any factories/trading posts to the south of Singapore, 
while the Netherlands undertook to respect the independence 
of Achin, at the northern tip of Sumatra. The Dutch now 
felt less impelled to `flag-flying' in the so-called outer 
Possessions (`Buitengewesten')26 and must therefore have 
thought that the new Treaty of London had solved 
territorial problems. This perception was mistaken and the 
terms of the treaty were to be heavily debated between the 
Netherlands and Britain in later years, when it appeared 
that the two parties interpreted certain stipulations 
differently. One important example of this was the Borneo 
dispute. The treaty was therefore not as definitive as it 
had appeared in 1824. 
In the 1840s further colonial difficulties arose when 
Sir James Brooke was installed as raja of Sarawak, a title 
which he accepted, along with control of a large area of 
Sarawak (on Borneo) in return for quelling the rebellion of 
the Dayak and Malays against the Sultan's governor. The 
Dutch feared further British expansion. These fears 
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appeared justified when, in 1846, the British government 
accepted the Sultan of Brunei's offer to cede Labuan, and 
appointed Brooke its governor. The Dutch protested that the 
cession violated the terms of the 1824 Treaty. Their 
protests achieved nothing, but encouraged the Dutch to 
consolidate their interests on southern Borneo. The Dutch 
protested again later in the century - this time with 
greater success - when concessions on North Borneo were 
granted to the so-called British North Borneo Company. As 
we shall see below, although they were (ultimately) not 
completely successful in excluding the British influence on 
North Borneo, those in the Dutch Foreign Office and 
government succeeded (more through persistence and 
determination than anything else) in ruffling the feathers 
of the British government and Foreign Office, whose members 
were at least forced to listen to the Dutch government. 
The 1840s and 1850s were therefore bad decades for 
Anglo-Dutch relations, from both a colonial and a domestic 
point of view. On the European front, the Dutch were bitter 
towards the British for the dissolution of the United 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Dutch and Belgians remained 
on a war footing until 1839 when, as Kossmann puts it: 
[... ] the Belgian Government finally accepted 
William I's decision of March 1838 to abandon 
his status quo policies. For this decision meant 
that the King was ready to agree to Belgium's 
independent existence [... ] 27 
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On the colonial front, too, the Dutch were, as we have 
seen, dissatisfied with British activity, particularly that 
of James Brooke on Borneo and Labuan. Later in the century, 
at the beginning of the 1870s, better relations were 
signalled by three Anglo-Dutch treaties (see Introduction, 
page 11), but this period of comparative peace was to be 
interrupted by the Borneo dispute and the Nisero question. 
The true low-points in the Anglo-Dutch relationship 
occurred, then, when there were disputes on two fronts, 
namely the European and the colonial. 
The twentieth century began with strong anti-British 
feeling on the part of the Dutch, intensified by the Boer 
War (1899-1902). For the Dutch, the British attack on the 
Boers might just as well have been an attack on the 
Netherlands itself, so strong were the ties of kinship they 
felt with the Boers. In Kossmann's words: 
With the decision of the Boers, regarded as 
members of the Dutch race, not to submit to 
Britain, the Dutch began to develop a 
nationalistic fervour powerless in fact but 
potentially dynamic. 28 
When the Boer War ended, Dutch anti-British sentiments did 
not subside. Although the formation of the Union of South 
Africa did improve matters to a certain extent, feelings 
were running so high that the Netherlands would not join 
the Allies - among them Britain - when the First World War 
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broke out. 29 Relations - and commercial relations in 
particular - improved again in the interbellum and a number 
of Anglo-Dutch companies were formed, among them Unilever 
in 1929. 
The Second World War constituted a high-point in 
Anglo-Dutch relations, when Queen Wilhelmina, the rest of 
the royal family and the government were exiled in London. 
Pro-British feeling in the Netherlands greatly increased 
when the country was liberated by the Allies. 
Thus it can be seen that Anglo-Dutch relations over 
the centuries have followed a roller-coaster course of high 
and low points. Previous generations of historians such as 
Pieter Geyl, Gustaaf Renier, Alice Carter, and Charles 
Wilson have traditionally viewed the Anglo-Dutch 
relationship against a backdrop of alliance, mutual respect 
and common interests interspersed with periods of rivalry. 
More recent studies of the relationship have, however, 
emphasised the element of dependence inherent in the 
relationship. Van Sas's study has shown how the Northern 
and Southern Netherlands were united and thereby promoted 
to the rank of middle power, under the aegis of Britain. 
Another recent study of Anglo-Dutch relations, a collection 
of essays edited by G. J. A. Raven and N. A. M. Rodger, also 
draws our attention to the underlying dependence which 
bound the Netherlands to Britain. 30 In one of the essays, 
J. A. de Moor describes the colonial relationship between 
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Britain and the Netherlands at the end of the nineteenth 
century as `very unpleasant', the reason being that from 
mid-century the Netherlands was `[... I chained to John Bull 
for military and political support, and simultaneously 
afraid that England might seize large portions of Borneo 
and Sumatra'. 31 De Moor explains the nature of the 
relationship as follows: 
From the beginning the defence of the 
Archipelago was regarded as an impossibility and 
the Dutch tacitly relied upon British support. 
Therefore, to a large extent, they were at the 
mercy of Britain -a circumstance which gave 
this relationship its ambiguous and unpleasant 
character. " 
De Moor does not believe that the Anglo-Dutch relationship 
during the period in question could be described as a 
partnership or alliance; it was a relationship based on 
dependency. He concludes: 
To describe this relationship as a form of 
partnership seems incorrect. From their former 
position of Lords of the Eastern Seas the Dutch 
were reduced to the status of a dependent `ally 
of a kind'. The tacit support of Britain was 
made the cornerstone of Dutch colonial policy. 
When the age of imperialism with its manifold 
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tensions began, the Dutch faced the future of 
the Netherlands Indies with confidence. With the 
help of Britain, which was so overtly 
imperialistic in other parts of the globe, the 
Netherlands Indies might be safely steered 
3 through the vicissitudes of the modern world. 3 
Rodger, too, appears to deny that the countries were 
allied by common interests. In his discussion of the 
Anglo-Dutch naval alliance which functioned from the late 
1680s, he states that: 
It [the alliance] never reconciled the divergent 
interests of the two countries, and in the end 
it did not survive the great discrepancy which 
developed in their power and their policies 
[] 
. 
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This is in considerable contradiction to the findings 
of an earlier generation of historians, such as Blok, who 
concluded that, 
The reigning houses have, like the nations 
themselves, maintained a friendship devoid of 
political consequences and strong enough to 
outlive temporary storms. " 
Since the Second World War it has certainly been true 
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that the two nations have `maintained a friendship'. Yet 
the circumstances of that friendship are very different in 
the late twentieth century from those in previous 
centuries. The second half of the twentieth century has 
been characterised by European integration and the 
Netherlands, still a small power, is now protected by 
European alliances and no longer obliged, as it has been in 
previous centuries, to seek out an ally from among the 
great powers struggling for mastery. 
The Anglo-Dutch diplomatic situation 1870-1914 
The 1870s were important for the Dutch in South-East Asia. 
The Culture System36 in Java had come under heavy criticism 
in the late 1860s and the Dutch government's response to 
this was a so-called Liberal Policy under which compulsory 
sugar cultivation was abolished and the entry of new 
private capital allowed. While the grip of the Dutch state 
on Java's economy was being loosened, the opposite was 
happening in Achin (Atjeh; on the northern tip of Sumatra). 
The Achin war began in 1873. Piracy was rife in the seas 
around Achin and the Dutch had failed to persuade the 
Sultan of Achin to solve the problem. The declaration of 
war on Achin by the Dutch was in effect a violation of the 
1824 Treaty of London which had stipulated that no action 
should be taken in this area. The Achin war, which lasted 
until 1908, cost many lives and was a considerable drain on 
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the Dutch economy. The British, meanwhile, were fighting 
the Boer War. The Dutch condemned the British for their 
involvement with the Boers, while the British condemned the 
Dutch for their activities in Achin. Both apparently 
overlooked their own activities. Nevertheless, the three 
Anglo-Dutch treaties mentioned above were concluded in the 
early 1870s against this background of colonial war. 
Economically, too, circumstances were favourable to both 
countries in the 1870s. The removal of trade barriers, 
which had begun in 1860 with the Anglo-French Cobden 
Treaty, continued into the 1870s with the adoption of the 
gold standard. The Netherlands adopted the gold standard in 
1875. The benefits of free-trade were, however, not to be 
enjoyed for long. As De Vries puts it: 
This optimum situation, in which goods and money 
circulated freely within and across national 
frontiers, lasted only from 1860 to 1880. Then, 
the economic idyll was shattered by 
protectionism and imperialism, the former aimed 
at reserving the home market, the latter at 
subjugating overseas possessions to the economic 
interest of the mother country. 3' 
This was very unfortunate for the Netherlands, a country 
which industrialised late in comparison to other European 
powers: 
38 
There is a curious irony in the fact that in the 
period 1860-1880 the country was insufficiently 
equipped in industrial terms to obtain full 
benefit from the optimum world situation, and 
that after 1880, when its industrial importance 
was on the increase, it ran into barriers of 
protectionism and imperialism. " 
There is, then, a possible general parallel to be drawn 
between the economic cycle and the trend in the Anglo-Dutch 
relationship. When the three treaties were concluded in the 
1870s, the world economic situation was generally good. As 
the economic situation worsened from the end of the 1870s 
onwards, so Anglo-Dutch relations worsened and encountered 
low-points such as the Nisero question and the Borneo 
dispute which were both a consequence of the protectionism 
and imperialism described by De Vries. 
Towards the end of the century the position of the 
Netherlands in the world had, according to some, not 
improved. In the words of Kossmann: 
The international position of the Netherlands 
could hardly be said to be improving at all. For 
the defence of its colonial empire the 
Netherlands depended entirely on British 
support. " 
The status of the Netherlands as a small power 
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restricted its ability to act in international situations, 
for example in the Boxer crisis of 1900 when, as Kossmann 
pointed out, the desire for neutrality precluded any Dutch 
action, despite alignment with the imperialist policy of 
the great powers. " 
In the late 1880s, apart from the Borneo dispute, the 
Netherlands was also involved in colonial issues with other 
nations, for example, with France over Suriname, and with 
America over tobacco from Sumatra. There were difficulties 
with Turkey and China over the long-standing issue of the 
status of their subjects in the Netherlands Indies. There 
were also several multilateral diplomatic issues to be 
dealt with at this time. There were problems in Japan with 
the multilateral trade treaty and it became apparent, when 
the treaty powers met there to negotiate, that Japan no 
longer wished to implement the concession which would have 
enabled it to revert to a later introduction of the trade 
convention, and continued to still claim the right to raise 
tariffs without having fully opened the country to foreign 
traders . 
41 This issue was important to the Netherlands, with 
colonies in the east. 
In November 1889 a conference was held in Brussels to 
discuss the problem of, the trade in weapons and slaves. 
Discussions at this conference also centred upon the 
question of import duties on strong liquor in Africa. 
Eventually a sliding scale was agreed upon, which could be 
periodically reviewed. This had strong implications for the 
Dutch, who protested heavily: the Act of Berlin (1885) had 
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forbidden import duties and, moreover, 75% of the Congo 
trade was carried out by the Dutch. The General Act, which 
was the result of the conference, was signed by sixteen of 
the seventeen participants - but the Netherlands refused to 
sign. 
The Sugar Convention was held in London in August 
1888. The aim of the discussions was to abolish export and 
production tariffs (or their equivalents) on sugar. Matters 
were complicated by the Belgian government which would not 
make sufficient concessions, and by the British government 
which wanted to exclude from the discussions the sugar 
produced in her own colonies. The Dutch government wished 
to abolish surtaxes but this was rejected by the British 
government, which instead proposed equal treatment of sugar 
beet and cane. It thus appeared that both could be taxed 
more highly than sugar from the British colonies. The 
British proposal was, then, based on self-interest. But 
this is not surprising since, for the European powers, 
free-trade interests and colonial interests continually 
clashed during this imperialistic age, and colonial 
interests often prevailed. Earlier that same year, the 
Dutch government had voted to establish a steam-packet 
monopoly in Indonesia, the Koninklijke Paketvaart 
Maatschappij (see Chapter 5 of this study), and it could 
not therefore claim that British self-interest was unique. 
During the 1880s the Netherlands also participated in 
a number of conferences, namely the Anti-Slavery 
Conference, the Maritime Law Conference in Brussels, the 
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Budapest Telegraph Conference (1896) and the first Peace 
Conference (1899). Thus, although the Netherlands was a 
small power, Dutch diplomats worked hard to make their 
voice heard at these international gatherings. 
During the first years of the twentieth century, the 
long-standing Venezuelan question42 became even more urgent 
and a provisional solution was finally reached in 1903. 
From the early 1890s until the outbreak of the First World 
War, the Netherlands continued to be active in 
international politics. A second Peace Conference was held 
in 1907 and in 1908-9 a Convention on Maritime Law was held 
in London. The aim of this convention was for the North Sea 
powers to obtain guarantees for their territories adjoining 
the North Sea. The participants at this convention were 
Germany, England, the Netherlands, France, Sweden and 
Denmark. During this period important negotiations also 
took place with Britain and France on the subject of 
arbitration treaties. Britain was to arbitrate in the case 
of the Nederlands Zuid Afrikaans Spoorwegmaatschappij 
(NZASM), and France in establishing a telegraphic 
connection between the Netherlands and the 
Netherlands-Indies. As far as trade was concerned, the 
Netherlands was still pushing for most-favoured-nation 
status, in particular with regard to America and France. 
Clearly it was a difficult period for a small power which 
was also a free-trade nation. 
These overviews of the Dutch diplomatic situation in 
the world would not be complete without mention of the 
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dramatis personae. A key figure in Anglo-Dutch relations 
was C. M. E. G. Count van Bylandt, who was appointed envoy to 
the Dutch Embassy in London in 1871 and remained in that 
post until 1893. The British Foreign Office and Van Bylandt 
thus had the opportunity to become well acquainted with 
each other, although the relationship was at times fraught, 
and Van Bylandt's actions and motives were sometimes open 
to question, as one or two incidents in the case studies 
below will show. Vice-Admiral E. A. J. Harris was envoy to 
the Netherlands when Van Bylandt was appointed. During Van 
Bylandt's twenty-two year posting in London, which ended 
with his death in 1893, he served under seven Dutch 
cabinets and eight different Foreign Ministers (see 
Appendix 1). The longest-serving British envoy to the 
Netherlands was Sir Henry Howard, who held office from 
October 1896 until 1908. The question arises why Van 
Bylandt held office for so long. One possible answer is 
that, particularly after he had served as envoy for some 
years, successive governments valued his experience and 
knowledge, and were therefore reluctant to replace him 
(despite the fact that he occasionally blundered) . This may 
have been reinforced by the feeling that in dealing with 
the British government it was best to remain consistent, 
which suggests that the Dutch viewed the British as fickle, 
and possibly untrustworthy. Who better, then, to keep the 
Dutch government informed than a long-serving envoy such as 
Van Bylandt, whose experience and British background (his 
mother was British and he had also served in the British 
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army) would have served him well in diplomatic dealings, 
giving him greater insight into the British mentality and 
enabling him to interpret - and hopefully predict - British 
actions and responses. These factors, rather than Van 
Bylandt's diplomatic skills (which at times left something 
to be desired) account for his long service. He was less 
than tactful and appears to have enjoyed deferring the 
blame (e. g. in the Nisero question), and examples of 
diplomatic one-upmanship were reported to his superiors 
with great relish. Van Bylandt was succeeded by 1893 by Mr. 
W. Baron van Goltstein van Oldenaller who remained in post 
until 1899. Van Goltstein dealt with the British envoys Sir 
Horace Rumbold (until 1896) and then Sir Henry Howard. Van 
Goltstein was succeeded in 1899 by K. W. P. (M). F. (X) Baron 
Gericke van Herwijnen, whose father had served as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs between 1871 and 1874 in the Thorbecke, 
De Vries/Geertsema, and Heemskerk cabinets. Van Herwijnen 
remained in post until 1913. Thus it can be seen that Van 
Bylandt was an exception when it came to length of service; 
he was the only constant factor amid all the changes. 
The man with whom Van Bylandt had most dealings at the 
British Foreign Office was Sir Julian Pauncefote. 
Pauncefote joined the Foreign Office as Legal Assistant 
Under-Secretary, a post created in 1876 specifically to 
deal with matters of international law. Pauncefote also had 
to deal with political issues. He was appointed Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State in 1882. At the Foreign office the 
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countries of the world were grouped into eight divisions, 
and each division was administered by one Senior Clerk. The 
Netherlands was in the fifth division with Spain, Portugal, 
and the South American States, and was clearly not 
considered as a `Central Power' to be included in the first 
division. Pauncefote was appointed for his legal 
qualifications and had no experience as a Foreign Office 
Clerk, as was usually the case. R. B. Mowat points out that 
Pauncefote entered the Foreign Office with `a fresh mind, 
with methodical habits, and with a great power of work. j43 
Also, Pauncefote was not an aristocrat; his appointment was 
a meritocratic one, and his attitude to work reflected 
this. In his dealings with Van Bylandt he was 
straightforward and business-like. It was clear that he did 
not suffer fools gladly, and sometimes appears to have 
included Van Bylandt in this category when the latter was 
too persistent (especially in the Borneo dispute). 
Pauncefote's apparent arrogance and brusqueness may simply 
mask a desire to be efficient and prove himself in a 
traditionally aristocratic institution, or could be due to 
the sheer volume and laborious working methods at the 
Foreign Office (the typewriter was not introduced until 
1886 when Salisbury's second cabinet took office) which 
would have allowed him little opportunity for time- 
consuming pleasantries at a time when the Foreign Office 
was dealing with so many major international issues 
resulting from the imperial `scramble' during the late 
nineteenth century. Also, Pauncefote's manner was almost 
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certainly due, in part, to the fact that he had little time 
for the smaller European powers, particularly when their 
envoys were as persistent as Van Bylandt. As Kennedy points 
out, the Foreign Secretaries themselves were always 
aristocrats (until Grey in 1905) with a classical 
education: 
[... ] all exhibited an essential pragmatism, a 
habit of understatement, and a feigned 
nonchalance which made their correspondence a 
delight to read. [... ]. A cool, detached view of 
politics, a global perspective, a distaste for 
mere trade, for the nouveaux riches and for 
foreign governments which did not follow the 
gentlemanly code, all this occasionally gives 
the reader of diplomatic dispatches a sense that 
their authors were in but not of this world. 44 
When we come to consider the case studies in detail, it can 
be seen that it is precisely this which characterised 
English perceptions of the matters in question, and which 
the Dutch diplomats and politicians found so frustrating 
and, at times, difficult to comprehend. 
During the final decades of the nineteenth century, 
then, the Anglo-Dutch relationship was severely tested as 
imperialism prevailed in Europe. The debate as to the 
nature and causes of imperialism is a long-standing one 
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which centres on such questions as whether it was driven by 
the export of surplus capital, or whether it was truly 
Eurocentric (see Chapter 1, pp. 2-7). The imperial struggle 
forms the context of this study. The Borneo dispute was 
typical of the age; a territorial squabble inflamed by both 
countries' desire to keep out other European powers with 
imperial ambitions. The Nisero question added to Dutch 
troubles at a time when it was trying to consolidate its 
authority in Achin, and the KPM was created to prevent 
other foreign companies gaining a foothold in Indonesian 
inter-island shipping, and thus undermining Dutch authority 
there. 
As we have seen, one of the main issues in the debate 
on Dutch imperialism/colonialism has been whether the Dutch 
pattern of overseas expansion corresponds with that of 
other European powers. In addition, attempts have been made 
to establish whether Dutch expansion could be truly defined 
as `imperialism' in the sense in which this concept is 
understood with reference to the expansion of other 
European countries. As H. L. Wesseling, one of the prominent 
Dutch historians at the centre of this debate, pointed out 
in 1988, 
The absence of the Dutch in the international 
debate on imperialism is striking [... ]. Of 
course there are scores of studies on Dutch 
expansion and Dutch colonial policy but none of 
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the authors discusses this subject within the 
conceptual framework of imperialism. 45 
Since then, however, considerable contributions have been 
made to the historiography of Dutch imperialism/colonialism 
(see Bibliography). 
The surveys of Dutch foreign policy and the 
Anglo-Dutch relationship have described the background of 
tension and friendship which characterised the two 
countries' dealings with each other. Against this 
background of tension and friendship, rivalry and alliance, 
the three case studies which follow will illuminate still 
further the following problems: the relationship between 
the British and the Dutch; the Dutch perception of that 
relationship; the discrepancy between the former and the 
latter, and the consequences of that discrepancy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE BORNEO DISPUTE 
Introduction: The Dutch and English in Borneo 
Since the early sixteenth century, various European powers, 
chiefly the Netherlands, Britain, Spain and Portugal, had 
attempted to gain a foothold on the island of Borneo. The 
main attractions were the favourable location of the island 
and its fertility. In the histories of these nations until 
the nineteenth century, Borneo is recorded as a `land of 
treachery, violence and sudden death'. ' The British East 
India Company attempted to secure its own share of Borneo's 
trade from the early seventeenth century, and finally in 
1764 the Sultan of Sulu ceded north-eastern Borneo and part 
of Palawan island to the Company. 2 Dutch settlement on 
Borneo began in the early seventeenth century and from the 
beginning of the nineteenth century there was intensified 
rivalry between Britain and the Netherlands on Borneo. The 
English and Dutch settlements co-existed until 1803, when 
Britain took possession of the Dutch colonies in order to 
prevent their falling to Napoleon. In 1814, a convention 
was concluded providing for the return of these colonies to 
the Netherlands. This appeared straightforward enough, 
since it stated that all colonies in the Eastern Seas which 
were in Dutch hands on 1 January 1803 would be returned to 
them. Negotiations progressed slowly however, and the small 
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settlement of Banjermasin on Borneo proved to be an 
obstacle. In 1797 the Dutch had withdrawn from Banjermasin, 
which left the fort of Tatas as the only Dutch possession 
on Borneo. ' In 1809 Tatas was also abandoned as Marshall 
Daendels concentrated on defending Java. The Sultan of 
Banjermasin consequently requested British protection. 
Alexander Hare was commissioned to establish a British 
settlement and became President of Banjermasin after the 
Sultan of Banjermasin ceded the forts (previously Dutch) of 
Tatas and Tabanio, the Dyak provinces of South Borneo and 
their districts on the south and east coasts. The treaty to 
this effect was signed on 1 October 1812.4 When the time 
came for the return of the Dutch colonies under the 
convention of 1814, the Dutch position was unambiguous: 
Banjermasin should be returned with the other colonies; it 
had belonged to the Dutch in 1803 and was now in British 
hands. It should therefore be restored to the Dutch. For 
the British the situation was less straightforward. First, 
Alexander Hare had announced his intention of retaining his 
14,000 square miles of property, irrespective of whether 
Banjermasin was restored to the Dutch. Second, the British 
government was still bound to the terms of the 1812 treaty 
which stipulated that Britain would not hand over 
Banjermasin to any other European power. Third, the Sultan 
of Banjermasin, having sought European protection for many 
years, now announced that he wished to rule his own country 
again. 5 This independent stance faded, however, and the 
Sultan later made generous concessions to the Dutch 
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Commissioners-General. The problem was finally solved and 
in 1817 Dutch sovereignty was proclaimed over Banjermasin. 
Anglo-Dutch commercial rivalry surfaced again after 
1814. Those traders who had enjoyed prosperity and 
established themselves while the colonies were in English 
hands - in particular the merchants of Penang - were 
decidedly unenthusiastic about the return of the 
monopolistic trading of the Dutch. The situation became 
heated in the 1840s when the Englishman James Brooke 
settled on north-western Borneo, in Sarawak, which was 
recognised as a separate state by the United States in 1850 
and by Britain in 1864. Brooke's involvement with Borneo 
began when he arrived there in 1839, ostensibly to explore 
and to carry out scientific research. His arrival coincided 
with the Sarawak civil war, in which the district was 
rising against the Sultan of Brunei. Brooke helped to 
suppress the rebellion and was offered the governorship of 
Sarawak by the Sultan of Brunei's uncle, Muda Hashim. 6 
Dutch concern mounted as it became obvious that Brooke's 
aim was to establish permanent British influence in 
north-west Borneo. In November 1841 the Governor-General of 
the Netherlands Indies advised the Dutch Minister of 
Colonies Baud that he intended to establish a Dutch 
Government post in the Sultanate of Brunei. Baud, however, 
reasoned that the Netherlands Indies government possessed 
no sovereign rights in Brunei, and therefore had no right 
to exclude other powers from there. Also, Dutch settlements 
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on the south and west coasts were unimpressive and as such 
unlikely to tempt competition on Borneo from other powers. ' 
The Dutch were nevertheless forced to examine their 
position on Borneo and in 1842 Baud ordered an archival 
investigation into the Netherlands' rights in the Far East. 
Baud's subsequent policy opposing British expansion on 
Borneo took the form of formal diplomatic protests between 
1845 and 1848. In 1848, however, the policy was abandoned. 
In the revolutionary atmosphere of that year the Dutch 
government considered it wiser to preserve good relations 
with England; disputes over colonial issues were therefore 
avoided. ' 
This gives some indication of the Dutch perception of their 
relationship with the British, namely that of a second-rank 
power obliged to tread carefully in order to avoid 
disrupting their relationship with a neighbouring 
first-rank power on which they depended for some degree of 
protection from the pretensions of other first-rank powers. 
The debate re-surfaces: the Dent and Von Overbeck 
concessions. 
When Anglo-Dutch rivalry on Borneo reached another 
high-point in the 1870s, the European context was no longer 
one of revolution, but one of imperialism. Since Rajah 
Brooke had settled on Borneo, Europe was industrialising 
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rapidly and Britain's lead was narrowing. The late 
nineteenth century became synonymous with imperialism as 
the major European powers engaged in a scramble for 
territory. Characteristic of this was the partition of 
Africa and Britain's conquest of India. 
Traditionally, this surge of colonial expansion has 
been attributed to the search for new markets and sources 
of raw materials for Europe's industries, although in 
recent decades the importance of non-Eurocentric, non- 
economic factors has been increasingly recognised by 
historians (see the discussion on imperialism in the 
Introduction). With regard to the debate among Dutch 
historians on the nature of Dutch overseas expansion, 
Kuitenbrouwer, author of the most recent comprehensive work 
on the Netherlands and modern imperialism, recognises that 
the explanations for modern imperialism which came to be 
accepted after 1900 were based on three main forces, 
namely: external and internal political forces (resulting 
from the dynamics of international relations, nationalism 
and social imperialism), and economic forces (i. e. 
commercial, industrial or financial) . Kuitenbrouwer also 
points to the shift in imperialist historiography towards 
more `local' explanations for imperialism, this shift 
following in the wake of post-war decolonisation and the 
resulting greater interest in third-world countries. He 
acknowledges the fact that an increasing number of 
historians have based their research on the Robinson 
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paradigm that imperialism was a product of interaction 
between European and non-European politics. This paradigm 
recognises the concept of the `turbulent frontier', or the 
local power vacuum, as a cause of imperialism. ' 
Late nineteenth-century Dutch imperialism, then, cannot be 
explained solely in economic terms either. As we shall see, 
the preservation of the Netherlands' reputation as a 
colonial/imperial power was equally important. In the 
Borneo dispute the Dutch were concerned less with extending 
their own authority on Borneo than with protecting their 
existing colonial possessions from other European powers, 
in this case Britain. The ensuing debate among Dutch 
politicians and diplomats as to whether the Dutch actually 
had any rights to the disputed territory goes to prove that 
this was more a matter of prestige than economics. As was 
pointed out in the debates in the Dutch Second Chamber, the 
territory on Borneo which the Dutch so vociferously claimed 
(when the British threat was perceived) was territory which 
they had not even fully exploited. The Borneo dispute has 
much in common with other debates which arose between 
Britain and other colonial powers during this age of 
imperialism in which the smaller powers saw their 
possessions threatened by their more powerful European 
rivals, one notable example being Portugal in Africa. The 
late nineteenth-century imperial desperation among the 
larger European powers made them increasingly impatient 
towards the protests of smaller powers whose possessions 
58 
were thereby threatened. British impatience with the 
protests of the Dutch is one characteristic of the Borneo 
dispute. 
The Dutch were understandably alarmed when they heard 
that Baron von Overbeck was to be granted concessions on 
Borneo. In January 1875 Von Overbeck purchased the 
concessions granted by the Sultan and Pangeran Temenggong 
of Brunei to Joseph Torrey, now the sole surviving member 
of the American Trading Company. 1° Von Overbeck was an 
Austrian subject and former Hong-Kong consul, and was 44 
years of age when he acquired the concessions. The 
concessions involved all the territory between Kimanis Bay 
on the north-west coast, and the Sebuku river on the east 
coast (see Map 1). " Having satisfied himself that the 
concessions were valid, Von Overbeck entered into 
partnership with Alfred Dent, whose father had previously 
employed Von Overbeck as a local manager in his Hong Kong 
opium firm. Dent would provide most of the financial 
backing for the exploitation of the concessions. " A final 
agreement was made with the Sultan of Brunei in 1877. But 
there were problems with the concessions. The Sultan of 
Brunei had ceded territories to which he had no rights. The 
Sultan of Sulu claimed the entire north-west coast and, 
furthermore, his was the only authority recognised by the 
local natives. This was apparently only a minor obstacle 
for Von Overbeck. He visited the Sultan of Sulu and 
succeeded in obtaining from him a second cession which 
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secured those he had originally purchased. On 22 January 
1878 the Sultan of Sulu ceded all the territory lying 
between the Pandasan and Sebuku rivers, and Von Overbeck 
became their `supreme and independent ruler'. 13 However, in 
1879 Von Overbeck withdrew from the enterprise when the 
Austrian government refused to support it. Alfred Dent and 
Company now owned over 30,000 square miles on Borneo, with 
850 miles of coastline. 14 
Although at this stage there was very probably no 
direct threat to the Dutch from these concessions, they 
nevertheless saw in Dent the spirit of James Brooke 
returning to haunt them, and this caused much alarm. The 
debate among Dutch politicians and diplomats centred on the 
following main issues which will be discussed in detail 
below: the issue of rights on Borneo according to the 
treaty of 1824 (did this treaty establish or deny British 
or Dutch rights on Borneo? Should the Dutch extend their 
authority over the independent territories in the North? ), 
and the issue of Britain's intentions on Borneo. Spain was 
also worried about British expansion on North Borneo, but 
Spanish protest was soon dispelled. The basis for Spain's 
claims to North Borneo was her defeat of Sulu in 1851 
resulting in a treaty of capitulation in which Sulu 
admitted vasality to Spain. Spain therefore claimed Sulu 
territories on North Borneo. The matter was finally settled 
in March 1885 with a treaty between England, Germany and 
Spain. England and Germany thereby recognised Spain's 
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sovereignty over Sulu, and Spain renounced all claim to 
North Borneo. 15 
The settlement of the Dent and Von Overbeck enterprise 
raised several issues among Dutch politicians and 
diplomats. The ensuing parliamentary and diplomatic debates 
were largely brought about by differing interpretations of 
the 1824 Treaty. Was the Von Overbeck enterprise purely 
commercial, or the foundation for a later British 
settlement? Also at stake were the pros and cons of Dutch 
expansion in the Archipelago, given the imperialist climate 
of the time. Finally, how should the Netherlands defend its 
rights, given its small-power status? It could be argued 
that these issues were symptomatic of the times; with the 
larger European powers competing more intensely for the 
world's remaining potential colonies, it was inevitable 
that smaller powers would be pushed aside. 
The Anglo-Dutch dispute over Borneo was a long one, 
and was not resolved until 1891, when the border between 
British and Dutch territory was established, the disputed 
area having been made a British protectorate in 1888. 
During the course of the Borneo question there were nine 
changes of government in the Netherlands and six in 
Britain. In the Netherlands the Borneo question was dealt 
with by ten different Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
eleven different Ministers of Colonies. In Britain the 
dispute was presided over by six different Foreign 
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Secretaries and seven different Colonial Secretaries. 
The increased colonial ambitions of the European 
powers from the 1870s onwards forced the Netherlands to 
look carefully at its own possessions in the `threatened' 
territories. Borneo was a prime example. Would it be better 
to have England as a neighbour than another, potentially 
less friendly power, or should the Netherlands struggle to 
keep the remainder of Borneo independent? It was clear at 
any rate that the Netherlands - small power or not - could 
not simply sit back and do nothing while its European 
neighbours fought over the remaining colonial spoils to be 
had in India, Africa and the Far East. The situation was, 
however, complicated by the Netherlands' relationship with 
Britain. This was very probably the reason for the 
conservative Minister of Colonies' (Baron W. van Goltstein 
van Oldenaller) reluctance, in the initial stages of the 
dispute, to publish documents or to commit the government 
to firm action. This suggests that, even at this relatively 
early stage of the Borneo debate, the Dutch government was 
cautious of Great Britain and reluctant to fully express 
its disapproval. J. J. Cremers (Member of the First Chamber 
from 1850 until 1882) clearly supported this course of 
action and on 12 November 1879 in the First Chamber he 
justified Van Goltstein's reluctance thus: 
In exchanges of views between governments, 
expressions are sometimes used which are 
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mutually forgiven but which, when made public, 
can lead to mistaken conclusions. If the 
government has expressed itself very strongly, 
it is often in danger of harming the other party 
by publicising this. If its statements are weak, 
it will be attacked for this at home. Why would 
we provoke such a situation? 16 
The Dutch government had until now, Cremers pointed out, 
enjoyed the confidence of the King and Parliament, and 
could be relied upon to act wisely in the matter. 
At the very least, then, the Netherlands' relationship 
with Britain caused the government to pause for reflection 
while deciding how - and more importantly whether - to 
prevent the settlement of Dent and Von Overbeck on Borneo. 
The extent to which relations with Britain influenced these 
reflections will be made more clear by examining political 
and diplomatic exchanges, and the reactions of the press in 
both countries. 
The following section will discuss developments in the 
Borneo question from the point of view of Anglo-Dutch 
relations, from its re-emergence in the late 1870s to the 
year 1888, when the disputed territory was made a British 
Protectorate. The final section of the chapter will deal 
with the period 1888 to 1891/2, that is from the 
declaration of the British Protectorate to the Anglo-Dutch 
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border settlement in North Borneo. 
The Borneo question and Anglo-Dutch relations, 1878-1888 
On 30 March 1878 the Dutch Department of Foreign 
Affairs received a letter from the Consul-General of 
Singapore, who reported that the Sultans of Sulu and Brunei 
had ceded a considerable part of Borneo to an English 
Company under Von Overbeck. 17 On 11 September 1878 the Dutch 
envoy in London, Count Charles M. E. G. Count van Bylandt, 
wrote to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Van 
Heeckeren van Kell (a Liberal serving in the cabinet of J. 
Kappeyne van de Coppello, which had come to power on 3 
November 1877), reporting a meeting with Lord Salisbury, 
the British Foreign Secretary. 18 During the conversation 
with Salisbury, Van Bylandt reminded him of the tendency of 
certain British subjects (citing, of course, the example of 
James Brooke) to raise the British flag when they settled 
in distant and uncivilised regions. The national flag 
represented sovereignty and could not be used by private 
persons or enterprises without causing difficulty, which 
both governments wished to avoid. Van Bylandt also reminded 
Salisbury of the 1824 Treaty and expressed the wish that 
Salisbury inform the Dutch government before taking a 
decision on the Dent and Von Overbeck concessions. Lord 
Salisbury, reported Van Bylandt, had listened very 
attentively and declared himself not unwilling to comply 
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with Van Bylandt's request to inform the Dutch government 
in advance of the conditions of the concessions. However, 
the time was not yet ripe to make a decision. 
The 1824 Treaty referred to by the Dutch should have 
brought an end to Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the Indonesian 
archipelago, since it established - apparently beyond 
dispute - the dividing line between Dutch and British 
spheres of influence. When the 1824 Treaty was concluded, 
both parties were apparently in agreement as to its purpose 
and interpretation. Later in the century, however, this 
situation had changed. British and certain Dutch 
interpretations of the treaty differed. Indeed, the Dutch 
themselves could not agree upon its interpretation. The 
first question which arose when the Borneo dispute 
re-emerged in the 1870s was whether the whole or only part 
of Borneo belonged to the Dutch. Opinions were divided. 
Addressing the Second Chamber in October 1879, the Liberal 
Member for Zutphen, L. E. Lenting, claimed that the whole of 
Borneo belonged to the Netherlands, reminding the Chamber 
that Borneo was not mentioned in the 1824 Treaty because it 
had not been a disputed area at that time. Lenting reasoned 
that the Netherlands would not be in contravention of the 
Treaty if it were to extend its authority over the small 
independent kingdoms of the North and it could therefore be 
assumed that the whole of Borneo belonged to the 
Netherlands. 19 
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The Dutch government then proceeded to issue 
persistent and unambiguous reminders that Britain would be 
contravening the 1824 Treaty if concessions were granted to 
Von Overbeck. Yet, in spite of this, envoy Van Bylandt had 
to tread carefully; his instructions in the early stages of 
the Borneo dispute were simply to try to make Britain 
reflect before lending her support to the Von Overbeck 
enterprise. This was another indication that the Dutch 
government was reluctant to express its full disapproval 
for fear of angering the British government. On 24 
September 1879, the liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Van Heeckeren van Kell, wrote to Van Tets (Charge 
d'Affaires in London), making his government's position 
clear: 
Our attitude in this towards England must above 
all serve to prevent the government of that 
country - as far as is possible - from 
supporting the new company, and in particular 
from negotiations through which the new 
enterprise, at the Sultan of Brunei's loss of 
independence, would politically become British. 20 
His Majesty's delegation should repeatedly remind the 
British government of the purpose of the 1824 Treaty and of 
the possibility that the Netherlands' rights were not being 
considered in the granting of the concession. The British 
government, on the other hand, denied from the beginning 
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that Von Overbeck's was a British settlement. Sir Julian 
Pauncefote, (permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs in London) had reassured Van Bylandt that there was 
no question of a British settlement either then or in the 
future. " 
It became increasingly obvious that the British view 
of the 1824 Treaty differed from the Dutch view. In a 
report on the settlement of James Brooke and the Treaty of 
1824, Jhr. Mr. R. A. Klerck pinpointed this difference in 
interpretation. The Dutch, he pointed out, emphasised the 
spirit of the treaty while the English emphasised its 
letter, and consequently: 
All our explanations are thus reasonings by 
analogy, which must always be sought outside the 
written contract, while the English simply 
answer: It is written. 22 
Lord Salisbury himself wished to leave the treaty out 
of the discussions on the Von Overbeck concession. He 
thought it better not to become involved in a discussion of 
principles and to avoid reference to the said treaty. " 
Not only the Dutch were anxious to know what was 
happening about the Von Overbeck concessions. Members of 
the British House of Commons were also curious. On 8 April 
1878 Sir Charles Dilke (Member for Chelsea and a radical 
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liberal) asked the Secretary of State for Colonies (Sir 
Michael Hicks Beach) whether reports in the London and 
China Telegraph of 1 April 1878 on the subject were true. 
The reports had stated, first, that an English company had 
obtained cessions from the Sultans of Borneo and Sulu; 
second, that the Sulu cession was witnessed by the Governor 
of Labuan and the Consul General for Borneo and, third, 
that a Vice-Consul in her Majesty's Service had been 
appointed Resident in the ceded district. Hicks Beach 
answered that these reports were true, but that Her 
Majesty's Government had not yet decided `whether the 
proceedings are such as can be properly sanctioned. '24 
The following month Mr Ernest Noel (Member for 
Dumfries) asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir 
Stafford Northcote) whether the government had now reached 
a decision, and was informed that this had been deferred 
until the promoters of the scheme had arrived in the 
country in the summer. 25 In December 1878 - well after the 
summer - yet another request was made for information, 
again by Sir Charles Dilke. The Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs (Robert Bourke) replied that a 
statement of the Company's views had been submitted to the 
Foreign Office only a few days before, and that the 
government had therefore not yet had enough time to reach 
a decision. 26 This was not merely an excuse: in March 1882 
the Attorney General (Sir Henry James) confirmed that the 
submission had been late. 27 
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Another explanation must then be found for the British 
government's apparent reluctance to reach a decision on the 
matter. The most plausible explanation can be found in the 
political circumstances of the time. A change of government 
was imminent and it has been suggested that Lord Salisbury, 
Foreign Secretary in the out-going Conservative government, 
thought it better to leave a decision to his successor. 28 
However, Alfred Dent, a businessman with many dealings in 
South-East Asia (including the opium firm in China) wanted 
Salisbury to make the decision. Speaking in the House of 
Commons in March 1882, Mr L. L. Dillwyn (Member for Swansea) 
informed Members that: 
[... ] just before the late government went out 
of Office, Mr Dent, who not unnaturally thought 
he had a better chance of getting concessions 
from the Conservatives than from the Liberals, 
was particularly anxious to get the Charter 
sanctioned by the Government. 29 
As it transpired, Dent did succeed in having the 
Charter granted - in November 1881 under Gladstone's 
Liberal government. Salisbury had indeed left the decision 
to his successor. Kuitenbrouwer has pointed out that, in 
certain circumstances, Gladstone's government was given to 
continuing the expansive policy of his predecessor 
Disraeli; the British North Borneo Company's Charter 
appears to be one example of this. 30 
69 
In June 1879 Mr W. E. Forster (Member for Bradford and 
one of the leading representatives of the advanced liberal 
party) asked the Under-Secretary of State for Colonies 
Bourke whether the government had incurred any 
responsibility in the Borneo case. According to Bourke, 
this was another question altogether. He could not answer, 
without notice, a question referring to the Foreign 
Secretary's opinion on whether the negotiations should be 
made public. " When he repeated his question a few days 
later, Forster was informed that the government would not 
assume any responsibility other than that `which devolves 
on Her Majesty's Government of affording protection to 
British subjects in all parts of the world [... ]'. Her 
Majesty's government, however, had not yet approved the 
cession. 32 
Diplomatic exchanges continued, with the English 
maintaining their stance and the Dutch continuing to remind 
them of the terms of the 1824 Treaty, asking that the 
Netherlands' rights on Borneo be taken into consideration. 
By 1881 no great progress had been made and the Dutch 
showed signs of impatience; Van Bylandt sent a strongly 
worded memorandum to Foreign Secretary Granville, who found 
the memorandum too severe and requested that Van Bylandt 
ask his government's permission to withdraw it. 33 Three 
factors had caused the Dutch government to lose its 
patience. First: in all the years that the Borneo question 
had been in the air, no written communication had ever been 
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received from the British government on the subject, 
despite repeated requests. Second: various dispatches from 
the Dutch government to the British government had remained 
unanswered. Third: the Dutch government had recently had 
occasion to peruse confidential papers belonging to Alfred 
Dent, and as a result became even more suspicious of 
Britain's intentions. C. T. van Lynden van Sandenburg (Prime 
Minister until 1883, and also Minister of Foreign Affairs 
until 1881) and his cabinet had to act quickly, before it 
was too late. This had prompted Van Bylandt's strongly 
worded memorandum, which had offended Granville, but which 
the British government could hardly refuse to answer. The 
conversation with Granville, however, persuaded Van Bylandt 
that he had acted in haste. Granville repeated his promise: 
he would inform the Dutch government of the draft charter 
for Dent & Co., before it was settled. Granville felt that 
his promise had not deserved such a heated response. 
Van Bylandt was prepared to withdraw the memorandum, 
but on the condition that he replace it with another 
memorandum of the same date, to be submitted in place of 
the original. In this second memorandum, Van Bylandt would 
state that the incidental perusal of the Dent papers gave 
rise to the fear that the conditions of the charter 
requested by Dent & Co. contradicted the reassurances given 
to Van Bylandt by the British government, who claimed that 
the Dent and Von Overbeck enterprise was purely commercial. 
Further, that Van Bylandt had been instructed to draw 
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attention to this before it was too late, but that the 
Dutch government still hoped that its fears were unfounded. 
Van Bylandt wrote to Van Lynden that he believed 
Granville's request for the withdrawal of the offending 
memorandum was made to avoid future embarrassment. Sooner 
or later the Borneo documents would have to be published 
for Parliament. If the question had been solved 
satisfactorily, it would not be desirable for the British 
government to publicise the fact that it had received such 
a strong memorandum. If this was the case, there was 
something to be said for withdrawing it, thereby sparing 
the British government this embarrassment. " This belief 
echoed the sentiments expressed by Cremers in the First 
Chamber in 1879, when he spoke of the dangers of publishing 
exchanges of views between governments. 
Granville's request for the withdrawal of the 
memorandum, and Van Bylandt's apparently unreserved 
willingness to comply with that request (albeit on the 
condition that a replacement be submitted), provide another 
clue to the nature of the Anglo-Dutch diplomatic 
relationship. Van Bylandt himself, it seems, was easily 
persuaded by Granville that he was in the wrong. In a 
letter to Van Lynden he even admitted the possibility that 
the memorandum had been presumptuous, saying that `we are 
crying out before we have received a blow. '35 This was not 
to be the first time that Van Bylandt reviewed his 
position, and suggests that he was either easily persuaded 
72 
or uncertain. Clearly, then, the British government 
retained the upper hand in the relationship. The Dutch 
government, having finally managed to protest in no 
uncertain terms against the British government's behaviour, 
quite soon found itself obliged to qualify its words - 
apparently for the sole purpose of sparing the British 
government future embarrassment. 
Van Lynden did not agree with Van Bylandt's proposals 
for the substitute memorandum, since he could find no 
mention of the Dutch objections to the charter. '6 Van 
Bylandt's wording did not make this clear enough. Van 
Lynden was also thinking ahead; if the memorandum was 
unclear, it would lose much of its significance and later, 
when the documents were published, it could be remarked - 
and rightly so - that it was difficult to deal with 
unspecified objections. The Dutch government would also be 
criticised for not having set out its objections more 
clearly. Despite his reservations, Van Lynden did not wish 
to prevent Van Bylandt from submitting his substitute 
memorandum. He did, however, request that Van Bylandt 
broadly keep to the content of the original, while its tone 
could be modified by altering the phrasing. Van Lynden 
enclosed a draft which met these requirements. Van Bylandt 
submitted the new memorandum to Granville, who then 
reminded him again of the promise regarding the draft 
charter, adding that he had made the promise on the 
condition that this was done as an act of courtesy. The 
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promise was proof of the friendly relations between the two 
countries, but was in no way a recognition of the Dutch 
government's right to request this. 37 From this statement 
it is apparent that the Dutch and British differed yet 
again, this time in their interpretation of the Anglo-Dutch 
relationship. The British were prepared to inform the Dutch 
of the draft charter by way of courtesy. The Dutch, on the 
other hand, felt that this was their right. It could be 
argued that the Dutch overestimated their influence within 
the Anglo-Dutch relationship, and therefore demanded more 
than they were entitled to, from the British point of view. 
Furthermore, the case of the withdrawn memorandum shows who 
called the tune in the Anglo-Dutch relationship. 
In November 1881, events took a turn for the worse, 
causing the Dutch government to feel even more 
disillusioned towards Granville. On 10 November Van Bylandt 
informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs W. F. Rochussen 
(who had succeeded Van Lynden in September 1881) that the 
text of the charter granted to the British North Borneo 
Company had appeared in the London Gazette the previous 
evening. 38 The English government had presented the Dutch 
government with a fait accompli. It had published the text 
of the charter without answering in writing the Dutch 
objections to that charter - as Granville had promised on 
more than one occasion. On 8 August 1881 the British 
government had sent a draft of the Charter to the Dutch 
government, asking it to submit any objections to this 
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within three days. As Sir John Eldon Gorst (Member for 
Chatham) pointed out in the House of Commons, `that was 
rather hurrying the Netherlands government, considering 
that the Charter had been under the consideration of the 
Government for many years. ' Nevertheless the Dutch were 
able to return - within the stated time - `a most admirable 
despatch, which pointed out, beyond all controversy, the 
political character of the undertaking. ' This prompted the 
comment by Gorst that in the Netherlands they were able to 
act `with more despatch'. 39 
The British government failed to answer this despatch, 
although it had ample time to do so - from 11 August to 
9/10 November. This had indeed caused some consternation in 
the Netherlands, since the despatch was not answered until 
after the publication of the Charter. `That was', Gorst 
sarcastically pointed out, `a very courteous mode of 
treating a Foreign Government. , 40 Why had the British 
government failed to answer this despatch? A possible 
explanation is that it had deliberately given the 
Netherlands government a deadline of only a few days, 
perhaps expecting that it would not be able to present its 
objections in such a short time. Having been taken somewhat 
by surprise when this was in fact possible, the British 
government may have deliberately postponed an answer until 
after the publication of the Charter, if indeed it intended 
to answer at all. According to Van Bylandt, the English 
government intended to simply leave the objections 
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unanswered, `since it would not be easy to provide - 
officially and in writing -a sound refutation of those 
objections., " 
Van Bylandt deeply regretted the fact that his 
proposal for arbitration (made in October 1879) on the 
meaning and tenor of the 1824 Treaty had not been taken up. 
The British government, he believed, could not have 
rejected this proposal, having itself set the example in 
the Alabama question and the Delagoa Bay question with 
Portugal. Whatever the outcome of arbitration, the British 
government could not have gone further than it had now and 
the Netherlands would have had the chance to win over 
public opinion. Yet Van Bylandt recognised that the 
question remained whether a complete success for the 
Netherlands in the Borneo question would not have been 
damaging for relations with Great Britain, `with whom we 
have to deal in so many other sensitive colonial issues., " 
Thus, although feelings about the Borneo question ran high 
in the Netherlands, and the Dutch government persevered in 
making its protests heard, it nevertheless had to tread 
carefully in relations with Britain. 
For Van Bylandt the Borneo question was Britain's 
reprisal for the diplomatic and political success achieved 
by the Dutch in 1871 with the Sumatra treaty and the 
cession of the coast of Guinea to England. 43 The possibility 
of a connection between these two issues was also raised in 
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the Dutch press, and in particular by the Arnhemse Courant 
which emphasised the flexible attitude of the Dutch 
government: 
When the `spirit of a treaty' remains outside 
the "letter of a treaty', subsequent protests 
achieve little, particularly since it appears 
that our authorised agents have been so 
ultra-polite as to reciprocate England's 
compliance regarding Sumatra with the 
Netherlands' compliance regarding Borneo. " 
This was, of course, also a reference to the fact that the 
Dutch interpretation of the 1824 Treaty differed from the 
British one. 
In the despatch of 22 November 1881, Van Bylandt also 
reported his most recent conversation with Granville, in 
which he referred to the Dutch objections to the Von 
Overbeck charter. He asked Granville whether he would be 
willing to provide a written response to the many written 
communications on the subject from the Dutch government, 
none of which had been answered. Granville appeared 
embarrassed and somewhat surprised that this was the case. "' 
Two days later, on 24 November 1881, Van Bylandt reported 
to Minister of Foreign Affairs Rochussen that he had now 
received the awaited reply from Granville - dated 21 
November (i. e. the day before the above conversation had 
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taken place) . 
46 The reply was not favourable. Granville 
informed Rochussen that his objections `were duly 
considered by H. M's government who, however, have found 
themselves unable to concur with the Netherlands government 
in their appreciation of the meaning and objects of the 
charter, or in any of the apprehensions which they express 
on the subject. j4' Such an answer was hardly surprising. 
Given that the British government had just granted the 
Charter, it could hardly now be seen to concur with Dutch 
objections to it. Rochussen's government would admit, 
continued Granville, that the Netherlands had - as far as 
international rights were concerned - no ground whatever 
for opposing the absolute annexation of North Borneo by 
Great Britain. 
For Van Bylandt these words were proof that the 
dispute over the 1824 Treaty should have been subject to 
arbitration. This was the heart of the matter; if the Dutch 
government was not prepared to stand by its interpretation 
of the 1824 Treaty, then it was pointless to oppose from 
the beginning the charter which would sooner or later lead 
to British sovereignty on North Borneo. Furthermore, 
Granville's ready vindication of Britain's right of 
annexation was a bad omen. 48 But it was too late. The 
British government had granted the charter to the British 
North Borneo Company before the matter of the 1824 treaty 
had been resolved. Furthermore, both sides failed to 
appreciate the other's point of view. Granville, in his 
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reply, stated that: 
H. M. 's government, therefore, are at a loss to 
understand the opposition of the Netherlands 
government to confirmation by charter, under 
proper guarantees, of this private undertaking 
[... ] and which promises to open up an important 
field to commercial enterprise to the manifest 
advantage of the native populations and 
certainly not to the detriment of the 
neighbouring territories under Dutch rule. 49 
Granville assured Rochussen that the decision had been 
delayed as long as possible in order that the Dutch 
government could put forward its objections. This assurance 
is not entirely convincing. If the British government had 
indeed waited for the Dutch government's protests, why had 
it failed to answer those contained in the letter of 11 
August 1881 - which had reached London by the stipulated 
deadline? Very probably because, as was suggested above, it 
could not answer those objections without admitting that 
they were to some extent justified. The decision to grant 
the concession could not be postponed any longer, given the 
important private interests involved and the length of time 
already devoted to consideration of the charter. 
Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, Dutch rights on Borneo 
were being debated. Not everyone believed that the 
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Netherlands had a valid claim to the disputed territory. 
The debate raged in parliament and in the press. In a 
series of six articles published between 5 and 17 January 
1882, the liberal-conservative Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant 
(NRC) examined the various aspects of the Borneo dispute 
and claimed to have shown that the Netherlands could not 
justly resist British settlement in an area of Borneo which 
was not under Dutch sovereignty. However, there was a 
positive side to this: it also meant that the Netherlands 
was not prevented from expanding its authority on Borneo: 
The 1824 Treaty, in not excluding Britain from 
Borneo, equally does not prevent the Netherlands 
from extending its authority on Borneo. 50 
The Arnhemse Courant, a more liberal newspaper than 
the NRC, had even greater reservations about Dutch claims 
to the disputed area of North Borneo. The Netherlands, it 
claimed, could do nothing to prevent Britain's settlement 
on Borneo: 
It is true that we, strictly speaking, literally 
have no right on North Borneo. In 1824 we were 
far too modest, and have been far too modest to 
now be able to exert any rights at all in North 
Borneo. " 
The Java-Bode also believed that the Netherlands' 
80 
claims to the disputed territory were doubtful, and could 
at most be based on political and geographical factors 
(presumably meaning that there were already Dutch 
settlements on Borneo). However, these claims were stronger 
than those of Great Britain, which had no legal claims to 
the area whatsoever. "Z In parliament too, it was the 
liberals who argued that the Dutch had no claim to the part 
of North Borneo which was not under their sovereignty and 
was now being claimed by a British enterprise. 
Des Amorie van der Hoeven, Member for Breda and a 
prominent member of the clerical party, found Lenting's 
interpretation of the 1824 Treaty dangerous. 53 The terms of 
the 1824 Treaty did not explicitly forbid further 
expansion. Yet it could not be concluded from this that the 
Dutch were now the rulers of all Borneo. Furthermore, a 
colleague (whom he did not name) had shown him a map of 
Dutch possessions in the Indies. Areas under Dutch 
sovereignty were coloured green on the map and when asked 
by his colleague to indicate the location of the Dent and 
Von Overbeck settlement, Van der Hoeven pointed to the 
northern region, coloured white. `Well', pronounced his 
colleague: `if it is not located in the green area, what in 
the world does it have to do with us? ' . 
54 Van der Hoeven 
shared this straightforward approach to the situation. 
In the series of articles in January 1882, the 
liberal-conservative NRC also pointed out the illogical 
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nature of this argument: 
Borneo was not mentioned in the [1824] 
negotiations. Borneo is not mentioned in the 
Treaty. Borneo was not to be mentioned before 
the English Parliament. In the Dutch Chambers, 
Borneo had to be tacitly passed over, and still 
they want us to believe that the Treaty settles 
the legal situation on Borneo! 55 
The conservative Minister of Colonies, Van Goltstein 
(serving in Anti-Revolutionary Van Lynden van Sandenburg's 
cabinet which had come to power in August 1879) was also 
unconvinced of Dutch rights on Borneo. He found Borsius's 
proof of those rights weak: they were based on the fact 
that the Dutch had settled `here and there', the fact that 
Banjermasin - as distinct from Borneo - was returned by 
England, and the fact that the 1824 Treaty delineated Dutch 
and English spheres of influence. All this was not, 
according to the Minister, proof of Dutch sovereign 
authority in these regions. This was so well understood, 
continued Van Goltstein, that Dutch authority everywhere 
rested on contracts, treaties and agreements with the 
ruling powers of the islands and if it appeared that such 
a contract had been overlooked, the Indies government would 
rectify this . 
s6 
The Chamber was informed of all such contracts, each 
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of which contained an article recognizing the sovereignty 
of the Netherlands. For Van Goltstein, then, Dutch 
authority rested not on tradition or historical precedent 
but on legal recognition in a series of bilateral 
agreements. Successive governments, he claimed, had never 
interpreted the matter in the manner of Borsius and 
Lenting. The debate continued and it became obvious that 
interpretations of the 1824 Treaty differed not only 
between the Dutch and the British, but also among the Dutch 
themselves. In a memorandum of reply to the First Chamber, 
the Minister of Colonies Van Goltstein made clear the 
government's interpretation of the 1824 Treaty, stating in 
the first place that previous governments had never 
believed that Dutch authority in the Indies extended beyond 
those areas secured by occupation, conquest or contracts 
with native rulers. This was definitely not the basis of 
the 1824 Treaty. The present government shared the view of 
previous governments - that the treaty's point of departure 
was to avoid communal possession in the Indonesian 
archipelago. The Dutch government had therefore referred to 
the treaty to protest against the establishment of British 
authority in that area of Borneo not under Dutch authority. 
The treaty did not, however, give the Netherlands the same 
rights with respect to the other powers. In this case the 
`normal rules determining the limits of Powers' authority' 
were valid. 57 
Borsius nevertheless placed a different emphasis on 
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the treaty. It was intended, he claimed, to settle all 
existing difficulties. At the time the treaty was labelled 
a `partition' in the First Chamber, and that had indeed 
been so. The Netherlands had ceded to Britain Malakka and 
Singapore; Britain ceded its only possession on Sumatra and 
renounced all claim to Billiton and all islands lying to 
the South of Singapore. The cessions, exchanges and mutual 
recognition of sovereignty were, Borsius believed, proof 
that Borneo came under Dutch sovereignty. 58 
As to the British interpretation of the treaty, the 
Minister of Colonies reassured the Dutch Chambers that this 
had not been shown to differ from the Dutch interpretation. 
Not all members were convinced. Speaking in the Second 
Chamber L. W. C. Keuchenius, the Anti-Revolutionary Member 
for Gorinchem, asked why, if this were so, the British 
government had not yet - after one year - withdrawn its 
support and protection from the Dent and Von Overbeck 
enterprise. 59 This debate was complicated by a further 
issue, namely the nature of the Dent and Von Overbeck 
enterprise. Was the undertaking purely commercial or did it 
have political overtones? In October 1879 Minister of 
Colonies Van Goltstein had reassured the Second Chamber 
that the Von Overbeck enterprise was purely commercial. " 
It had not yet become evident that the British government 
had taken the business into its protection. The 1824 Treaty 
was therefore irrelevant in a case involving the 
establishment of a trading enterprise belonging to an 
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Austrian subject in a part of Borneo which did not belong 
to the Netherlands. The areas in which Von Overbeck had 
acquired the disputed concessions were in two areas of 
Borneo - Sulu and Brunei - which were independent of the 
Netherlands. 
The Dutch had never concluded treaties with the 
Sultans, who therefore did not recognise Dutch sovereignty. 
Speaking in the First Chamber in November 1879 Van 
Goltstein, replying to a speech by Borsius, challenged the 
latter's interpretation of the situation. Borsius spoke, he 
said, as if Von Overbeck would be ceding rights to the 
British government, but the fact of the matter was that the 
concessions would be made by the Sultan of Brunei to Von 
Overbeck. The question around which the whole debate 
centred was this: could the British permit such a cession 
under the terms of Article 10 of the 1847 Treaty? (In this 
treaty between Britain and the Sultan of Brunei, the latter 
undertook to admit no other settlements to his territory 
without the permission of the British government. The 
British government informed the Dutch of this treaty in 
1849. The Dutch did not react, and it was thus assumed that 
there were no objections it. This lack of reaction was now 
also criticised by those who wished to see Dutch rights 
more actively defended. ) Cremers also supported the 
government, declaring that there was no evidence that the 
British government intended to acquire crown territory on 
Borneo, and so long as that situation did not change, she 
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was not contravening the treaties. " 
Lenting and Borsius were less optimistic and trusting. 
Lenting claimed to have proof from the horse's mouth, as it 
were, of the political nature of Von Overbeck's enterprise. 
In the spring of 1877, there had been a meeting of English 
capitalists in London. The speeches and resolutions of the 
meeting had, according to Lenting, had distinctly political 
overtones. The chairman made a speech during which he 
explained that the British government was not taking 
governmental responsibility for the territory in question, 
but would recognise the settlement of British subjects 
there and ensure that their operations were not hindered. 
He went on to reveal that it was of the utmost political 
significance that England was in possession of North Borneo 
since the British merchant fleet operating between Hong 
Kong and Singapore would otherwise have no safe haven in 
times of war. Britain should be in possession of North 
Borneo before any other power gained a foothold. Lenting 
went on to inform the Second Chamber of the following 
resolution made at the meeting: 
That the location of North Borneo, in the middle 
of the China Seas, between the great trading 
centres Hong Kong and Singapore, with 
exceptionally good ports and coal mines, is so 
favourable, that the timely possession of that 
territory is of indubitable significance for the 
86 
interests of England as a great sea power. 62 
Still Van Goltstein remained unconvinced of Britain's 
`dishonourable' intentions. He dismissed Lenting's 
arguments, claiming that the words spoken during this 
meeting were no more proof of British intentions than were 
those spoken during a dinner held in honour of James 
Brooke, during which Brooke himself expressed the wish that 
his settlement Sarawak be taken over by the English 
government. 63 
Borsius, too, believed that Von Overbeck's settlement 
on Borneo was political. After the concessions had been 
granted, the British flag had been hoisted in the presence 
of the Governor of Laboean. The intention, as Borsius saw 
it, was to establish a British settlement, a post directly 
under British sovereignty. For Keuchenius the British 
government's involvement was also clear. 64 The government 
wished to co-operate in the measures taken by Von Overbeck 
to gain a foothold on Borneo. The British had, after all, 
sent the warship HMS Kestrel to North Borneo, ostensibly in 
search of pirates. HMS Kestrel destroyed a campong and then 
visited Von Overbeck's agent in Sandakang. A visit was then 
made to the Sultan of Sulu, who declared that he had no 
objections whatsoever to the Dent and Von Overbeck 
enterprise. 
According to Kuitenbrouwer, the Dutch placed 
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considerable trust in Gladstone, the confessional circles 
trusting him more than the Liberals. 65 In the case of Borneo 
this could have been because he was seen to be continuing 
in Disraeli's expansionist footsteps, which could explain 
the liberal Lenting's mistrust of Britain's intentions on 
Borneo. Lenting was not, however, one of the majority of 
Dutch liberals who, according to Irwin, `openly admitted 
that the Netherlands had forfeited all right to oppose 
British expansion in northern Borneo by accepting the 
British treaty with Brunei of 1847'. 66 As we have seen 
above, Lenting looked to the 1824 Treaty to confirm the 
Netherlands' rights on Borneo. It was not only the liberals 
who claimed that the Dutch had no rights on Borneo: the 
conservative Minister of Foreign Affairs, Van Goltstein, 
also believed this. However, Van Goltstein's trust in 
Britain appears somewhat naive and misplaced, in the face 
of the arguments presented by Lenting and Borsius. 
The British North Borneo Company finally received its 
Royal Charter on 1 November 1881. Four months later the 
Charter was debated at length in the House of Commons. The 
debate is interesting since it shows that there were also 
British politicians who believed, first, that the British 
government had deceived the Dutch government, and, second, 
that the British North Borneo Company was indeed political 
- as certain Dutch politicians had been claiming all along. 
Sir John Eldon Gorst (Member for Chatham) , stated that 
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the arguments which had convinced the Dutch government 
would be unlikely to convince Members of the House. He 
continued: 
I wish to point out to the House from this 
Charter several circumstances which seem to me 
to establish beyond all doubt that it is a 
Company of a political and not of a commercial 
character. 67 
The first proof of this, according to Gorst, was that 
the company must be, and always remain, British: `[... ] 
every member of the Court of Directors is to be a British 
subject; and every representative of the Company in Borneo 
[... ] are all to be British subjects. ' Second: the fact 
that the appointment of officers and representatives of the 
company was to be approved by Her Majesty, and that of the 
company's principal officer in Borneo by the Secretary of 
State. Third: the company would use a distinctively British 
flag - also to be approved by the Secretary of State, and 
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. As Gorst saw it, 
the company was a means whereby Britain could avoid 
competition from other nations on Borneo while evading 
direct responsibility. The company was nothing more than a 
front; `a mere puppet, to whom she gives her orders, and 
through whom she acts in the Eastern Seas. ' Gorst described 
the whole affair thus: 
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In point of fact, it is a sort of filibustering 
by proxy which the noble Lord the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs [Granville] thinks is 
so extremely cheap and safe. 68 
For Gorst, then, the Chartered Company was a form of 
colonialism on-the-cheap. This concept is recognised by 
historians of the nineteenth century. Swartz, for example, 
states that the Chartered Company was `one means by which 
the government tried, at minimal cost, to accommodate the 
expansive drive of capitalist enterprise. /69 
This was also remarked upon in the Dutch press. On 19 
November 1881 the NRC had observed that, since Gladstone's 
cabinet had made known its disapproval of unlawful 
annexation, it was obliged for the moment to resort to 
disguised annexation `ä la Serawak', through a powerful 
company. 7° The Java-Bode commented that the British 
government could, without taking any trouble, enjoy all the 
advantages of this company, and admitted that it had acted 
logically in grasping this opportunity. After all, it 
remarked candidly, any government would have done so under 
the circumstances - even the Dutch government, had it not 
been so sleepy. " This comment hints at sentiments which the 
Dutch government largely concealed. It is likely that the 
Dutch government's indignation towards Britain was fuelled 
- at least to some extent - by colonial jealousy, and 
regret at not having taken those steps itself. The Dutch 
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government's protests almost exclusively concerned 
Britain's perceived mistakes and rarely, if ever, did it 
turn the spotlight on itself and admit that it had missed 
a valuable opportunity - or even admit behind closed doors 
that it was logical for Britain to seize this opportunity 
on North Borneo. 
It would appear that there was some truth to Gorst's 
claims. Given the strong pressure of colonial competition 
from other European powers from the 1870s onwards, it is 
all the more likely that the British government would seek 
to maintain its influence overseas in ways which involved 
minimal cost and responsibility. 
Another member who disapproved of the British 
government's behaviour in the Borneo question was Mr Peter 
Rylands (Member for Burnley). Although he disagreed with 
the Dutch protests, he did not think that the British 
government had behaved correctly. According to Rylands, the 
papers relating to the Borneo question `represented the 
diplomatic conduct of Her Majesty's Government in a very 
unfavourable light. ' The Dutch government was deeply 
offended by its behaviour. Moreover, regardless of whether 
or not the Charter was just, Her Majesty's government must 
have known that `it would give the deepest umbrage to that 
government. ' Rylands refuted, as Gorst had done, the claim 
that the Company was purely commercial. Through the charter 
the Company had now acquired the right to levy taxes, 
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enforce the law and establish a monopoly over a territory 
almost the size of France. `Could this' asked Rylands, `be 
represented as a purely commercial arrangement? '72 It 
appeared that Great Britain had virtually annexed the 
territory. In the light of this criticism, Dutch protests 
seem increasingly justified. Indeed, the British government 
appears to have been protesting its innocence rather too 
vigorously. 
Neither was the Dutch press convinced that the Dent 
and Von Overbeck enterprise was purely commercial. The 
Arnhemse Courant remarked that, through the Charter, the 
British North Borneo Company had acquired a semi-official 
character, simultaneously fulfilling the roles of 
mercantile company and political agent of the British 
government. 73 The liberal-conservative NRC, reacting to the 
granting of the Charter in November 1881, asked why a Royal 
Charter was necessary for incorporation when, surely, a 
parliamentary charter would have sufficed. Now that a Royal 
Charter had been granted: 
With the Company's activities we will always 
have to remember, to consider John Bull, who is 
behind it and has its puppets totally in his 
power, making them dance to his tune. 74 
The Company would thus fulfil the role of `[... l 
agent; obedient servant of the English Government. ''' These 
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were the very same views which Gorst was to express in the 
British House of Commons a few months later. The nascent 
British North Borneo Company was viewed by the NRC as a new 
East India Company, indeed this was the title of three 
articles by its London correspondent, published on 18,19 
and 21 November 1881. The Java-Bode shared this view: 
Their enterprise is a trading company with 
sovereign rights, after the manner of the old 
English and Dutch East India Companies. 76 
It commented further that the Charter was in fact the 
continuation of an English plan, originating at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, to keep open the 
routes from England and Bengal to China, and to ensure 
bases along those routes. " 
Meanwhile, Dutch politicians had been debating the 
virtues of colonial expansion. In the Netherlands, as 
everywhere else, not everyone was convinced that more 
colonies were a universal panacea, and such debates were 
characteristic of the period. The anti-expansionists 
believed that additional acquisitions would prove too great 
a burden. Minister of Colonies Van Goltstein, addressing 
the First Chamber in November 1879, stressed that an 
expansion of Dutch authority should not be thought about 
lightly. It would bring extra responsibilities and 
obligations. The problems in Achin were, he claimed, 
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largely due to the international obligations placed on the 
Dutch to combat piracy in northern Sumatra. 7e Van der Hoeven 
also advocated a policy of `authorization and 
self-restraint' (`machtiging en zelfbeperking'). '9 He had 
not always held this view. One year previously he had 
addressed the Second Chamber thus: 
The concept that very extensive colonial power 
would make a country great belongs to the 
concepts of the past; in no country will the 
policy of expanding colonial territory as far as 
possible any longer be thought a wise policy. 
But once a country has the fortune - or 
misfortune - to be a colonial power, it is often 
confronted with the necessity of such 
expansion. "' 
Lenting regretted this change of sides by Van der 
Hoeven, who was now of the opinion that the extension of 
Dutch power in the Indies was not desirable. Van der Hoeven 
also claimed that Lenting's politics (with which he had 
broadly been in agreement in 1878) `would find much 
sympathy with Lord Beaconsfield. 18t 
Although he approved of the government's handling of 
the situation, Cremers believed that the Netherlands, as a 
neutral power, should extend its authority on Borneo. 87 
Lenting, surprisingly, also shared Van Goltstein's 
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anti-expansionist stance. He declared himself to be against 
colonial expansion in the Archipelago - the Netherlands 
already had enough on its colonial plate. He even welcomed 
foreign industry in Dutch possessions where Dutch 
entrepreneurs had, for one reason or another, not become 
established. But this was not the issue. Intervening 
against a foreign settlement did not necessarily mean 
bringing the disputed area under direct Dutch authority. 83 
Clearly, then, at this stage of the Borneo question, 
incomprehension and mistrust were the order of the day in 
the Anglo-Dutch relationship. It was evident from the 
beginning that the Dutch did not place much trust in the 
British as far as Borneo was concerned. In a further report 
on Borneo (this time on the settlement of Von Overbeck) 
dated 30 September 1879, R. A. Klerck declared that `even in 
Parliament the English government persists in its ambiguous 
attitude'. 84 In a later report on the history of James 
Brooke in Sarawak, Klerck spoke of the `traditional 
treacherous politics of the English government'. 85 In 
November 1879 Van Bylandt wrote to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Van Lynden, saying that he could not emphasise 
enough - as a result of his own practical experience - that 
the verbal negotiation of important issues with the British 
government `leads to nothing and cannot be trusted at 
all. '86 Van Lynden himself also distrusted the British 
government. In a despatch to Van Bylandt dated 10 March 
1881 he mentioned `the very unconfidential attitude of the 
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British government' (`zeer weinig vertrouwelijke houding 
van de Britsche regeering'), which encouraged the greatest 
caution (`groote omzichtigheid'). 87 
Mistrust of the British government was also evident in 
the Dutch press. In the first of six articles examining the 
Borneo question, the NRC asked whether the official truth 
propagated by the British government was actually the real 
truth. It sounded a note of warning to the Dutch 
government: 
If our Government is all too blindly soothed to 
sleep by the meaning of official statements, who 
knows how quickly the logic of the facts will 
rudely shake it awake. 8e 
The Java-Bode criticised the British government more 
heavily, comparing British politics to those of the 
Vatican, commenting that they were flexible enough to adapt 
to all changes in the political world, while always 
remaining essentially the same. 39 A few days later the Java- 
Bode criticised the British press which, it concluded, 
viewed the Dent and Von Overbeck concessions as a British 
annexation while ignoring the sovereign rights of other 
powers. British politicians and the press, it remarked, 
apparently acted according to the principle: `where we 
come, the rights of others cease., " 
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Granville's long-awaited reply of November 1881 did 
not still Dutch protest. At the beginning of January 1882 
he wrote to Van Bylandt acknowledging a despatch from the 
Dutch government, but regretting that the objections to the 
charter `have not been entirely removed by the 
correspondence which has passed on the subject. ' The Dutch 
government was persisting in the claim that the 
establishment of British dominion on Borneo would be a 
contravention of the 1824 Treaty. Granville continued to 
reassure Rochussen that Britain had no intention of 
acquiring North Borneo: 
H. M. 's government have already explained to the 
government of the Netherlands that the grant of 
the charter does not in any way imply the 
assumption of sovereign rights in North Borneo, 
it is therefore unnecessary to pursue the 
discussion further. 91 
These words convey the impression that Granville was 
tired of reassuring a Dutch government, which was either 
unable or unwilling to take him at his word. Granville 
concluded by expressing his regret that the two countries 
were still at variance on the matter of the 1824 Treaty. He 
assured Rochussen that the British government `been 
actuated by no unfriendly feeling towards your government, 
with which on the contrary, in regard to this and all other 
subjects, they desire and hope to maintain the most cordial 
97 
relations. '92 
In Britain, however, there was mistrust of the British 
government's integrity among Members, some of whom 
criticised the government's behaviour towards the Dutch 
government. During the debate in the House of Commons of 
March 1882, on the granting of the Charter (discussed 
above), Gorst had criticised the British government's 
behaviour towards the Dutch government. `As to the 
Government of the Netherlands' he pronounced, `Her 
Majesty's Government have not, I believe, infringed any of 
their positive rights; but they have cheated and they have 
affronted them. 193 He cited examples of this, the first of 
which was the British government's failure to answer the 
Dutch despatch of 8 August 1881. The second example was the 
British government's claim that it assumed no sovereign 
rights in Borneo. Gorst asked the House whether it would 
believe that no such thing was contemplated in the Charter 
and `that the statement made to the Netherlands government 
was the grossest -I might almost say the most impudent - 
inaccuracy? ' Although it had suited the Dutch government to 
accept such a statement, Gorst was in no doubt that it 
could see through it. 
In the Netherlands, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Rochussen was equally unconvinced by Granville's 
professions of friendship: `the extraordinarily friendly 
conclusion to the note of 7 January does not remove these 
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two reservations., 94 The first of Rochussen's reservations 
concerned Granville's remark about the 1824 Treaty, at 
which we have seen he had taken offence. Rochussen thought 
such a remark unfounded. His second reservation concerned 
the difference between past and current information from 
the British government regarding the cession of Laboean. 
The Dutch government had only now become aware that a 
district on mainland Borneo would thereby become a British 
possession. Rochussen instructed Van Bylandt to request 
information on this latter point and to convey his 
appreciation for the amicable spirit in which Granville's 
last communication was conceived. Granville, in turn, 
expressed the hope that the Borneo question could now be 
considered solved. 95 Van Bylandt was somewhat surprised by 
this, and also by the fact that Granville appeared to 
believe that there was no longer any difference of opinion 
on the 1824 Treaty. 96 
The British government seemed to attach less weight 
than the Dutch government to the whole Borneo question. For 
the Dutch government it was a central issue. The British 
were keen to get the whole matter out of the way, while the 
Dutch persisted in their demands for information and 
recognition of their rights. This situation could be 
interpreted in a number of ways. First, it is possible that 
the British government, realising that its position was not 
totally unassailable, wished to brush aside the Dutch 
government's objections with fine talk of friendship and 
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reassurances as to its intentions. Second, it is also 
possible that Granville and his government simply found the 
Dutch reaction exaggerated and were genuinely unable to 
understand their objections. The assurances given by the 
British government to the Dutch government regarding its 
intentions in Borneo appear sincere, and at first sight the 
Dutch government's reactions do indeed appear exaggerated. 
The initial tendency is to sympathise with the British 
government's attitude towards the persistent protests of 
the Dutch. However, the debate of 17 March 1882 in the 
British House of Commons (discussed above) provides 
evidence to the contrary and leads to the conclusion that 
the Dutch protests were - at least in part - justified. It 
cannot be denied that the British government published the 
Charter before it had answered the objections of the Dutch 
government contained in the despatch of 11 August 1881 . 
Furthermore, there is no obvious explanation for this 
discourtesy other than - as Van Bylandt pointed out - the 
British government's inability to counter those objections. 
The failure of the British government to answer this 
despatch could therefore be seen as a tacit admission of 
guilt, yet again implying that the Dutch protests, albeit 
persistent, were not totally unfounded or exaggerated. A 
third possible explanation is the sheer volume of work at 
the Foreign Office in London, which increased phenomenally 
during the last three decades of the nineteenth century. 
The Dictionary of National Biography records Granville's 
apparent inability to cope with the increase in the number 
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of despatches from 17,000 per year during his first period 
of office as Colonial Secretary (1868-1874), to 70,000 per 
year in his second period of office as Foreign Secretary 
(April 1880 to June 1885). 
As to the second of Rochussen's reservations, 
concerning the Laboean cession, Granville wrote on 17 
February 1882 that `there is no treaty in existence, which 
has not been communicated to the Netherlands government, 
under which territory on the mainland of Borneo is ceded to 
Great Britain'. 97 This had simply been a misunderstanding. 
At the end of that same month, Van Bylandt wrote to 
Rochussen with a possible explanation for Granville's 
extreme friendliness in the memorandum of 17 February. " 
Remarks had been made to Goschen (the British ambassador in 
Germany) during his stay in Berlin some weeks before, 
regarding the extensive rights granted in the Borneo 
charter, and the fact that this had not been the intention 
of the 1876/77 treaty between Germany and Great Britain on 
the one hand, and Spain on the other. This treaty had 
provided for the protection of trade and shipping in the 
Spanish possessions of the Sulu archipelago. The Dutch 
defended these criticisms, denying that the British had any 
intention of obtaining sovereignty on mainland Borneo. This 
episode could have its advantages. Van Bylandt thought it 
possible to find out - in confidence - whether the Borneo 
question had indeed been discussed in this context. He 
thought it possible that Germany would be willing to 
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support the Netherlands government in its interpretation of 
the 1824 Treaty. It appeared later, however, that the 
rumour regarding this criticism by Germany was unfounded. 99 
As the Borneo negotiations continued, the Dutch 
government appeared to become even more sensitive. This 
gave rise to more misunderstanding between the two 
countries. During the House of Lords debate in March 1882, 
Granville had referred to the commerce of Spain and the 
Netherlands as `far from being as liberal as our own'. This 
was immediately interpreted as a direct criticism of Dutch 
trade and colonial policy. Van Bylandt was instructed to 
express the hope that Granville would rectify this 
erroneous assertion in Parliament and `de dissiper ainsi 
l'effet fächeux dune erreur A laquelle 1'administration 
coloniale et la politique commerciale des Indes 
Neerlandaises n'ont pas donne lieu'. 100 
Again Granville was obliged to placate the Dutch 
government. He immediately reassured Van Bylandt that the 
words `were not meant to convey the impression which they 
appear to have produced'. Granville had merely intended to 
convey the fact that in Spain and the Netherlands, free 
trade was not yet fully established, as it had been in 
Britain for some years. And he would, of course, make this 
clear to the House of Lords should the Dutch government so 
wish. 101 
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This incidental episode - although not directly 
connected to the Borneo question - shows how sensitive the 
Dutch government had become, and how its sensitivity caused 
it to misinterpret as criticism the most straightforward 
statements concerning its policies. This was probably due 
- in part at least - to Dutch awareness of and sensitivity 
to the Netherlands' status as a second-rank power, an issue 
which arose in the various debates surrounding the Borneo 
issue. Borsius, for example, cited Messchert van 
Vollenhoven (Member of the Second Chamber until June 1877) 
who, during the debates on the 1872 treaties regarding 
Sumatra and the cession of the Guinea Coast, stressed the 
general principle that small nations, in dealing with 
larger powers, must compensate in energy and policy what 
they lacked in power and size. Borsius endorsed this, 
stating that `he who wishes to be respected must respect 
himself. , 102 This was especially true of a small colonial 
power such as the Netherlands. For some, the status of the 
Netherlands as a small power justified the belief that she 
should act forcefully, while others believed that she 
should tread carefully. Borsius believed in acting 
forcefully. Speaking in the First Chamber in November 1880, 
he declared that it was the business of a powerful 
government - even that of a small state - forcefully to 
make itself heard by larger and more powerful nations when 
it had the right to do so. If the Dutch government had 
already acted with respect to Borneo, it should actively 
continue down that path. If it had not yet acted, it was 
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time to do so before it was too late. Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Van Lynden was more reserved. He adhered to the 
principle that a second-rank power should not to go any 
further than the rights in question permitted, but should 
strongly defend those rights. "' 
F. F. de Casembroot (Conservative member for Delft) 
reminded the government that the whole world was aware that 
the Netherlands, being a small power, could not always act 
with force. However, he maintained, it would have been 
wiser to send a warship to expel the `adventurer' Von 
Overbeck while circumstances permitted. Furthermore, the 
navy was too small and its budget too low for a colonial 
power such as the Netherlands. The Governor-General in the 
Indies (concluded De Casembroot) was consequently 
hard-pressed to keep a wary eye on all that might happen in 
the Archipelago. 104 
The Dutch press were also aware of the limitations 
imposed on the Netherlands by its second-rank status. The 
Java-Bode warned that British influence on Borneo would 
weigh upon Dutch authority and government `[... ] with all 
that humiliating pressure and hindrance that a great 
neighbour can impose on a smaller power. j105 It would be 
worthwhile to see, the Java-Bode continued a few days 
later, how the British government would have behaved if the 
disputed territory on Borneo was adjoined, and had been 
claimed by a large power such as Russia or Germany, instead 
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of two smaller powers such as Spain and the Netherlands. 106 
Clearly, the Java-Bode was under no illusions about the 
nature of the Anglo-Dutch relationship and the subservience 
expected by Great Britain of a smaller power such as the 
Netherlands. 
By may 1882, the emphasis in the Borneo question had 
begun to shift from the interpretation of the 1824 Treaty 
to the precise location of the border between the territory 
of the Netherlands and that of the British North Borneo 
Company. The Charter of the British North Borneo Company 
was now a fait accompli about which the Dutch government 
could do nothing, and it appears that it had now abandoned 
the struggle to get the British government to share its 
interpretation of the 1824 Treaty, deciding to settle for 
the next best thing, namely a clear and unambiguous 
delineation of territory. In the words of the NRC: 
The Netherlands must have the unambiguous 
authority to be able to say to foreign 
intruders: this far but no further. "' 
But this was not as straightforward as it appeared. 
The problem was the northern boundary of Dutch territory, 
which was normally taken to be that of the Kingdom of 
Boeloengan, part of the once great kingdom of Berouw (see 
Map 2). Berouw had belonged to Banjermasin. 108 At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century the Dutch concluded 
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contracts with Banjermasin whereby Boeloengan came - in 
name at least - under Dutch authority. Another more 
northerly part of Berouw was occupied by the Sultan of 
Solok who, in 1763, had granted to the English an area in 
the North of Borneo, himself retaining the north-east 
coast. The border between Solok and Tidoeng (the most 
northerly part of Berouw) was unclear; was Tidoeng an 
independent territory situated between the possessions of 
the Sultan of Solok and the Dutch, or did Tidoeng belong to 
Boeloengan, and therefore to the Dutch? This situation was 
now complicated by the fact that the Sultan of Brunei also 
laid claim to the coastal area of Solok. His rights were 
dubious and when he ceded his territory to Von Overbeck the 
latter thought it prudent to seek the permission of the 
Sultan of Solok. Since the border between Solok and the 
Dutch territory was uncertain, the southern border of Dent 
and Von Overbeck's territory was also unsettled. 
Furthermore the British, it was claimed, were reluctant to 
indicate the southern boundary of their territory. The area 
was very fertile and this tempted the English to extend 
their boundary further to the south-west. 109 
There were consequently three different 
interpretations of the location of the Dutch northern 
boundary on the east coast of Borneo. Of these three, Batoe 
Tinagat was the most south-westerly and opinions were 
unanimous on the fact that this point at least belonged to 
the Netherlands. 
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The Indies Council (Raad van Indie) advised the Dutch 
government to bring this to the attention of the British 
government, adding that the watershed extending from Batoe 
Tinagat to the central mountains formed the border between 
Dutch possessions and those of Solok and Brunei. 10 The 
British took the frontier to be fixed at about 3°20 North 
latitude, as stated in the decree of 28 February 1846. But 
this was not the latitude of Batoe Tinagat. The Dutch 
claimed that the frontier now extended beyond 3°20 , since 
the incorporation of Boeloengan. The British government 
refuted this, on the grounds of the dates involved. 
Granville pointed out that the Dent and Von Overbeck 
concessions were dated 29 December 1877 and 22 January 
1878. The date of the incorporation of Boeloengan, as fixed 
in a `contrat de vassalite' was 2 June 1878 (communicated 
by the Dutch government on 17 January 1880). The 
concessions had therefore been granted before Boeloengan 
was incorporated, and the latter could not invalidate the 
former. Granville's conclusion was amiable but firm: 
You will permit me to say, therefore, monsieur 
le ministre, that a careful friendly examination 
of your arguments has convinced H. M. 's 
government that they fail to support a claim for 
the recognition of a frontier beyond 3°20. "' 
Dutch hopes now rested on a discrepancy. In October 
1882 Minister of Colonies De Brauw, an Anti-Revolutionary 
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who had succeeded the conservative Van Goltstein on 1 
September 1882, wrote to his colleague in Foreign Affairs, 
Rochussen, stating that he was unable to provide an answer 
to Foreign Secretary Granville's letter (quoted above). He 
was awaiting the answers to two questions, the first 
regarding official proof from its archive that the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs had informed the English government of 
the decree, and the second regarding the location of the 
Sibuku river on recent English naval charts. "' Herein lay 
the discrepancy: the location of the river on these charts 
was inaccurate, being placed further north than in reality. 
Since it could be assumed that Dent and Von Overbeck had 
referred to these charts, the difference of opinion with 
Britain was now solved. If Dent and Von Overbeck accepted 
that their territory was bounded by the Sibuku river, as 
located on the British charts, then Batoe Tinagat now 
definitely fell within Dutch territory since the Sibuku 
river was located too far to the north on the charts. 
De Brauw soon received a reply to his first question 
regarding proof of communication of the 1846 decree. On 5 
November 1882 Van Bylandt reported that, during a visit to 
Sir Julian Pauncefote (Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs), the latter had handed over documents 
which showed that it had been communicated not by the Dutch 
government, nor by the delegation, nor the Governor-General 
of the Indies, but by the British delegate at The Hague, 
Sir Edward Cromwell Disbrowe. 13 Van Bylandt was relieved: 
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`this clarifies the matter and makes it much simpler. ' 114 if 
the Dutch government now stood by its rights, the British 
government would concede. Van Bylandt echoed the hope that 
the British North Borneo Company would wish the border of 
its territory to be fixed at the more northerly point. If, 
however, it insisted that the border were the Sibuku to the 
South of Batoe Tinagat, he hoped that the Dutch government 
would not give in, but would be steadfast. Once it was 
realised in London that the Dutch were tired of conceding, 
and were resolved to defend their rights, the matter would 
not, believed Van Bylandt, be taken any further. Finally, 
he remarked, the British North Borneo Company was in heavy 
financial difficulty and that the whole matter was in 
danger of becoming a fiasco: `all the more reason not to 
concede. '5 This may have been true at the time but, as 
will be seen below, comparisons were made between economic 
development in Dutch and British Borneo which put the Dutch 
in the shade. It would appear from these claims that the 
financial problems of the British North Borneo Company, 
alluded to by Van Bylandt, were short-lived. 
The correspondence continued, with no further 
progress. In January 1883 the British envoy in The Hague, 
Stuart, wrote to Rochussen, informing him that in 
Granville's view further correspondence on the matter 
`would not be likely to lead to any satisfactory 
agreement'. 116 The matter could best be resolved, Granville 
thought, if both governments jointly appointed 
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commissioners to investigate the matter in loco. Granville 
proposed that these commissioners be naval officers. The 
Dutch commissioner should be appointed by the 
commander-in-chief in the China Seas. 
The Dutch were not pleased with this apparently 
reasonable proposal. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
Colonies (Rochussen and De Brauw) sent a memorandum to the 
Dutch king, relating the history of the Borneo question 
thus far and requesting His Majesty's permission to reject 
Granville's proposal (for a further joint investigation) . 
"' 
This they did on the grounds that Batoe Tinagat had for 
many years been recognised as the northern boundary of the 
Netherlands' possessions on the east coast of Borneo. This 
had been established in a contract with the ruler of 
Boeloengan. Furthermore, this point lay to the north of the 
river which was, according to the Ministers and according 
to the map accompanying the documents on the Borneo dispute 
presented to the Dutch parliament, known as the Sibuku. The 
difference of opinion with England had very probably arisen 
from the fact that in the concessions made by the Sultans 
of Solok and Brunei, a second Sibuku river was named `which 
is a totally different river from that which the Dutch 
government knows under that name. j18 Royal permission to 
reject the proposal was duly granted. 
The British government, however, apparently changed 
its mind and put forward a second proposal. By way of 
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settlement, the northern boundary of Dutch territory would 
be fixed at 40 North. This would mean that the British 
North Borneo Company's territory would extend south of the 
Sibuku river - further than stated in the concessions. The 
Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Colonies informed 
the king of this latest development and remarked that what 
the British considered a settlement was in fact nothing 
other than a cession of territory by the Dutch government 
to the said Company. 19 
The Ministers therefore requested the king's 
permission to state, in answering this second British 
proposal, that the government felt itself unable to 
co-operate. Rochussen lamented this development to Van 
Bylandt. The matter had, he wrote, `taken an entirely 
undesirable turn. j120 The British government had not shown 
His Majesty's government the friendly inclination to which 
it so often laid claim. 
In a conversation with Van Bylandt, Pauncefote 
regretted the fact that the Dutch government saw something 
unfriendly in the two proposals . 
12' The British government 
had no interest at all in the question and was prepared to 
accept an arbitral decision in the Netherlands' favour. 
Pauncefote saw no other solution than an investigation in 
loco and, if this was unsuccessful, arbitration. Van 
Bylandt refuted this, stating that arbitration was only 
feasible in differences between two governments. In this 
case, however, the dispute was between the Dutch government 
and the Sultan of Sulu, who had made the concessions. 
The cause of the present difficulty was, according to 
Van Bylandt, the fact that the British government had 
granted the charter too hastily. If the border dispute had 
been settled first, and the charter made dependent upon 
this, the British North Borneo Company would have been more 
accommodating, but now that the company was in possession 
of the charter `it is making excessive claims at the 
expense of Dutch rights. '122 
Van Bylandt was probably right about the fact that the 
charter had been granted too hastily. As we have seen, many 
months had elapsed before the British government reached a 
decision on whether or not to grant a charter (the change 
of government being a major factor in this delay) . However, 
once the decision was taken, the British government was 
apparently determined that objections from the Dutch (and 
also from the Spanish and American governments) would not 
stand in the way of the charter. Ultimately, this is 
probably why it did not answer the despatch from the Dutch 
government dated 11 August 1881. 
By January of the following year (1884) the situation 
still had not changed significantly. In a letter to Van 
Bylandt, Granville expressed his regret at the lack of 
progress: 
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It is moreover to be feared that, if matters are 
allowed to remain much longer in their present 
unsatisfactory condition, a state of feeling may 
be engendered which will hardly be consonant 
with the friendly relations now so happily 
existing between this country and the 
Netherlands and which H. M. 's government are so 
desirous of maintaining. 12' 
Granville proposed, yet again, a joint mission to 
establish the true position of the Sibuku river. Van 
Bylandt now thought this proposal acceptable, since Dutch 
and British commissioners would work together to ascertain, 
and not to dispute. 124 Van Bylandt thought that this latest 
proposal would put an end to the claim repeatedly made by 
the North Borneo Company that the Dutch government had 
extended the borders of its territory after the concessions 
had been granted. 
In reply Minister of Foreign Affairs Van der Does de 
Willebois (who had assumed office in April 1883) stated 
that if his government accepted the proposal it would be by 
way of courtesy ('acte de courtoisie'). Such an acceptance 
would in no way be considered a recognition of Britain's 
rights to co-operate in the verification of the boundary. 
Such rights were only enjoyed by a power whose territory 
bordered on Dutch territory, in this case the Sultan of 
Solok. 125 In this statement, in which De Willebois describes 
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that acceptance as an act of courtesy, we hear echoes of 
Granville's statement concerning the British government's 
willingness to inform the Dutch government of the draft 
charter of the British North Borneo Company. Granville had 
stated that he only did so as an act of courtesy, and that 
the gesture should in no way be considered as a recognition 
of the Netherlands' right to demand this. This could be 
seen as an attempt by the Dutch government to avenge this 
gesture by the English government. It could also be seen as 
a reflection of the Dutch perception of their place in the 
Anglo-Dutch relationship - namely that they felt their 
government was justified in making assertions as strong as 
those made by the English government, and wished to show 
that it could employ the same tactics. Such an attitude 
seems consistent with the principles of Messchert van 
Vollenhoven, as cited by Borsius in the Second Chamber, to 
the effect that small nations, in their dealings with 
larger powers, must compensate in energy and policy what 
they lack in power and size. It was, then, important for 
the Dutch government to be seen - at home as well as abroad 
- to be holding its own in relation to the larger powers. 
In his study of nineteenth-century Borneo, Irwin, however, 
denies that the Dutch government's action regarding the 
British North Borneo Company was energetic: 
The Dutch had not acquiesced willingly in the 
foundation of the British North Borneo Company, 
yet it cannot be said that they fought a 
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full-scale diplomatic battle against it. 126 
Comparing Van Bylandt's protests with those of Van 
Dedel (the Dutch Ambassador in London) forty years earlier 
against James Brooke, Irwin comments that the former's were 
`weak and hesitant'. He attributes this to the fact that 
the governing Liberal party had admitted that the Dutch had 
no right to oppose British expansion on Borneo, since they 
had accepted the British Treaty with Brunei of 1847. He 
argues that: 
Van Bylandt's protests were probably intended 
more to pacify the Conservative Party in the 
States General than to impress the British 
Foreign Office. 127 
Irwin's claim that the Dutch did not wage a full-scale 
diplomatic battle against the British North Borneo Company 
seems harsh. The chronological span of the Borneo question 
is not consistent with half-hearted diplomacy or `weak and 
hesitant' protests. If this had been the case, the Dutch 
government would surely have dropped the matter much sooner 
and been more easily satisfied with British explanations 
and reassurances. The Dutch government continued to make 
its feelings heard at the Foreign Office in London, 
refusing to let the matter drop. Yet it did now realise 
that it was useless to refer to the 1824 Treaty with 
Britain, and opted instead for a favourable border 
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settlement. 
De Willebois feared that the British government would 
reject Van Bylandt's proposal to ascertain rather than 
dispute the boundary. De Willebois and the Minister of 
Colonies believed, as their predecessors had, that the 
local investigation would be fruitless and that the Dutch 
government would be unable to co-operate in bringing the 
issue to arbitration. 
Approximately one year later, in February 1885, Van 
Bylandt had written to De Willebois that he now thought it 
a favourable time to take up the matter again. 128 De 
Willebois disagreed, requesting that Van Bylandt `play a 
waiting game' and await further developments. 129 This the 
Netherlands could safely do, particularly after the 
statement by Lord Fitzmaurice (Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs) in the House of Commons that Britain was not 
claiming sovereign rights on Borneo. In answer to this, Van 
Bylandt emphasised again that the Dutch government should 
strike while the iron was hot. Sooner or later rich 
resources such as coal or copper-ore would be discovered in 
the disputed border area. The British North Borneo Company 
would `stretch out a greedy hand, and no doubt be supported 
by the British government'. However, given the present 
uncertainty surrounding this, and the difficulties then 
being experienced by the British government (Gladstone's 
Liberal government was about to be replaced by Lord 
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Salisbury's first cabinet, which came to power in June 
1885), Van Bylandt believed that neither the British North 
Borneo Company nor the government would be in a position to 
make excessive demands. Under the circumstances, there was 
one way in which the problem could be solved, according to 
Van Bylandt: namely to fix the location of the disputed 
boundary by means of direct negotiation between the Indies 
government and the Company itself. If this were successful, 
the British government would be forced to respect the 
settlement. "' It would appear that, after this memorandum, 
both sides let the matter rest. This was the advice given 
one year later in 1886 when Van Bylandt expressed concern 
about the colonial exhibition in London, where space had 
been allotted to `British' North Borneo. 13' 
In May 1887, however, matters again became heated when 
it was rumoured in the press that Sir Frederik Weld 
(Consul-General at Singapore) was being sent to Brunei, and 
that Britain was planning to establish a protectorate on 
North Borneo. Minister of Colonies Sprenger Van Eyk wrote 
to his colleague Van Karnebeek (the liberal Minister of 
Foreign Affairs who had replaced De Willebois on 1 November 
1885) that Britain must be dissuaded from this course of 
action since it was against the spirit and purpose of the 
1824 Treaty. Van Eyk realised, however, that the Dutch 
interpretation of the treaty could not be pressed with much 
force, since the conditions themselves gave the Dutch no 
right to contest British authority in a part of Borneo not 
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under Dutch sovereignty. It was nevertheless useful' to 
broach the subject - so long as the region in question was 
not yet under British authority - so as not to give the 
impression of indifference. "' Van Bylandt asked for further 
information at the Foreign Office, where Sir Julian 
Pauncefote explained that Sir Frederik Weld had been sent 
to Brunei to investigate the disputes between Rajah Brooke 
of Sarawak and the British North Borneo Company (who were, 
naturally, deadly enemies in commerce) and the Sultan of 
Brunei, who was caught in the middle. Weld's report had 
only just been received, and Pauncefote was the only person 
to have seen it. Van Bylandt trusted Pauncefote's 
information, but expressed reservations regarding the 
Colonial Office. Circumstances would sooner or later force 
Britain to establish a protectorate on North Borneo and Van 
Bylandt believed that the Colonial Office `will do 
everything it can to bring this about, even against the 
wishes of the Foreign Office. '133 It seems, then, that the 
British themselves were not in agreement as to the fate of 
North Borneo. 
In December 1887, Van Bylandt reported that both Sir 
Frederik Weld and Rajah Brooke were in England, and that 
Weld's report on North Borneo was under consideration. "' 
Van Bylandt also reported a conversation with Pauncefote. 
Public opinion in the Netherlands had, believed Van 
Bylandt, been stirred by the use of the word `resident' in 
connection with Sir Frederik Weld and North Borneo. It was 
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possible that this word had a different meaning in England. 
Otherwise, the appointment of a resident on North Borneo 
was inconsistent with the conditions of the North Borneo 
Company's charter. First, there was no question of a 
British protectorate or British sovereignty over North 
Borneo. Second, the British enterprise was exclusively 
private and commercial and, third, the purpose of the 
charter was to keep the company within those limits. Sir 
Julian agreed with this, but failed to see that this 
prevented a British protectorate on North Borneo. This 
would be justified on the basis of old treaties between 
England and the Sultans of Brunei, who had undertaken not 
to cede any territory without the British government's 
permission. A British protectorate had then, in effect, 
already existed for a long time. Van Bylandt did not wish 
to pursue the matter, having heard this, but wondered 
whether the treaties mentioned by Pauncefote had been 
communicated to the Dutch government and if so, through 
which channels. Had no proof of such communication been 
found, Pauncefote's claims would have been invalidated. 
Unfortunately for Van Bylandt and the Dutch government, 
proof of this communication was indeed found. Yet again, it 
appeared, the Dutch were paying the price for not reacting 
to the British treaty with the Sultan of Brunei in 1847. 
At the end of the 1880s, the situation did not look 
good for the Dutch. During the past ten years the Dutch 
government's persistent and determined protests against the 
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perceived threat of British expansion on Borneo (in the 
form of the British North Borneo Company) had fallen on 
stony ground in London. The British government, although 
appearing at first amicable - albeit bewildered - in the 
face of the Dutch protests, was at best unco-operative, 
delaying responses to and ignoring communications from the 
Dutch government. At worst it was hypocritical, officially 
professing a willingness to co-operate, while still tacitly 
pursuing its intended path. The Dutch government had failed 
to prevent the granting of the British North Borneo Company 
Charter in 1881. It could only be said that it helped to 
delay proceedings. 
The Borneo question cast a shadow over Anglo-Dutch 
relations from 1878 until the declaration of the 
Protectorate in 1888 (Anglo-Dutch relations after the 
declaration of the Protectorate will be discussed in the 
following section of this chapter, beginning on p. 147). The 
Dutch government, as we have seen above, did not trust the 
British government, and found its attitude ambiguous, 
deceitful and unco-operative. The criticisms voiced in the 
House of Commons lend credibility to the Dutch government's 
protests, which appear at first sight somewhat obsessive 
and not totally justified. 
The Borneo question was no doubt influenced by a 
change in the British attitude towards colonial problems in 
the 1870s. This change resulted from the increased colonial 
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competition from other European powers. According to L. R. 
Wright, the period marked the beginning of a 
protection-annexation policy: 
It was aimed at territories unoccupied by any 
other European power. The policy was stimulated 
by the expansion of German and French commercial 
interests. In Borneo the change of attitude was 
reflected in Colonial Office support for 
Sarawak's expansionist tendencies, and by an 
attempt at the Foreign Office to define its 
Borneo policy -a policy which hitherto had been 
vague. 1 35 
The British government's need to define its policy on 
Borneo at this time was an extra obstacle for the Dutch 
government, since the British government was consequently 
less sympathetic to criticisms of its activities in Borneo. 
Borneo was important for the British in blocking the 
expansion of other large European powers which would have 
undermined her commercial supremacy in the Far East. For 
the Netherlands, however, the Borneo question was one of 
principle. As a second-rank power the Netherlands had to be 
seen to defend its rights. Since the separation from 
Belgium, the Netherlands had increasingly looked to its 
colonial possessions for proof of its standing in the 
world. This sentiment was also echoed in the Dutch press. 
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In November 1881, in the first of two articles on the 
British North Borneo Company, the Arnhemse Courant 
commented: 
The only position still of any greatness, which 
we occupy in the ranks of nations, is that of a 
colonial power. As a colonial power we can still 
fulfil an important role; if we cease to be 
this, the Netherlands will fall back into the 
ranks of small states with walk-on parts. 136 
This tells us why the Borneo question was so important 
to the Netherlands. Its priority was not to secure any 
material advantages in the disputed territory, but to hang 
on to the last vestiges of former greatness, now to be 
found in its colonies. In November 1888, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Hartsen wrote to the Governor-General in 
the Indies, Pijnacker van Hordijk: 
However small our country may be, our government 
of the Indies gives us a position which has not 
been sufficiently asserted, particularly in our 
own eyes, because although we no longer belong 
to the ranks of the great powers, I do believe 
that we have often belittled ourselves, and 
consequently compromised our real rights. I 
believe that a country with limited material 
political powers can only ensure its existence 
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and future by upholding its rights. 13' 
From the Protectorate to the border settlement, 1881-1891 
By mid-1888 it had become evident that the British 
protectorate in North Borneo was a fait accompli, just as 
the British North Borneo Company's Charter had been in 
1881. From a communication from Hartsen, (the conservative 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Anti-Revolutionary Mackay's 
cabinet, which had come to power in April 1888) to Van 
Bylandt, it would appear that Hartsen first learned of the 
protectorate from the Dutch Consul-General in Singapore. 
Hartsen informed Van Bylandt that since public opinion 
would be so sensitive to the issue of the protectorate, the 
Council of Ministers (Ministerraad) had been called 
together before a decision could be taken on the 
appropriate course of action. He advised Van Bylandt to 
proceed with the utmost caution and to make no official 
approach to the British government. It was not impossible 
that: 
[... ] we must finally concede and in that case 
the only alternative for us is to use this 
opportunity to obtain as compensation from 
England a favourable border settlement with 
recognition of our rights on Borneo [... ]"138 
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Dutch protests had apparently little or no influence 
on British decisions; despite claims to the contrary, 
Britain now exercised authority in North Borneo. This 
should not have been a surprise; from the beginning of the 
Borneo question, the political and literary journal the 
Indische Gids had been warning the Dutch government of the 
dangers inherent in the Von Overbeck concessions. The 
Indische Gids was broadly anti-British and it was heavily 
critical of the Dutch government. In 1885 it openly accused 
the Dutch government of `ostrich politics' 
(`struisvogel-politiek'). The article concerned was a 
report of a lecture at London's Royal Colonial Institute on 
"British North Borneo". During this lecture, a member of 
the audience enquired about the possibility of territorial 
expansion. The question was answered by Admiral Mayne (a 
director of the British North Borneo Company), who stated 
that the southern boundary of the Company's territory was 
not yet fixed. Mayne was not sure that this would be for 
the best, since an official boundary would bind British 
hands at a time when they were best left free. `It is 
strange' wrote a contributor to the Indische Gids, `that 
these words have hitherto been totally ignored in the 
Netherlands. Another case of ostrich politics? ' It warned: 
`[... ] the dignity of the Netherlands is again in great 
danger. ' 1 39 
The Dutch government was again made painfully aware of 
the Netherlands' comparative powerlessness as a nation of 
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the second rank. As we have seen, Hartsen believed that the 
Netherlands had often belittled itself and thus compromised 
its rights. With the British protectorate now established, 
the whole question was brought back to the point it had 
reached in 1882/83: the question of the 1824 Treaty. In the 
House of Commons Mr F. S. Stevenson (member for Suffolk, 
Eye) asked the Under-Secretary of State for Colonies (Sir 
James Ferguson) whether it was true that a protectorate was 
to be extended over North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei. He 
also asked whether it was `distinctly understood that the 
Treaty of 1824 does not apply to Borneo'. Ferguson replied 
that the protectorate was the subject of negotiations not 
yet completed. He added: 
It is distinctly held by Her Majesty's 
Government that the Treaty of 1824 between Great 
Britain and the Netherlands has no application 
to Borneo. ' 40 
The official British view regarding the 1824 Treaty 
was, then, unchanged since 1 881 , while the Dutch were again 
considering Van Bylandt's proposed arbitration on the 
subject. It was Hartsen's personal opinion that the Dutch 
government should resign itself to the situation - if 
Britain was prepared to recognise the points Batoe Tinagat 
and the river Tawao as the boundary of Dutch territory. If 
not, then Hartsen thought it advisable to reconsider Van 
Bylandt's suggestion of arbitration on the 1824 Treaty as 
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well as the boundary settlement in relation to the treaty 
with the Sultan of Boeloengan. 14' Van Bylandt replied that 
he was in favour of arbitration regarding the boundary 
settlement, but that arbitration on the treaty seemed 
impossible. 142 He believed that an arbitration which might 
not turn out in the Netherlands' favour would be more 
damaging to its morale as a colonial power than the entire 
Borneo dispute was worth. 143 Moreover, when he first 
proposed arbitration, he had not read closely enough the 
second paragraph of Article 12 of the 1824 Treaty (the 
crucial article defining the Dutch and British spheres of 
influence). He had since re-read this and now feared that 
an arbitral decision could rule against the Netherlands. 144 
This is a surprising admission of oversight by someone in 
a position such as Van Bylandt's. That he was capable of 
this blunder regarding such an important document suggests 
that he was not always as reliable or well-informed as a 
diplomat should be. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs under 
whom he served may also have noticed this, since on one or 
two occasions his suggestions were overruled. 
The biggest obstacle to further negotiations was now 
the difference between the latitudes 3°20' and 4°20' . The 
Dutch claimed 4o20' as the boundary of their territory, 
while the British protested that this had never extended 
further than 3° . According to Lord Salisbury, the 
disputed 
area in fact belonged without doubt to the Sultan of 
Sulu. 145 The concessions to the North Borneo Company were 
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therefore perfectly legal. It was the Dutch government 
which had encroached on the territory of the Company by 
hoisting the Dutch flag. By now Van Bylandt could see that 
the matter could only be resolved through arbitration, 
given the steadfastness of the British government. He now 
believed that an arbitral decision could rule in the 
Netherlands' favour, especially in the light of the weak 
arguments used by Lord Salisbury in the memorandum. 
However, the question remained as to what sort of effect a 
decision in the Netherlands' favour would have on future 
relations with Britain as a colonial power. Van Bylandt did 
not venture to pronounce on this. Although he would not be 
happy to see the Dutch claim to Batoe Tinagat surrendered, 
it was possible that a friendly settlement involving some 
sort of concession would be preferable. But the Dutch claim 
must not be abandoned until arbitration was the only 
remaining solution. 146 In a further communication to 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Hartsen, written three days 
later on 21 February 1889, Van Bylandt clearly expressed 
his feelings towards the British government. 14' During the 
past ten years it had acted `contrary to the most 
elementary principles of international law' (`in strijd met 
de meest elementaire beginselen van het volkenrecht 
[... 1'), while the Dutch government had shown the greatest 
politeness and patience. The Dutch government had trusted 
in the loyalty and friendly assurances of the British 
government but was now bitterly disappointed. Under the 
circumstances, arbitration was the only solution. Other 
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governments should be made aware of Britain's disdain for 
the principles of international law. Finally, Van Bylandt 
noted, public opinion could have a great influence, as had 
been the case in the Nisero question. Presumably he was 
referring to the fact that the pressure of British public 
opinion was largely responsible for the British 
government's attitude towards the Dutch government in this 
issue, which is the subject of the following chapter. 
Resentment towards Britain had clearly increased over 
the many years that the Borneo question haunted both 
governments. The British government failed to understand 
Dutch protests and claims. This was probably inevitable, 
since to do so could have been seen as an admission of 
guilt. The Dutch government was continually frustrated by 
Britain's apparent indifference and lack of response. Yet 
when the British government did respond, the Dutch 
government variously accused it of treachery, ambiguity and 
presumptuous behaviour. As we have seen above in the House 
of Commons debate of 17 March 1882, the Dutch government's 
perceptions were not totally exaggerated, but contained 
some element of truth. The British government was, at the 
very least, guilty of non-co-operation, one example being 
the failure to answer the despatch of 11 August 1881. It 
could also be argued that the British government was guilty 
of some degree of deception by claiming that the Von 
Overbeck enterprise was purely commercial when it was 
blatantly obvious that there were political advantages to 
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be enjoyed from supporting it. It would be unusual for a 
government to ignore such advantages during a period of 
intense colonial competition. 
The next step was not the arbitration favoured by Van 
Bylandt, who was again overruled - possibly for the reason 
given above. What followed instead was a further proposal 
by the Dutch government for a joint commission to 
investigate the respective boundary claims by consulting 
the charts, maps and documents, and by the comparison of 
dates. 148 Salisbury rejected this proposal on the grounds 
that all the points of the border should be open to 
discussion. He evidently thought that the proposal did not 
allow for this . 
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Hartsen consequently instructed Van Bylandt to make a 
further proposal, this time explaining that in the 
forthcoming discussions `no point concerning the boundary 
settlement will be excluded', and that both governments 
would enjoy the same freedom in this respect. 15° Salisbury 
accepted this second proposal. "' 
A final solution to the Borneo question now appeared 
imminent. However, the first meetings of the Boundary 
Commission made little progress `because both sides stood 
firmly by their respective rights. '152 Sir Phillip Currie 
(permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) 
now proposed a compromise: the boundary in question should 
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start from the point 4o10 (instead of 3°20 or 4°20 ). The 
islands of East and West Nanoekan would be left to the 
Netherlands, while Sebatik would become British (see Maps 
1 and 2). The compromise also stipulated freedom of 
shipping for both countries on all rivers in the disputed 
area. The Boundary Commission met for the last time on 27 
July 1889. At that meeting Van Bylandt summarised the 
issues involved in the Borneo question, leaving no doubt as 
to his interpretation of the matter. He stated that the 
Netherlands government had indeed received repeated 
reassurances as to the nature of the Dent and Von Overbeck 
enterprise and Britain's intentions, but 
[... ] all these reassuring and misleading 
declarations have been belied by subsequent 
facts. We have been all along kept in the dark 
and placed uninformed before accomplished 
facts . 
"' 
This complaint was justified, given the action of the 
British government during the ten years that the Borneo 
question had remained unresolved. To summarise, then, both 
the granting of the charter and the protectorate had been 
`accomplished facts' which the Netherlands was powerless to 
change. Both actions had been preceded by constant 
reassurances from the British government that it was not 
seeking sovereign rights or political influence on Borneo. 
The granting of the British North Borneo Company charter 
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was initially delayed, for reasons discussed above. When it 
was finally granted, the news first reached the Dutch 
government via the press (its last protests having been 
deliberately ignored by the British government). Foreign 
Secretary Granville did not keep his promise personally to 
inform the Dutch government. Van Bylandt was accurate in 
observing that subsequent facts had belied the government's 
reassurances. This also applies to the declaration of the 
Protectorate, of which the Dutch government was equally 
ignorant until it was too late. 
Why, then, had the British government made the 
territory a protectorate? According to Robinson and 
Gallagher, the protectorate was `another device for evading 
the extension of rule', the first being the chartered 
company. This action by the British government was also the 
result of intense colonial competition. In the words of 
Robinson and Gallagher: 
[... ] faced with the prospect of foreign 
acquisitions of tropical territory hitherto 
opened to British merchants, the men in London 
resorted to one expedient after another to evade 
the need for formal expansion and still uphold 
British paramountcy in those regions. 154 
Meanwhile, Minister for Foreign Affairs Hartsen had 
been considering the British proposal for compromise. His 
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first impression was that the British government wanted to 
bring the matter to an end by dividing the disputed area 
into two halves, without further considering the rights of 
the native rulers. Furthermore, the matter of the inland 
boundary had been completely overlooked. He communicated 
these reservations to Minister of Colonies Keuchenius (also 
of the Anti-Revolutionary Party) who, after due 
consideration, concluded that the Dutch government would 
accept the tenor of the proposal subject to the 
co-operation of the Sultan of Boeloengan and the approval 
of the States General. 155 These, then, were the prior 
conditions for the Dutch government's acceptance. "' 
Keuchenius wished the British government to consider the 
following as further conditions. First: that the settlement 
of the east-coast boundary be dependent upon the settlement 
of the entire east-west boundary. Second: Keuchenius agreed 
with Van Bylandt that Sebatik should remain Dutch. Third: 
the point chosen as the east-coast boundary should be a 
suitable starting-point for the inland boundary. Two months 
later, at the end of October 1889, Hartsen wrote to the 
Governor of the Netherlands Indies, Pijnacker van Hordijk, 
stressing the importance of resuming negotiations with the 
British government as soon as possible (since Hartsen's 
reply to the British proposal in August 1889, negotiations 
had been suspended). 157 According to Van Bylandt, the 
present British government was willing to conclude the 
matter; if a new government came to power there would be 
less chance of success. The Dutch government should 
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therefore act as soon as possible. Moreover, circumstances 
were more favourable now that Sir Julian Pauncefote had 
been appointed British ambassador to Washington. Pauncefote 
had been, according to Hartsen `the great opponent in 
London of Dutch interests, also in the matter of Borneo. '158 
His influence had been so great that it was doubtful 
whether, had he remained in London, any progress would have 
been made. 
Pauncefote`s influence was indeed unmistakable. He was 
a long-standing friend of the Dent family and fully 
supported the Dent & Von Overbeck enterprise. According to 
one historian: 
It is not too much to say that the labours of 
this civil servant secured North Borneo for the 
British in the face of years of delay and 
opposition from other government departments and 
politicians . 
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In May 1890 Van Bylandt was visited by Admiral Mayne, 
a director of the North Borneo Company who had attended the 
meetings of the Boundary Commission in 1889. Mayne wished 
to discuss several points with Van Bylandt before 
submitting to the British government his company's response 
to the proposed compromise. He proposed that the inland 
boundary be fixed at a latitude of 4o10 , and extend 
in a 
straight line to the mountain Goerapiek. It was in his 
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experience not practical to use a watershed as a boundary, 
since meandering rivers could complicate matters. Van 
Bylandt was much taken by Mayne's views, and saw in this a 
possible solution to the Borneo question. The matter of the 
island of Sebatik, however, proved more sensitive. Van 
Bylandt explained that since the Netherlands had already 
surrendered the coastal region between Batoe Tinagat and 
Broershoek (see Map 1), there was a danger that the 
States-General would reject the entire proposal if Sebatik 
also had to be surrendered. Mayne in turn explained the 
importance of Sebatik for his company. Given the damp and 
unhealthy climate of the north coast above Batoe Tinagat, 
the North Borneo Company had hoped to establish trading 
offices and coal stations on the Northern coast of Sebatik. 
Van Bylandt replied that Dutch sovereignty need not prevent 
this; he was sure that the Dutch government would be 
prepared to grant concessions on a piece of land on 
Sebatik, which could be used for this purpose, but which 
would remain under Dutch sovereignty. 
Hartsen was less enthusiastic about Mayne's 
proposals. 16' In the first place, the matter of the boundary 
line was unclear. A boundary line extending from Broershoek 
to Goerapiek did not correspond to a latitude of 4o10 , but 
ran in a south-westerly direction which was again 
unfavourable for the Netherlands. Furthermore, the exact 
location of the mountain Goerapiek - and even its existence 
- was doubtful. In the second place, a boundary continually 
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crossing the same river could be problematic. In the third 
place, the proposal went against the Malay concept of a 
watershed as boundary between inland states. Van Bylandt, 
in a despatch to Hartsen dated 12 June 1890, stressed again 
the necessity of a timely solution. He feared that the 
English would in the meantime become much more familiar 
with Borneo than the Dutch, and would discover rich 
resources. If this happened before a definitive boundary 
settlement were established, the British government would 
make excessive demands, and the Netherlands, given its 
status as a small power, would be unable to refute those 
demands: 
Because in such a situation, without a 
definitive boundary settlement, the negotiations 
between a small and a great power are always `a 
pot of clay against a pot of iron'. 161 
Moreover, if the Netherlands continued to press for 
the recognition of the watershed as a boundary, the North 
Borneo Company would possibly be less flexible regarding 
the island of Sebatik. The development of Dutch North 
Borneo was, after all, dependent upon a good relationship 
with `the most powerful neighbour' (`den machtigsten 
buurman'), which was so desirable `even if this must be 
achieved by a small territorial concession'. "' It would 
appear from these words that, in the end, preserving good 
relations with Britain was at least as important for the 
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Dutch as their claims to North Borneo. 
In the period immediately preceding the Borneo 
settlement, the Indische Gids became even more outspoken 
than hitherto in its mistrust of Britain, this time heavily 
critical of Britain's colonial greed and unwillingness to 
stand by the smaller powers. In 1890, by way of proof, it 
published a statistical comparison of Britain's overseas 
possessions in 1880 and 1890. The figures showed that in 
those ten years, the British government had annexed 
approximately 1,210,000 English square miles of territory, 
which was, the Indische Gids helpfully pointed out, nine 
times the surface area of Belgium. Yet still Britain's 
colonial hunger was not stilled. This could have 
unfortunate consequences: `Immoderation will prove in time 
to be very damaging to the health. j163 As regards Britain's 
unwillingness to stand by the smaller powers, the Indische 
Gids commented that Britain was trying to teach other 
powers - especially the smaller ones - two lessons: `Solve 
your own problems' and `Trust no-one, not even me! '. 
Britain was definitely not in the habit of drawing its 
sword to defend the weak against the strong. Therefore, if 
the Netherlands was counting on Britain's permanent 
protection, she would be disappointed, particularly since 
Britain thought so badly of Dutch colonial policy or - more 
likely - because the British envied the Dutch their 
colonial possessions. 
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Give Borneo to Britain today, and do not be 
surprised if tomorrow she tries to filch 
Celebes, Sumatra or Java. 169 
The Dutch govi 
not to become, 
`connivings' 
(`vrijmoedigheid') 
the British envied 
mutual. 
? rnment should do everything in its power 
once again, the victim of British 
(`kuiperijen') and `gall' 
. 
165 The Dutch may well have believed that 
them their colonies, but this was surely 
The stand taken by the Dutch government around 1890 is 
markedly different from that taken at the beginning of the 
dispute in the late 1870s and early 1880s, when the 
government resolved steadfastly to defend its rights. 
However, as negotiations became more and more protracted, 
the government appears to have become more conciliatory and 
was continually confronted with its own comparative lack of 
power as a nation of the second rank. The determined 
pronouncements made in the early stages faded with time. 
Later, more mention was made of the importance of friendly 
relations with Britain, and of not rocking the boat. Van 
Bylandt pointed out, by way of example, that Portugal's 
assertive behaviour had resulted in its obtaining 
diminishing rights in Africa. 166 Here, Van Bylandt is very 
probably referring to the results of the 1884-5 Berlin 
West-Africa Conference where, as J. Duffy has pointed out: 
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[... ] Portugal lost half of what she had sought 
to keep, and had it not been for the skill of 
her diplomats, who played the animosities of 
France, England and Germany against each other, 
she would have lost more. "' 
Eventually, in March 1891, Lord Salisbury, who had 
succeeded Lord Iddlesleigh (Sir Stafford Northcote) as 
Foreign Secretary in January 1887, informed Van Bylandt 
that he was prepared to accept the latest Dutch proposals 
for the boundary. These proposals he understood to be, 
first: 
That the boundary-line should start from 4o10 
on the coast and should follow in a straight 
line in a West-North-West direction, between the 
rivers Simengaris and Soedang, as far as the 
point where the 117 East longitude crosses the 
parallel of 4o20 North latitude, the object 
being to include the whole of the river 
Simengaris within Dutch territory. [see Maps 1 
and 21 
And, second: 
That it should then proceed Westward along the 
parallel of 4o20 as far as the Crest of the 
Central Mountains, which forms the Eastern 
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watershed on that parallel, and thence in a 
South-Westerly direction along the summit of 
that range to Gura Peak (Goerapiek). 168 
Salisbury enclosed a draft agreement which gave rise 
to further correspondence and exchanges between the two 
governments. The agreement was finally concluded on 20 June 
1891. By this time, the Dutch had accepted that it was 
pointless to persist in the opinion that the Treaty of 17 
March 1824 precluded joint occupation on Borneo. This was 
confirmed by the President of the Council of State (Raad 
van State) in a memorandum to the dowager Queen Regent: 
The Council of State shares the feeling of the 
government expressed in the explanatory 
statement that it would serve little purpose to 
persist in the opinion that the Treaty of 17 
March 1824 excludes joint possession on that 
island. 169 
The establishment of a boundary, even if not totally 
to the liking of the Dutch government, was far preferable 
to a state of uncertainty. 
The Indische Gids welcomed the final negotiations on 
the border settlement. However, it lamented that fact that 
the government had not heeded its many warnings. Also, the 
British North Borneo Company had, some years previously, 
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made a proposal to the Dutch government similar to the one 
now made by that very government. The Indische Gids 
regretted that the Dutch government had not then seen fit 
to take up that proposal. The government had seemed 
`strangely and unfortunately enough, little given to 
solving the question, and the matter became drawn out. j10 
In 1892, when the Borneo treaty formalised the 
boundary settlement, the Indische Gids commented that the 
fact remained that the Netherlands had - yet again - been 
forced to haul down its colours for Britain. It was true 
that the ceded territory was untamed, low-lying and swampy, 
and that what remained was enough, but these were merely 
consoling thoughts which did nothing to restore national 
pride. "' The Economist, another quality Dutch journal, also 
had its doubts about the final settlement. It bemoaned, as 
the Indische Gids had, the Dutch government's slowness. If 
it had listened to the advice of Indies civil servants and 
concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Brunei, the 
Netherlands would now have become established on Borneo's 
Northern coast. Britain would then have accepted this 
situation and the recently settled question would never 
have arisen: 
We cannot persist in excluding others from an 
area adjoining our boundary, where we have never 
exercised sovereign rights and in which we have 
never shown any interest. "' 
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In the course of the exchanges between Great Britain 
and the Netherlands from 1878 to 1891, changes in attitude 
can be observed. These changes appear to have been mostly 
on the Dutch side, while the attitude of the British 
government remained fairly consistent. 
At the beginning of the question the attitude of the 
Dutch government was comparatively steadfast, being 
determined to make the British government see that it was 
contravening the 1824 Treaty. Even at this stage, however, 
the Dutch government was not happy with the attitude of the 
British government which, as we have seen above, was seen 
to be pertinacious, ambiguous and at times even 
treacherous. The Dutch were continually frustrated by 
Britain's lack of response. Van Bylandt made these feelings 
known when he made his general remarks (in English) at the 
last meeting of the Borneo Boundary Commission on 27 July 
1889: 
I must confess that up to the present moment I 
have been unable to explain to myself the 
reluctance of the British government to provide 
a friendly power with fair information, on a 
subject in which political interests of some 
importance for my country were involved. '" 
By 1888, with little progress having been made and the 
prospect of a British protectorate on North Borneo, the 
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Dutch government realised that its attempts had been 
fruitless. On 13 August 1 888 Van Bylandt had a conversation 
with Lord Salisbury `from which it became apparent to me 
that the British government will never recognise our 
interpretation of the 1824 Treaty. /174 
In 1888 the Indische Gids referred to an article in 
the Bataviaasch Handelsblad, which asked how the principle 
of occupation (i. e. that a country could only claim rights 
to a colony which it actively occupied) should be 
interpreted with regard to Dutch possessions. The Indische 
Gids again remarked on the indifference of the Dutch 
government: `We have also asked this question, but the 
government seems unconcerned by it . j15 In that same 
edition, the Indische Gids drew attention to a less 
well-known, but nevertheless significant development. This 
concerned economic development in British North Borneo and 
Dutch North Borneo. It was becoming apparent, according to 
the Indische Gids, that British Borneo was developing much 
faster economically than Dutch Borneo. Moreover, it was 
evident that increasing numbers of Dutch entrepreneurs were 
looking for opportunities in British Borneo. The Indische 
Gids was understandably alarmed by this: `Why must Dutch 
industrialists and capitalists seek employment for their 
labour, knowledge and money in British Borneo? ' 176 Later 
that year, the Indische Gids returned to this problem in an 
article entitled `Development of British Borneo by the 
Dutch' ('Ontwikkeling van Britsch-Borneo door 
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Nederlanders'). The blame was laid squarely at the feet of 
the Dutch government and its colonial policy: 
Does it not cast a most unhappy light on Dutch 
colonial policy, we ask yet again, that Dutchmen 
prefer to devote their capital and spirit of 
enterprise to the exploitation of British 
Borneo, and that Dutch Borneo as well as the 
other possessions remain untamed and 
unproductive? For political reasons too, this 
seems highly dubious. "' 
In 1890 the Indische Gids published yet more evidence 
of British North Borneo's economic success, taken from a 
report in Petermann's Mitteilungen by the German Dr. 
Posewitz. There followed more criticism of the Dutch 
government: were Dutch statesmen so lacking in zeal and 
patriotism that they did not take it upon themselves to 
obtain such results on Dutch Borneo? Dutch industrialists 
and capitalists were forsaking Dutch for British Borneo. 
This was how the Dutch government kindled the national 
spirit of enterprise ! 1" This development was obviously an 
embarrassing one for the Dutch government, and it appears 
to have avoided the subject during parliamentary debates. 
It would certainly not have helped the anti-British 
position if it were known that the Dutch government was 
claiming (dubious) rights to a territory which, ironically, 
was apparently less attractive to Dutch entrepreneurs than 
143 
the British settlement which it wanted to exclude. The 
Indische Gids continued to stress the importance of 
developing Dutch Borneo and the Outer Possessions 
(Buitenbezittingen). It therefore considered the 
consolidation of existing Dutch possessions more important 
than expansion. 
The Indische Gids was not only critical of the Dutch 
government's stance, but also mistrusted the British 
government, stating that it was out to deceive public 
opinion into believing that the Dutch government was guilty 
of encroachment by occupying a position north of the 
Siboekoe river . 
179 The Indische Gids agreed with member of 
parliament Brantsen van de Zijp that the greatest vigilance 
was now necessary, but did not express much faith in the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. It would be a great surprise 
- and relief - to many if the Minister did not allow 
himself to be outwitted by Britain, and proved himself 
equal to the task in hand. "' 
Conclusion 
As the years passed, disappointment at Britain's 
conduct had increased among Dutch ministers and diplomats, 
although towards Britain itself the Dutch government showed 
a friendly spirit, only letting its impatience show on the 
few occasions discussed above. But, with time, the Dutch 
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government became more accommodating - apparently of 
necessity - and began to make concessions later in the 
dispute on points which it would not even discuss at the 
beginning (e. g. its interpretation of the 1824 Treaty, 
Batoe Tinagat as the northern boundary on the East coast, 
the possession of Sebatik). Throughout the dispute, as seen 
above, Britain continually refuted the protests made by the 
Dutch government, with constant reassurances that the Dent 
and Von Overbeck enterprise was purely commercial and that 
it was not seeking to acquire sovereign rights in North 
Borneo. On occasion British despatches showed signs of 
impatience and bewilderment. The British government seems 
to have thought that the Dutch government was over-reacting 
and prone to being over-sensitive. Admiral Mayne, whose 
proposal regarding the boundary line formed the basis of 
the final agreement, failed to understand why the Dutch 
government was so incensed: 
I am still at a loss to understand how a great 
government owning such an enormous tract of land 
in Borneo as the Netherlands government does, 
can make any serious point of such a little 
island [Sebatik]. 181 
It would appear, then, from the diplomacy of the 
Borneo question, that the Netherlands government was 
finally unable to hold its own against Great Britain. Van 
Bylandt had been perceptive in his observation that 
145 
negotiations between the two countries could be likened to 
a pot of clay against a pot of iron. Its initial 
steadfastness having been undermined by lack of progress 
and English unresponsiveness, the Dutch government was 
increasingly reminded of the restrictions imposed by its 
country's status as a second-rank power. Van Bylandt had 
remarked as early as 1879 that the representatives of large 
powers (to which England owed respect) received better 
treatment at the Foreign Office than those of the smaller 
powers: 
[... ] but for the representatives of smaller 
states, for whom Lord Salisbury himself is very 
rarely available, the verbal discussion of 
important issues with Foreign Office heads of 
department is the most inadequate that one could 
possibly contrive. 1' 
Lord Salisbury's reactions confirmed this impression 
for Van Bylandt who, shortly after the above communication, 
reported a conversation with the former to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Van Lynden. In this conversation it had 
become clear to Van Bylandt that Salisbury was not prepared 
`to recognise the equality of rights between great and 
small powers., 183 
It could be argued that, had the Borneo question 
arisen earlier in the century, Great Britain would have 
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been more accommodating towards the Netherlands. However, 
in an age characterised by the race for colonies, it was 
far more important for the British government to ensure, 
first, that it was not out-paced by other would-be colonial 
powers - its neighbours in Europe - and, second, that 
existing trade routes and colonies were protected. Great 
Britain -a colonial power of the first rank - could not 
therefore afford to devote too much attention to the 
protests of a second-rank neighbour, thereby running the 
risk that its own colonial status would be undermined. This 
could explain the British government's impatience with the 
continual objections from the Dutch government. Britain's 
professions of friendship might, then, have been genuine 
enough, but the government could not allow its relationship 
with the Netherlands to take precedence over wider and more 
pressing colonial issues; hence the British `stubbornness' 
(`vasthoudendheid'). 
It could also be argued that the Borneo debate between 
Britain and the Netherlands, arising as it did towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, was a sign of the times. 
With the great powers fighting amongst themselves for the 
remaining potential colonies, it was no surprise that the 
smaller powers were pushed aside in the rush. It could be 
argued that the Netherlands was pushed aside by Great 
Britain in the Borneo question, as the latter strove to 
maintain a position of paramountcy. This is evident in the 
way in which, as seen in this chapter, the British 
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government was relatively uninterested in, and 
unsympathetic towards, the protests of the Dutch 
government. As K. G. Tregonning pointed out in his study of 
North Borneo under the chartered British North Borneo 
Company, 
Neither Salisbury nor his successor, Lord 
Granville, both of whom were well briefed by 
Pauncefote, was prepared to pay much attention 
to the Dutch claims, which they pressed most 
insistently, that a British settlement in Borneo 
would cause a profound disturbance, and that it 
was a violation of the 1824 Anglo-Dutch treaty. 1e' 
British Liberal governments during the last decades of 
the nineteenth century were faced with a dilemma: how to 
maintain Britain's commercial, industrial and colonial 
position (in the face of increasing competition from her 
European neighbours on all three fronts) without incurring 
extra expense and responsibility. Borneo was an example of 
how this was attempted. The resulting Anglo-Dutch dispute 
over the island shows what could happen when a second-rank 
power - aware of its limitations but nevertheless 
steadfastly adhering to the principle that it should speak 
up for itself - attempted to exert influence on such a 
policy. 
The results of the Netherlands' attempts to defend its 
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rights on Borneo were mixed. Initially, the Dutch 
themselves could not even decide exactly what those rights 
were. It was the liberals who finally established that the 
Netherlands had no rights in the contested area. Having 
decided that it could not prevent British expansion in 
North Borneo, the Dutch government settled for the next 
best thing: a favourable boundary settlement between the 
Dutch and British territories. Even then, the Dutch were 
obliged to accept compromises which were initially 
unthinkable, while Britain herself made few, if any, 
concessions. 
However noble its efforts to speak up for itself, the 
Dutch government was unable to exert as much influence on 
British decision-making on the matter as it would have 
liked. The evidence examined in this chapter strongly 
suggests that the Dutch perception of their role in the 
Anglo-Dutch relationship differed from that of Britain. 
Judging by its attitude in the Borneo dispute, the Dutch 
government overestimated its ability to influence the 
British government. The result was mounting suspicion, 
bitterness and disappointment. There was also a growing 
awareness that, however attractive the British assurances 
of fairness and friendship, the British government 
nevertheless called the tune in the relationship. This had 
become painfully obvious in the granting of the British 
Borneo Company's charter and the declaration of the British 
Protectorate. 
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Nevertheless, the Netherlands still needed the 
friendship of Britain as it had done for many decades: 
Britain had protected Dutch colonies from the French in the 
Napoleonic era, and had engineered the establishment of the 
United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1814, which gave the 
country - coupled with the southern Belgian provinces - the 
status of a first-rank power, albeit temporarily. This 
necessity for friendship with Britain confirms the 
Netherlands' position as a small power, which R. L. 
Rothstein defines as: 
[... ] a state which recognises that it cannot 
obtain security primarily by use of its own 
capabilities, and that it must rely 
fundamentally on the aid of other states, 
institutions, processes or developments to do 
so; the Small Power's belief in its ability to 
rely on its own means must also be recognised by 
the other states involved in international 
politics. 185 
Rothstein also makes another observation on the 
foreign policy of small powers which is largely consistent 
with the attitude of the Netherlands in the Borneo 
question: 
In some cases, foreign policy not only 
concentrates exclusively on the short-run 
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factors, but also tends to consume the entire 
political process of a Small Power. The threat 
confronting it may seem so total and so 
imminent, that discussion of anything else 
appears irrelevant. "' 
In the Borneo dispute the need to remain on good terms 
with Britain was never overlooked by Dutch politicians and 
diplomats. However angry, fearful and suspicious the Dutch 
government may have been towards Britain, it remained 
cautious, even when expressing sympathy with other small 
powers experiencing similar colonial struggles with 
Britain. When Portugal was embroiled in the dispute over 
Africa, which culminated in Salisbury's famous ultimatum of 
January 1890 (stating that Portugal should withdraw her 
forces from the disputed territory), the Dutch press was 
favourable to Portugal. However, as E. Axelson points out: 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs [G. van 
Tienhoven] expressed the sympathy of his cabinet 
for the predicament in which Portugal found 
herself, but made it clear that his Government 
would not act against Britain. 
Although the Borneo question was obviously not the 
only issue occupying foreign-policy makers in the Dutch 
government, the British government's activity on Borneo was 
seen as a major threat to the Netherlands' status as a 
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colonial power, and this threat may have resulted - 
initially at least - in a panic which caused some Dutch 
politicians temporarily to overlook the fact that the 
Netherlands had no rights to the territory in question. 
The Anglo-Dutch relationship survived the turbulence 
caused by the Borneo question but the Netherlands appears 
to have paid the price for its survival by making more 
concessions than Britain; indeed it could be argued that it 
had no choice. The stifled resentment over the Borneo 
question may have helped to contribute to the eruption of 
anti-British feeling during the Boer Wars at the very end 
of the century. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE NISERO QUESTION 
Introduction 
Historians of Indonesia (and of Sumatra in particular) will 
already be familiar with the Nisero incident which involved 
the kidnap of a crew - including some British seamen - 
after a shipwreck which took place in 1883 during the Achin 
War. The purpose of this chapter is therefore not to 
introduce new sources, but to consider existing sources 
from a perspective which has not been dealt with in great 
depth by historians who have written on the subject. In 
this chapter, the Nisero question will be considered 
within the context of Anglo-Dutch relations, and in 
particular the Dutch perception of that relationship. 
The so-called `Nisero question' dominated Anglo-Dutch 
relations for a short period in the early 1880s, placing 
extra stress on a relationship which was already under 
strain from the long-running Borneo dispute. This chapter 
will examine the consequences of the Nisero question for 
the Anglo-Dutch relationship. The claim made by Maarten 
Kuitenbrouwer, in his standard work on Dutch colonial 
policies in the later nineteenth century, that the Nisero 
question did not fundamentally alter the Dutch government's 
policy towards Britain will also be considered. ' The Nisero 
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question is furthermore important from the point of view of 
public opinion (in this case British), and the extent to 
which the British government was influenced by this. In the 
Borneo dispute the situation was reversed: Dutch public 
opinion called for action against the British on Borneo, 
whereas in the Nisero question British public opinion 
called upon the British government to pressurise the 
apparently reluctant Dutch government into securing the 
release of the captured Nisero crew. 
The fullest treatment of the Nisero incident is to be 
found in A. Reid's Contest for North Sumatra. 2 The most 
recent treatment is in the work by Kuitenbrouwer mentioned 
above. 3 Also of interest is an article by W. Ph. Coolhaas, 
which describes the reactions of a prominent intellectual, 
Professor P. Harting to the Nisero question. ' Reid devoted 
an entire chapter to the Nisero question, which he 
considers from the perspective of the history of Sumatra, 
and more specifically `the special problem created by the 
division of commercial and political power in North Sumatra 
in a period of imperial expansion'. ' 
The Nisero incident took place within the context of 
the Dutch government's attempts to bring under its control 
Achin, a Sultanate in North Sumatra, the various districts 
of which were ruled by a chief traditionally known as an 
uleebalang. Later rulers of Achin's coastal dependencies 
were referred to by the colloquial Malay term `raja'. The 
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power of the Sultanate weakened with time, particularly 
during the nineteenth century with the rise of the coastal 
`pepper rajas', so-called because they derived most of 
their income from the pepper trade. 6 
Under the terms of the Anglo-Dutch Sumatra Treaty of 
1871, Great Britain undertook to `desist from all 
objections against the extension of the Netherlands 
Dominion in any part of the island of Sumatra', thereby 
effectively giving the Dutch a free hand there, although 
the earlier Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 still placed certain 
responsibilities upon them. In 1873, two years after the 
Sumatra Treaty, the Dutch government declared war upon the 
rebellious Achinese, many of whom resented their would-be 
masters and repeatedly expressed a desire for British 
protection. From the mid-1870s, several Dutch posts, with 
military support, were established on Sumatra's north, east 
and west coasts. ' Each post was governed by an Assistant 
Resident, who was responsible for strengthening Dutch 
influence in the dependencies of Achin. But the 
dependencies did not readily submit. Resentment grew and 
Dutch posts were frequently attacked. Dutch control thus 
appears to have been shaky, to say the least. What little 
control the Dutch had was exercised through punitive 
military attacks and the blockade of trading ports -a 
method which was applied at various times throughout the 
Achin War when other methods appeared to be failing. 
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The most important Dutch post, from the point of view 
of the Nisero question, was Meulaboh, on the north-west 
coast of Sumatra (see Map 4). Meulaboh was the closest post 
to the stranded ship Nisero and her captive crew. The 
relationship between Meulaboh's Assistant Resident, K. F. H. 
van Langen, and the Raja of Tenom, who had captured the 
Nisero crew, was a volatile one. It was characterised by 
harsh punitive measures provoked by suspicion and mistrust. 
Van Langen was suspicious and distrustful of the Raja, who 
in turn resented the presence of Van Langen. The Raja of 
Tenom had - outwardly at least - submitted to the Dutch in 
1877 by signing the so-called Eighteen Articles. 8 Yet such 
declarations on the part of native rulers were not always 
sincere, and it was not unknown for a Raja, having pledged 
his loyalty to the Dutch, to pass on financial aid from the 
latter to the pro-Achinese war party. ' 
On the night of 8 November 1883 the Nisero, a British 
ship registered in Sunderland, was stranded on the coast of 
Tenom, on the west coast of Achin. 1° She had left Soerabaija 
(on the east coast of Java) on 27 October 1883 with a cargo 
of sugar, bound for the Suez Canal and then for Marseille. 
The Captain, W. S. Woodhouse, and his crew were captured by 
the Raja of Tenom and held to ransom. The majority of the 
crew were English, with two Dutch, two Germans, two 
Italians and two Norwegians. " The British government held 
the Dutch government responsible for the release of the 
prisoners; they had, after all, been captured in a 
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territory over which the Dutch government claimed 
sovereignty. Heated exchanges ensued when the Dutch 
government - in British eyes - did not act swiftly and 
efficiently enough, and the situation worsened as reports 
reached Europe of illness and death among the prisoners, 
caused either by disease or by lack of food. Some British 
politicians also accused the British government of acting 
too slowly, while others appealed for financial 
compensation for the captives' dependants. 
In order to determine the extent to which the Nisero 
question influenced Anglo-Dutch relations, three main 
sources will be examined. Those sources are (as for the 
Borneo dispute): diplomatic exchanges, parliamentary 
debates, and the press. The Nisero question was essentially 
a humanitarian one: a straightforward question of life and 
death. However, other `peripheral' issues clouded the 
question, in particular the connection with the Achin War. 
Issues arose which had also fuelled the Borneo dispute, 
such as the Treaties of 1824 and 1871, and the small-power 
status of the Netherlands. These `peripheral' issues will 
be examined in this chapter on the grounds that they 
explain (but do not necessarily justify) the Dutch 
government's attitude in the question, which is the main 
subject of this study. 
In the following chapter, the Nisero question will be 
divided into three chronological sections, which highlight 
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the main developments in a somewhat complicated course of 
events. The first section will deal with the `initial' 
phase from the capture of the crew in November 1883 until 
W. E. Maxwell's visit to Tenom in February 1884, and his 
subsequent report. The second section will deal with Lord 
Granville's offer of mediation, made at the end of April 
1884, and in particular his motives and Dutch reactions to 
the offer. The third section will deal with the final stage 
of the question, from the Anglo-Dutch agreement to take 
joint action against the Raja of Tenom, reached in July 
1884, to the release of the captives in September 1884. 
From the capture of the crew to Maxwell's report 
When he heard that the Nisero crew had been captured, the 
Governor of Achin, Ph. F. Laging Tobias, instructed the 
local Assistant Resident to take all necessary measures to 
secure the prisoners' release. On 26 November the British 
Consul (Henry George Kennedy; the first British Consul for 
Sumatra, appointed in April 1882) arrived at Olehleh, as 
did the British warship H. M. S. Pegasus with its commander, 
Bickford. H. M. S. Pegasus had come to receive the captives 
on their release; Bickford would not intervene. Van Langen 
(Assistant Resident at Meulaboh) duly received a letter 
from the Raja of Tenom stating that he would free the 
prisoners if a certain Khoo Tiang Poh, a Chinese pepper 
trader from Penang, came to settle his debt in person. 12 The 
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solution at first appeared straightforward: if Tiang Poh's 
debt were settled, the prisoners would be released. 
Governor Tobias would pay this debt, and Tiang Poh would 
later reimburse the Governor. The Dutch government would 
then inform the Raja of Tenom that, if he released the 
prisoners, he would receive the same treatment from the 
Dutch government as the other Achin dependencies. '3 
Meanwhile, Mr Edouard Roura (a French naval commander 
and friend of the Raja of Tenom) and Teuku Yit (former 
guardian of, and principal counsellor to the Raja) 
delivered the message that the Raja was now demanding 
US$200,000 and a guarantee from the British Consul Kennedy 
that his ports would be re-opened. However, this `message' 
was deemed untrustworthy and it was decided to wait for the 
Raja's written reply to the latest Dutch proposals, which 
arrived on 4 December 1883. In a letter to Kennedy, the 
Raja demanded $300,000 compensation for damages caused by 
the punitive expedition sent to Bubun by the Dutch in 
December 1882. He also demanded the opening of his ports 
(with a guarantee from the King of England) and the exile 
of two of his enemies, whom he suspected of blaming him for 
attacks on Meulaboh. The Raja of Rigas, acting as an 
intermediary, conveyed a reply to these demands to the 
effect that the Dutch authorities would pay Tiang Poh's 
pepper debt and $500 for each prisoner released. As to the 
re-opening of the ports, it was reiterated that the Raja 
would receive the same treatment as the other dependencies 
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of Achin. 14 This meant that the Raja's ports would indeed 
be opened, albeit subject to the shipping regulation 
(scheepvaartregeling) imposed by the Dutch in 1883 (and 
re-imposed in 1892). The regulation stipulated that foreign 
ships visiting Achin must be accompanied by Dutch 
officials. Moreover, coastal trade was severely limited by 
restrictions on vessel size. 
On 10 December the Raja of Tenom's reply was brought 
by the Raja of Rigas. He was accompanied by Captain 
Woodhouse, the second engineer and the Nisero's Chinese 
cook. The second engineer was ill, and Woodhouse had been 
released on the condition that he return to captivity; if 
he failed to do so, his crew would be put to death. " 
Woodhouse now shed new light on the Raja's motives: it 
appeared that he was attempting to drive Britain and the 
Netherlands to war with each other (presumably because he 
preferred British to Dutch masters in Achin). 16 C. E. Van 
Kesteren, the chief editor of the Indische Gids, did not 
trust Woodhouse and could not understand why the Raja had 
released him: 
What moved the Rajah to release the Captain, of 
all people? We simply cannot find an acceptable 
reason for this. Indeed, wherever this man turns 
up there is mystery. " 
In fact, he considered the whole question mysterious, 
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not least the stranding of the Nisero in a location which, 
given its point of departure and destination, was miles off 
course: 
It is a mystery how he became stranded [... ] and 
no less a mystery how, having shown himself in 
any case to be incompetent, he was again given 
command of a ship, directly after his return to 
England - where they are usually unforgiving 
towards negligent captains. 18 
The Indische Gids was an influential colonial journal 
which first appeared in the Netherlands in 1879. Van 
Kesteren was a strong supporter of the colonial reform 
movement which had originated in Java. 19 He wrote three 
articles on the Achin War and the Nisero question which 
were, given the status of the Indische Gids influential and 
read with interest. J. K. W. Quarles van Ufford, who from 
1863 to 1901 was the author of the colonial chronicle in 
the liberal De Economist, recorded that the articles were 
`very much appreciated by different persuasions. ' He 
described the second of Van Kesteren's articles as an 
`excellent overview' (`uitstekend overzicht') of the Nisero 
question, and the author himself as `talented' (`bekwame 
schrijver'). 20 
It was not only in the Indische Gids that doubts were 
voiced about the stranding of the Nisero. The Dutch 
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Ambassador in London, Count Van Bylandt, asked Sir Julian 
Pauncefote (since 1882 Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs) whether the Nisero's course on the 
night in question was being investigated, in particular 
Captain Woodhouse's decision to set a new course which 
brought him so close to the coast of Sumatra. There were no 
harbour facilities for large ships and the coast was, 
moreover, under Dutch blockade. " According to Coolhaas, 
Captain Woodhouse was also suspected of smuggling weapons 
for the anti-Dutch, pro-Achinese party based in the Straits 
Settlements. 22 Pauncefote's answer to Van Bylandt was 
predictable. The matter had been investigated and although 
the findings had not yet been published, the conclusion was 
known: Captain Woodhouse was not guilty of acting in bad 
faith, and the shipowners were above all suspicion of 
deliberate shipwreck. 23 Given his status as a diplomat, Van 
Bylandt's question was neither diplomatic nor constructive, 
and appears to have been nothing more than an attempt to 
deflect blame from the Netherlands onto Britain. If this 
was the case, his attempt was unsuccessful. Such a 
sensitive question - which could be seen as a veiled 
accusation - would be unlikely to elicit from Pauncefote an 
admission of Woodhouse's negligence. Even if Woodhouse had 
acted negligently, it is unlikely that Pauncefote would 
admit that the meanderings of a British ship were 
responsible for the current painful state of affairs. He 
would probably be even less willing to make such an 
admission to Van Bylandt who, in the light of the 
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protracted Borneo dispute, had probably become the bane of 
his life. Moreover, as we have seen in the Borneo dispute, 
Pauncefote was not altogether favourably disposed towards 
the Netherlands. 
Van Bylandt's suspicions aroused the interest of the 
Salvage Association in London. On 13 June 1884 the 
Secretary of the Association wrote to Van Bylandt, 
requesting further information and informing him that the 
Association was representing the underwriters interested in 
the cargo. 24 Van Bylandt's reply of 18 June, written in 
English, stated that he was instructed to inform the 
Secretary that: 
the wrecking of that ship has never been 
attributed by me to any "criminal design" [... ] 
while my note of the 9th of that month [May] 
only expresses some doubt as to the 
"unavoidable" character of the wrecking, and the 
ground for this doubt is to be found in the own 
declarations of the captain of that vessel 
[]. 25 
According to Van Bylandt, Woodhouse's declarations 
left `very little doubt as to the careless manner in which 
Captain Woodhouse navigated his ship [... ]'. It was 
therefore not surprising, he concluded, that rumours 
abounded for which the Netherlands Government is not the 
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least responsible'. Z6 
Back in the East Indies, the demands made by the Raja 
on Captain Woodhouse's release were rejected. New Dutch 
proposals comprised settlement of the pepper debt, 
treatment on an equal footing with the other Achin ports, 
permission to export existing pepper stocks, and a payment 
of Hfl 5,000 for food for the imprisoned crew. The Raja was 
again unco-operative and expressed the hope that Consul 
Kennedy could persuade the Dutch to pay $300,000 
compensation for the losses at Bubun. 27 
The Raja's answer to the latest Dutch ultimatum had 
still not been received by 20 December 1883. This prompted 
Commander Bickford to ask Governor of Achin Tobias's 
permission to go to Tenom. Bickford would go with H. M. S. 
Pegasus but unaccompanied by any Dutch ship, to negotiate 
in person with the Raja. Tobias was reluctant. First, he 
foresaw danger for Bickford and, second, he believed that 
the mission would reflect badly upon Dutch rule. If 
Bickford were successful, the British success would 
highlight the Dutch failure. 28 Here we see further evidence 
of the Dutch preoccupation with the colonial prestige of 
the Netherlands, the preservation of which, as we have seen 
above in the Borneo question, was uppermost in the Dutch 
official mind. During the late nineteenth century scramble 
for colonies it was vital that the Dutch were seen to be in 
control of their own colonial possessions. If Dutch 
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authority were seen to falter, another European power might 
seize the opportunity to exploit that weakness. 
Eventually, in order to save the prisoners' lives, 
Tobias reluctantly agreed to let Bickford go to Tenom. He 
specified, however, that Bickford should sail on a merchant 
vessel flying a British flag. 29 If Bickford's mission was 
unsuccessful, a Dutch military expedition would be sent to 
Tenom. 30 Bickford cordially offered the services of H. M. S. 
Pegasus for the transport of troops and equipment on the 
expedition, but the offer was rejected. Van Kesteren, 
writing in the Indische Gids, could not understand why 
Bickford's offer of assistance had been rejected. Given 
that the Raja of Tenom wanted to cause antagonism between 
the British and the Dutch, would it not be more expedient 
to show him, by meting out a joint punishment, that he 
could not succeed? Van Kesteren feared that the rejection 
had offended Britain, citing as proof the fact that 
Bickford's following report was less amicable. " Meanwhile, 
a further complication had arisen. On 23 December, the 
warship HMS Merlin had arrived from Singapore, carrying a 
letter for Bickford from the Governor of the Straits 
Settlements, Sir Frederick Weld. Weld had written a letter 
to the Raja of Tenom, under the instructions of Colonial 
Secretary Lord Derby. He requested that Bickford hand this 
over in person. 32 Bickford then decided to appeal once more 
to the Governor of Achin to let H. M. S. Pegasus sail 
unaccompanied to Tenom. Bickford had, somewhat arrogantly, 
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let it be known that he intended to go to Tenom in any 
case. However, given the cordial relations between the 
British and Dutch authorities, he preferred to go with the 
Governor's agreement than without it. 33 Bickford's 
high-handedness could be explained by his eagerness to obey 
Weld's orders, particularly if those orders came indirectly 
from Lord Derby himself. Until this point he had not 
intervened directly, but had simply bided his time. 
However, orders such as those carried to him by H. M. S. 
Merlin could not be ignored. H. M. S. Pegasus duly set sail 
for Tenom, arriving on 26 December 1883. 
In the Indische Gids Van Kesteren had sympathised with 
Bickford when his offer of help was rejected. He was less 
sympathetic towards Bickford in reporting this latest 
complication. How could the Governor of Achin, who from the 
first had seen the danger inherent in Bickford's 
co-operation, now agree that H. M. S. Pegasus should appear 
unaccompanied in Tenom? The whole transaction, Van Kesteren 
commented, had been a humiliation for the Netherlands. 34 
This reaction is understandable. In this case the British 
government (represented by Weld and Derby) had made its 
influence felt. Van Kesteren criticised Tobias for allowing 
H. M. S. Pegasus to go to Tenom, but in reality he had had 
little choice. Since Bickford had stated that he would go 
anyway, the Governor's refusal to co-operate would only 
have angered the British government. It appears that he was 
prepared to suffer humiliation in order to avoid this. 
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Indeed, the merest flexing of diplomatic muscles by the 
British government appeared to awaken in the Dutch a strong 
desire for compromise and appeasement, however strongly 
they had hitherto fought their corner. This was also the 
case in the Borneo dispute: the Dutch government ultimately 
made concessions which it had considered unthinkable in the 
initial stages of the dispute. This suggests a relationship 
in which the Dutch government overestimated its role, 
possibly labouring under the illusion that it had as much 
influence as the British government on the course of the 
Anglo-Dutch relationship. The so-called `humiliations' 
suffered by the Netherlands were the British government's 
way of reminding the Dutch government of its subordinate 
position. 
Bickford's controversial visit to Tenom was fruitless. 
The military expedition was postponed due to the arrival in 
Olehleh of one Captain Christiansen, who had often traded 
in the ports of Achin, and was well known in Tenom. Tobias, 
in agreement with the British authorities, wished to send 
Christiansen to Tenom in a final attempt to communicate 
with the Raja. Christiansen was also unsuccessful, narrowly 
avoiding capture by the Raja of Tenom. 35 A Dutch military 
expedition consequently left for Tenom on 4 January 1884 
and hostilities began three days later when the Raja 
ignored a further ultimatum. " On 16 January the troops 
returned to Olehleh without the Nisero prisoners. 37 
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In many quarters, particularly in Britain, this 
unsuccessful military expedition was seen as a clumsy 
fiasco which had only served to make matters worse. The 
Raja of Tenom's residence had been destroyed, and several 
buildings taken. However, the net result was that the Raja 
had withdrawn into the interior of the island, taking with 
him his entourage and the prisoners. 38 Now they were even 
more inaccessible. Speaking in the British House of Commons 
in May 1884, Mr S. Storey (Member for Sunderland) recalled 
a description of the expedition by `a person who was well 
able to give information on the subject'. According to 
Storey, this source (whom he did not name) had stated that 
the purpose of the expedition (according to the Dutch 
government's official report) had not been the rescue of 
the prisoners, but `the chastisement of the district'. This 
led Storey to conclude that: 
[... ] it is not in the policy or the intention 
of the Dutch Government to do anything relating 
to these poor men except under strong pressure 
from the English government. 39 
It is possible that the military expedition of January 
1884 was not designed to rescue the prisoners. If its 
purpose had been to return with the prisoners, it is 
difficult to explain the fact that the Raja's escape 
further inland had not been predicted and strategic 
measures not taken to prevent it. There are two 
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possibilities: first, that the expedition was incompetently 
planned, or, second, that the expedition was indeed 
intended as a mere show of strength to punish and/or 
frighten the Raja. Either way, it had been unsuccessful. 
At the end of January 1884, the idea of sending a 
representative from the Straits Settlements to Tenom was 
discussed. The Dutch Governor-General of the Indies was 
consulted, and it was stated that the Dutch authorities did 
not object, provided the person in question would undertake 
the mission at his own risk. The Dutch would co-operate 
within limits to be set by the Governor of Achin. 4° On 26 
January Van Bylandt telegraphed the Dutch Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Van der Does de Willebois, that the 
Governor of the Straits Settlements (Sir Frederick Weld) 
had proposed sending a mediator to the Raja of Tenom. 41 On 
11 February, Van Bylandt informed the Minister that Weld 
wished to entrust the mission to someone by the name of 
Maxwell, a member of the Colonial Council of Singapore. 42 
Maxwell set sail from Penang for Achin on 16 February 1884. 
H. M. S. Pegasus, carrying Maxwell, arrived at Bubun three 
days later (see Map 4) and negotiations commenced, first 
with Teuku Yit (one of Tenom's leading private merchants 
who had great influence with the Raja) and later with the 
Raja himself. 43 The negotiations convinced Maxwell that 
there was only one possible solution: freedom of trade 
guaranteed by Britain. Governor Tobias, perhaps 
understandably, did not agree: freedom of trade would mean 
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the import of weapons for use against the Dutch, and the 
Bubun compensation could be used to the same ends. Maxwell, 
in turn, was probably frustrated at Tobias's intransigence. 
The dilatory attitude of the Dutch government could, then, 
be explained by its desire to solve two problems at once: 
the Nisero question and the Achin war. The Raja of Tenom 
was therefore not the only one bringing pressure to bear. 
It could be argued that the Dutch government, too, saw the 
Nisero incident as a means to an end, namely the submission 
of the rebellious Achinese. As Reid pointed out: 
Reports from Batavia had suggested that a 
complete closure of the Atjehnese coast would be 
the most effective way to bring pressure on the 
`war party', had it not been ruled out by the 
treaties with Britain. The growing crisis now 
presented an opportunity to make this closure 
acceptable to Britain as a means to the release 
of the crew. 44 
Thus it is likely that Maxwell was somewhat annoyed at the 
Governor of Achin's unwillingness to accept the only 
conditions which, Maxwell believed, would secure the 
prisoners' release. 
J. P. Sprenger van Eyk (Minister of Colonies from 
February 1884) claimed that the British had found the 
Raja's demands equally unacceptable. 45 From where, then, do 
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we receive the impression that Maxwell was dissatisfied 
with the Dutch attitude? Again, we must turn to the 
Indische Gids, and we find that the feeling was clearly 
mutual (at least as far as Van Kesteren was concerned). 
`Who is this Honourable Maxwell, anyway? ' ('Trouwens, wie 
is die Honorable Maxwell zelf? '), he asked, wondering why 
Maxwell had undertaken the mission when he was not even 
acquainted with the Raja of Tenom, unlike Christiansen, who 
had been on good terms with him for many years. There must 
be an explanation. Van Kesteren even hinted at a certain 
amount of secrecy: `A great deal has been published, but by 
no means everything' (`Er is veel gepubliceerd, maar alles 
nog op verre na niet'). He perceived Maxwell thus: 
We do, however, know enough to venture to say 
that this man cannot have been the loyal 
representative of a friendly power; he is too 
biased and bitter towards the Netherlands. " 
By way of proof, Van Kesteren quoted from Maxwell's 
report. One of the passages quoted shows how Maxwell 
perceived the Dutch. He commented, for example, that: 
The national pride of the Dutch and their 
jealous guarding of their prestige in the East 
prevent them from accepting the concept of a 
British guarantee of their strict observance of 
these or any conditions. " 
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As in the Borneo dispute, Dutch colonial prestige 
again became an issue and to a large extent influenced the 
Dutch attitude towards the Nisero question. This thread is 
present in many Anglo-Dutch negotiations on colonial issues 
at this time. Great Britain, which had protected many of 
the Dutch colonies from Napoleon at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, now became - in Dutch eyes - as great 
a threat to their colonial status as the other European 
powers. 
Meanwhile the British government found it necessary to 
remind the Dutch government of its responsibilities. On 15 
March 1884, Pauncefote wrote to Van Bylandt to clear up an 
apparent misunderstanding which had arisen concerning a 
ransom demand from the Raja of Tenom. Maxwell had informed 
the Straits Governor (Weld) that he hoped for success if 
the Netherlands authorities would pay $200,000 to the Raja. 
This was somehow misinterpreted by the Dutch, who were 
under the impression that this demand came from Maxwell 
himself. Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Van der Does de 
Willebois saw the Maxwell mission as an attempt by Britain 
to take matters into her own hands, and could not therefore 
comprehend how she could make such a demand. It was at this 
point that Pauncefote reminded the Dutch government of its 
responsibilities: 
[... ] I beg to point out that the attempt made 
by the Governor of the Straits Settlements to 
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communicate with the Rajah was made with the 
concurrence of your Government and that it 
cannot in any way relieve them of any 
responsibility which may attach to them in the 
matter . 
48 
After the failure of the Maxwell mission, Governor 
Tobias and British Consul Kennedy considered the 
possibility of employing native rulers in Achin to secure 
the prisoners' release. 49 A telegram had been received from 
the Governor General of the Indies reporting that he had 
given permission for help to be granted to certain native 
rulers willing to show their strength against the Raja of 
Tenom, and that certain advantages had been promised if 
they succeeded in releasing the prisoners. " 
The British offer of mediation 
By this time, the failure of the Dutch government to secure 
the release of the prisoners had caused considerable 
resentment in Britain. The hitherto unsuccessful 
negotiations did not inspire optimism. On 29 April 1884, 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Granville wrote to Count van 
Bylandt, offering British mediation. 51 Granville hoped that 
the Dutch government would accept the offer `in the 
friendly spirit in which it is tendered', and that 
solutions could be found to satisfy all parties. 52 
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Granville was to be disappointed. The Dutch government 
did not accept his offer in a friendly spirit. In fact, his 
offer again touched the raw nerve of Dutch colonial 
prestige. On 10 May 1884 Van Bylandt handed over to 
Granville De Willebois' reply to the offer of mediation. In 
his report of the ensuing conversation, Van Bylandt 
informed De Willebois: 
I answered that the friendly intentions behind 
the proposal were not doubted for one moment, 
but that even before I had received my 
Government's answer, the proposal seemed totally 
unacceptable to me, to the greatest extent 
harmful to the prestige of our authority, not 
only on Sumatra, but throughout the whole of the 
Netherlands Indies. 53 
Tactful as ever, Van Bylandt did not hesitate to point 
out to Granville that the Raja would not have dared to make 
such outrageous and unacceptable demands if the British 
authorities had, from the very beginning, refrained from 
every intervention. Van Bylandt clearly felt that Britain's 
involvement had made matters more difficult for the Dutch 
government. 54 Whether or not his judgement was correct, it 
seems unwise for Van Bylandt to have stated this to Lord 
Granville at such a sensitive time. Again, Van Bylandt 
appears to be attempting to shift some of the 
responsibility for the Nisero question onto the British 
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government: he had first attempted to do so, as we have 
seen above, by suggesting that circumstances surrounding 
the stranding of the Nisero were suspicious. Van Bylandt 
ended his report of this meeting with Granville by 
informing De Willebois that: 
Lord Granville could not suppress his 
disappointment that his proposal of mediation 
had not been accepted, and I must confess that 
our leave-taking was cool. 55 
Granville's disappointment was not unnatural, but Van 
Bylandt does not appear to have considered the possibility 
that his own less-than-tactful remarks may have been partly 
responsible for the coolness of their leave-taking. 
De Willebois' reaction to the mediation offer appears 
to have been shared in many quarters. According to Van 
Kesteren in the Indische Gids, the Dutch government, in 
rejecting the offer, `[... ] was drawing a sharper and more 
distinct line between goodwill and subservience' "56 Clearly, 
then, Van Kesteren felt that the position of the 
Netherlands in the Anglo-Dutch relationship was not a 
favourable one. He added that the Dutch people were united 
in the rejection of British mediation. In a later article 
in the Rotterdamsche Courant, the author remarked that the 
mediation offer was not only in blatant contravention of 
the 1871 Treaty (according to which Achin was not a state 
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independent of the Netherlands), but was also not feasible, 
since there was no legal head of government in Achin. The 
offer was: 
[... ] nothing more and nothing less than folly, 
to which the British government was brought not 
by the concern for the fate of the Nisero crew, 
but by the [free-trade] argument of the pepper 
ports. 57 
These were strong words which accused Britain of being 
more concerned about its trading interests than about the 
prisoners. But the motivations of the British government 
are in a sense less relevant here than those of the Dutch 
government; the simple fact remained that the Dutch 
government had failed to rescue prisoners taken on 
territory over which it claimed sovereignty. The lives of 
those prisoners were more dependent upon Dutch actions than 
upon British actions. Therefore the motivation of the Dutch 
government could justifiably be called into question. 
The author of the Rotterdamsche Courant article 
attempted to make the mediation offer appear even more 
unreasonable by emphasizing that it had been made by `a 
civilised nation - one of the greatest powers' to the 
government of a nation `which, in a moral sense, stands 
equal to that nation' (`dat in zedelijk opzicht met dat 
grote land gelijk staat'). 58 
187 
Strong voices were also heard on the subject of the 
mediation offer in the Dutch Second Chamber where, at the 
beginning of June 1884, Brantsen van de Zijp (the 
Anti-Revolutionary Member for Zutphen) proclaimed: 
[... ] as a Dutchman I protest -I protest with 
all the power that is in me against every 
intervention, from whatever side, in our 
domestic affairs, and it seems to me that a 
refusal was the only possible answer. 59 
Speaking on the same occasion, Des Amorie van der 
Hoeven (Member for Breda) also expressed his approval of 
the rejection of the British offer of mediation. He stated 
that any other response would have constituted `[... I a 
forfeiture of our honour and the dignity of our colonial 
rule and of our Dutch nationality. j60 According to L. W. C. 
Keuchenius (Member for Gorkum), the stipulations in the 
Anglo-Dutch Treaties of 1824 and 1871 justified the 
rejection of any intervention by Britain, and also 
justified the attempts by the Dutch to carry out their 
responsibilities on Sumatra as laid down in those Treaties. 
But Keuchenius was less antagonistic towards Britain than 
his colleagues Brantsen and Des Amorie van der Hoeven. He 
would not have asked to speak, he claimed, if he had not 
feared that Brantsen's speech could be damaging to the 
relationship with Britain. 61 He had, in the history of the 
Achin War thus far, found no reason at all to doubt the 
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goodwill of Britain towards the Netherlands. Given the 
various British attempts to help the Dutch succeed in their 
struggle against the Achinese, Keuchenius, an outspoken 
critic of the Achin war, believed that the offer of 
mediation was nothing other than friendly and his remarks 
show that he was clearly anxious not to anger the British 
government. 62 
De Willebois justified his rejection of Granville's 
offer by explaining that if British mediation were 
accepted, Achin chiefs would resort to the same tactics in 
the future, thus endangering British subjects and those of 
other nations in Achinese waters. Moreover, the measures 
required to make the waters safe for shipping would hinder 
commerce. De Willebois and his government were convinced 
that, in order to achieve anything with the chiefs of 
Achin, it was necessary to assert superiority and 
authority. De Willebois stressed further that `nothing 
would be so disadvantageous for the unfortunate prisoners 
than the activities carried out by a third power in order 
to deliver them'. 63 No doubt the Dutch government was 
sincere in these beliefs. In British eyes, however, this 
would not secure the release of the prisoners. 
Meanwhile, resentment at the Dutch government's 
failure was growing rapidly in Britain. On 22 May 1884 in 
the British House of Commons, Samuel Storey (Radical) 
pointed out that the crew of the Nisero had been in 
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captivity for 232 days. He did not hesitate in placing the 
responsibility for their release with the Dutch government, 
who `[... ] claimed sovereignty in those parts; and 
therefore they owed it to us to produce those men when we 
demanded their release'. Storey believed that the Dutch 
government was content to have an `open sore' between 
themselves and the Rajah of Tenom, and for the imprisoned 
crew to remain a `bone of contention'. It was, he 
emphasised, the duty of the British government to force the 
Dutch government into action. Other members supported him. " 
It is likely that Storey was motivated not by aggression 
towards the Netherlands, but by humanitarian feelings. Many 
of the relatives of the captured crew lived in his 
constituency (the Nisero was registered in Sunderland), so 
he would be more aware than most of the misery and hardship 
brought about by the men's capture. His impatience with the 
apparent indifference of the Dutch government - and also 
with the British Foreign Office - is more understandable 
when considered in this light. 
William Redmond (Member for Wexford), speaking on the 
same occasion, believed that the British government was 
`afraid, and altogether too mean, to stand up against a 
Power which could not be considered at all powerful'. " It 
is not clear from the context of this remark whether 
Redmond was referring to Tenom or to the Netherlands. 
However, if he was referring to the Netherlands, his remark 
is an insight into one particular British perception of the 
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status of the Netherlands. 
The debate in the British House of Commons was 
followed on 9 June 1884 by the debate (mentioned above) in 
the Dutch Second Chamber, centred on Brantsen van de Zijp's 
Interpellation, a matter which was naturally not ignored by 
the press. According to an article in the Amsterdammer, the 
British offer of mediation was `an ominous sign' (`een veeg 
teken') and it was the government's duty immediately to 
prevent all further reference to it. Reporting on the 
interpellation, the author of an article in the 
Amsterdammer praised the government for not angering 
Britain, an indication either that he recognised British 
superiority, or that he simply felt intimidated by Britain: 
During the Nisero interpellation, all sharp and 
hostile remarks towards the powerful Albion were 
withheld. That was sensible. It would have been 
by no means disadvantageous to the dignity of 
the Chamber, or to the impression which the 
debate must have made in England, if Mr Brantsen 
had concealed his doubt as to the actual 
accidental stranding of the ship; but there was 
in any case not a single word in the debate 
which could have caused offence on the other 
side of the Ocean. 66 
An article in the Rotterdamsche Courant of 15/16 June 
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1884 gives an interesting insight into another Dutch 
perception of Britain. The article refers to the belief, 
held by some (it does not specify by whom), that Britain's 
disappointment at events in Egypt and the Sudan, and the 
defeat suffered by her in Central Asia, `[... ] where the 
Briton must increasingly move aside for the Russian', had 
exerted a negative influence on the British attitude in the 
Nisero question. This suggests that Britain was avenging 
its disappointment on the unfortunate Dutch. However, the 
author disagreed with this and did not believe that a 
`misplaced national sentiment' would mislead the British 
government into `unjust treatment' of a friendly power. He 
preferred to believe that the British government was acting 
`in the best of faith' in the Nisero question, although it 
had unfortunately been `swept along by spokesmen and 
advocates with a wounded self-interest', which had led it 
to act subjectively. The final paragraph of this article 
reveals how the Rotterdamsche Courant perceived the status 
of the Netherlands: 
[... ] the decision to be made [on the Nisero 
question] will answer the demands of national 
pride and those of our glorious past, which 
tolerate no violation of our independence. 67 
Here, again, the Dutch were seeking confirmation of 
their world status in the colonial prestige of the 
Netherlands. Those who found it difficult to come to terms 
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with the Netherlands' second-rank status in Europe would no 
doubt find comfort in the reference to a `glorious past'. 
Towards the end of June 1884 a further complication 
arose. On 25 June, De Willebois received a telegram from 
the Dutch Consul-General in Singapore, reporting that 
Commander Bickford and H. M. S. Pegasus had once again left 
for Tenom. 68 This was an affront to the Dutch government. 
Van Bylandt pointed out to Granville that since the west 
coast of Achin was under blockade, no ship was permitted to 
enter those waters without a special license. If the 
British government had requested this license, the Dutch 
government would no doubt have granted it, in the spirit of 
friendship which had hitherto characterised relations 
between the two governments. 69 Granville attempted to 
appease the bruised sensibilities of the Dutch government. 
In a letter to De Willebois he assured him that no 
discourtesy had been intended. 70 At a time of such tension 
and sensitivity, it would surely have been more sensible 
for the British government to heed the formalities and make 
a formal request for the license in question. The fact that 
this was not done suggests two things: first, that the 
British government took it for granted that the Dutch 
government would not be concerned and, second, that it did 
not support the blockade, and thus such a contravention was 
a demonstration of opposition. Either way, the British 
government did not respect Dutch authority in the matter, 
which is a further indication of how it perceived the 
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Anglo-Dutch relationship 
The Proposal of United Action 
Meanwhile, the Anglo-Dutch negotiations had entered a new 
phase. On 29 June Van Bylandt wrote to De Willebois 
reporting a meeting with Sir Julian Pauncefote. Pauncefote 
declared that the only solution was for the British and 
Dutch governments to act jointly to bring the Raja to 
order. " Six days later, on 5 July 1884, a conference took 
place at the Foreign Office in London. Present were 
Granville, Pauncefote, Van Bylandt, Pruys van der Hoeven 
(Civil Governor of Achin from April 1882 to March 1883) and 
Van der Wyck (Secretary-General for the Colonies since 
1880). 72 Van der Wyck and Van der Hoeven would, it was 
hoped, lend weight to the Dutch government's arguments. The 
proposal for united action was made, with Granville again 
stressing the goodwill between the two countries. The 
Cabinet was anxious to act `in concert with the country 
with which Great Britain had always entertained relations 
of such close friendship, and in the continuance of which 
both nations were so much interested'. 
The thorny issue of Dutch national pride was again 
touched upon by Van Bylandt. Reporting the proceedings to 
De Willebois, he stated that he had raised the issue of the 
British government's attitude which caused it to challenge 
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the right of the Netherlands `to adopt in our own 
possessions such measures as we think fit to preserve our 
rights and protect our interests'. 73 
Shortly before the conference on 5 July at the Foreign 
Office, Storey had raised the Nisero question in the 
British House of Commons. 74 The British government was again 
called upon to bring pressure to bear on the Dutch 
government. Storey criticised the British government for 
leaving matters in the hands of the Dutch government which, 
he stated, `simply cared to keep open the dispute with the 
Raja, whom they had failed to conquer, and it was a matter 
of indifference to them, what became of the crew'. Yet he 
was not fundamentally anti-Dutch, simply critical of the 
Dutch attitude towards the Nisero question: 
[... ] it cannot be a thing to contemplate with a 
light heart that there should be any difficulty 
between us and a friendly Power like the Dutch. 
I should be the last to say one unnecessary word 
in this House or in the country to cause 
unpleasantness between us and the Dutch 
Government; but, after all, if circumstances 
have caused unpleasantness, the actions of the 
Dutch have assisted in this [... ]. 'S 
Mr A. Brogden (Member for Wednesbury), remarking that 
`too many cooks spoil the broth', echoed the Dutch view 
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that Great Britain should not have intervened. He asked the 
House how it would have reacted if the situation had been 
reversed. The Dutch government, left to its own devices, 
`would have been obliged to take some steps that would have 
before now produced good results'. 76 The Liberal Sir George 
Balfour (Member for Kincardineshire), somewhat 
chauvinistically attributed the present difficulties to 
`that monopolising spirit which pervaded the Dutch 
character', " but Gladstone himself defended the Dutch 
government, stating that it `was certainly not in an 
attitude of indifference', but that great difficulties 
attended the adoption of its measures. 78 
On 16 July 1884 the Dutch government informed the 
British government that it accepted the proposal for united 
action. 79 But Granville had two reservations. The first 
concerned the unspecified sum of money to be paid to the 
Raja, and the second concerned the Dutch blockade of Achin 
ports, which the British government opposed. 
A further complication concerned the wording of the 
instructions for the joint agreement to be sent to Consul 
Kennedy. The British government wished all details of the 
agreement to be included in these instructions, and wished 
to specify to the Raja that, if he complied with the 
ultimatum, freedom of trade would be established in his 
ports. The Dutch government disagreed. It argued that 
mention of the British government would be interpreted by 
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the Raja as a British guarantee of free trade and, in 
future differences with the Dutch government, he would turn 
to the British government for support. The Dutch government 
also disagreed with the concept `freedom of trade', and 
wished to guarantee no more than a re-opening of the Raja's 
ports in line with the shipping regulations. A solution was 
finally agreed upon on 25 July 1884. The final text of the 
paragraph contained no reference to a joint agreement 
between the Dutch and British governments; neither did it 
promise to guarantee freedom of trade, but simply stated 
that the ports would be `re-opened to trade'. This was 
indeed a victory for Dutch diplomacy. It is likely, 
however, that the British concession was due less to Dutch 
cogency than to a British desire speedily to resolve the 
matter. 
The correspondence on the wording of this paragraph 
had caused a delay of some five or six days, despite 
warnings from the British government that further delay 
could have serious consequences. The Dutch government was 
by all accounts very satisfied with the outcome, which was 
perceived by many as an important concession by the British 
government. This feeling was reinforced by the fact that 
the British government had made no further mention of 
mediation. In the Indische Gids, Van Kesteren commented 
that this development had brought the Nisero question into 
another phase. 80 An article in the Rotterdamsche Courant of 
20/21 July also acknowledged this: 
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That they have, in London, dropped this demand 
or, if you will, offer to intervene themselves 
with the Rajah of Tenom - yes, even with the 
Achinese chiefs - or actually removed it from 
the discussions, totally changed the character 
of the diplomatic negotiations. " 
The article ascribed this success to the firm attitude 
(`kloeke houding') of Van Bylandt towards the British 
government. This `victory' over the British government 
reinforced Dutch pride: `we may no longer be what we were 
in the international field, but the old Dutch resilience 
has clearly not yet perished. '82 Given the circumstances of 
the Nisero question, the results of the negotiations were 
even more satisfying. In an article in the Rotterdamsche 
Courant it was remarked - rather insensitively considering 
the plight of the captives - that `given the way in which 
matters have now been settled, we even have reason not to 
regret all too deeply that the Nisero difficulty arose. '83 
Dutch honour had remained intact, and the regard of the 
other Powers unshaken. These remarks lead to the unhappy 
conclusion that, at least as far as the Rotterdamsche 
Courant author was concerned, the preservation of Dutch 
prestige was at least as important as the lives of the 
captives. Considered in this light, British frustration 
with the Dutch government was understandable. 
Similar self-congratulatory sentiments were expressed 
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in Dutch diplomatic circles. On 30 July Van der Hoeven (the 
Dutch ambassador in Berlin) wrote to De Willebois, 
reporting that he had emphasised to the German government 
(and, when necessary, to his colleagues) that it was the 
British, and not the Dutch government which had `moved from 
its original standpoint and offered its co-operation', 
having first made an unacceptable proposal of mediation. 84 
On the same day Van Bylandt wrote a somewhat sycophantic 
letter to De Willebois, emphasising his success: 
Your Excellency will realise that it was no easy 
task for the ambassador of a second-rank power 
such as the Netherlands, to bring the government 
of a great power, such as England to take 
initiatives in flat contradiction to its 
attitude hitherto. 85 
Since the initiative for joint action had come from 
Britain, the honour of the Netherlands had been preserved. 
Van Bylandt was relieved. It was, he wrote, obvious that 
the Dutch government could not itself have asked for the 
British government's help: `that would indeed have been 
damaging to our prestige, and an admission of 
powerlessness. ' 86 
On 31 July in the Dutch Second Chamber, Des Amorie van 
der Hoeven (Member for Breda), also acknowledged the 
concessions made by Britain regarding the offer of 
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mediation and the wording of Article 2 of the Instructions 
for the joint mission. Again, as in the press and 
diplomatic circles, these were referred to in the context 
of Dutch prestige; both issues involved the national pride 
of the Netherlands and its sovereignty as a colonial 
power. " 
But was this really such a great victory for the 
Dutch? The Dutch attributed their `victory' to cogency yet, 
given the urgency of the circumstances, it is likely that 
the British government conceded these points in order to 
prevent further delay, which makes the victory appear 
somewhat hollow. Time, after all, was of the essence if the 
lives of the prisoners were to be saved. By contrast, the 
attitude of the British government in the Borneo question 
was markedly less conciliatory and more persistent. This 
suggests that in more urgent matters the British government 
was prepared to concede points to the Dutch government, and 
was not necessarily preoccupied with asserting its 
authority within the Anglo-Dutch relationship. This is 
supported by Reid's claim that Pauncefote wished to avoid 
a rupture with the Netherlands. 88 The Dutch, meanwhile, 
celebrated the British concession as a major victory. The 
self-congratulatory outpourings of certain diplomats, 
politicians and sections of the press suggest that Dutch 
priorities - in certain quarters - did not lie with the 
Nisero prisoners. They lay instead with the preservation of 
Dutch (colonial) prestige and the subjection of Achin. 
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These two preoccupations were certainly linked in the Dutch 
official mind, and are strongly indicative of feelings of 
inferiority, the main remedy for which was to remind the 
world (and Britain in particular) of the Netherlands' 
position as a colonial power. 
However, feelings of national inferiority were not 
universal among the Dutch. Van Kesteren, writing in the 
Indische Gids, was sceptical about the Dutch victory. He 
claimed that the British proposals accepted by the 
Netherlands were, in fact, mostly Dutch proposals, made in 
December 1883 at Kota Radja (the capital of Achin and a 
Dutch stronghold), but rejected by the British, who `saw 
the flexibility of the Dutch as pretentious'. The article 
ends with a negative perception of Britain. Van Kesteren 
wondered whether Britain, disappointed at the rejection of 
its mediation proposal, would try `in a roundabout way to 
achieve the desired outcome for its glory and thirst for 
power. 189 British foreign policy was not renowned for its 
loyalty and Van Kesteren feared that the intrigues of the 
Nisero question (which had been only partly revealed) would 
preserve this tradition. In a final note of warning, he 
emphasised that great caution should be exercised in 
organizing the Anglo-Dutch expedition, since even this 
could endanger the future and status of the Netherlands as 
a colonial power. " 
Van Bylandt, too, exercised caution in his dealings 
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with Pauncefote, whom he did not trust. As we have seen in 
the Borneo question, the interests of the Netherlands were 
not among Pauncefote's priorities. Towards the end of his 
triumphant letter to De Willebois of 30 July 1884, Van 
Bylandt mentioned the fact that Pauncefote was now as much 
with the Netherlands against the Raja as he had been 
against the Netherlands in the beginning. However pleasing 
this development, Van Bylandt was not taken in: 
This does not alter the fact that I do not trust 
him at all, and that every written proposal made 
by him must be carefully examined word for 
word. " 
Pauncefote's change of attitude was seen by the Dutch 
diplomats as an attempt to vindicate himself. On 18 August 
1884 Van Tets van Goudriaan (former head of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs' cabinet) wrote to Van Bylandt reporting a 
meeting with H. B. Fenton, secretary to the British legation 
in The Hague. Fenton was deeply sorry to hear that Van 
Bylandt found Pauncefote to be unfavourably disposed 
towards the Netherlands in the Nisero question, the more so 
since, on speaking to Pauncefote himself, he found the 
contrary to be true. Pauncefote had adopted a position 
which only a Dutchman could: it was, reported Van Tets 
'[... ] in a word, Sir Julian's only wish to help the Dutch 
government as much as possible in the unpleasant Nisero 
affair'. 92 Van Tets observed further that Fenton's message 
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had clearly been passed on with express purpose and was 
consistent with Pauncefote's recent politeness and 
obligingness. 93Clearly the unsatisfactory relations between 
Van Bylandt and Pauncefote regarding the Borneo question 
also influenced their dealings in the Nisero question. 
It was not only Pauncefote whose attitude had changed; 
on 31 July 1884, during an interpellation in the Dutch 
Second Chamber, the Dutch government was similarly accused. 
The liberal Rutgers van Rozenburg expressed his annoyance, 
not at the pressure exerted by the British government, but 
at the Dutch government's volte-face. The Dutch government 
was the guardian of Dutch prestige but, having initially 
carried out a well-motivated bogus defence, it had suddenly 
made an about-turn. 94 Van Rozenburg was referring to the 
fact that, having initially rejected British mediation, the 
Dutch government had now agreed to a joint mission. He saw 
this joint mission as `a cession of our authority in our 
own household. 95 De Willebois had justified this by 
explaining that the Dutch government had employed every 
possible method in order to free the prisoners. Then came 
Britain's unacceptable offer of mediation. The Dutch 
government was now in a difficult position. It had refused 
British mediation, yet still had not succeeded in freeing 
the captive Nisero crew. The obstacle to Dutch success was 
the Raja of Tenom, who believed that he could gain British 
support. Before the Dutch government could make headway, it 
first had to show the Raja that the British government 
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would not support his antics. The British proposal for 
joint action was considered in all seriousness and - unlike 
the mediation proposal - was found acceptable. Those who 
were against joint action overlooked the fact that the 1824 
Anglo-Dutch Treaty included a mutual responsibility to 
combat piracy - jointly if necessary. 96 
The debate in the Dutch Second Chamber on 31 July 1884 
reveals more than Dutch national sentiment; it also reveals 
Dutch perceptions of Great Britain. These perceptions were 
not all negative. The resentments and frustrations of the 
Nisero question cloaked a general realization that the 
British government was under considerable pressure from 
public opinion. De Willebois pointed out that the British 
government had no choice but to press for the release of 
the prisoners, since it was troubled almost every day in 
Parliament by very awkward interpellations. 97 According to 
Rutgers van Rozenburg it should be remembered that `the 
British government was faced with a wild agitation of 
sympathy among the English people,. " Van Houten (Liberal 
member for Groningen) was also aware of the influence of 
public opinion: 
[... ] it is the same there as here: initially 
the most boisterous opinion paves the way. Even 
now the Nisero question is not yet under 
discussion to the extent that every Englishman 
has an opinion on the matter, and the most 
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inflammatory and - for us - disadvantageous 
opinions are heeded most there. 99 
Certain Dutch Members were concerned that the British 
perception of the Dutch was inaccurate. The chairman of the 
Indisch Genootschap and Member for Hoorn, Mr W. van Dedem, 
regretted that the Dutch government had done nothing to 
correct the current British perception that the Dutch were 
powerless to free the prisoners, and that it was the Raja's 
power which prevented this. Van Dedem disputed this: the 
problem was that the prisoners were being held in an area 
of dense tropical forest unfamiliar to the Dutch. 10° As a 
mitigating circumstance this is unconvincing, given that it 
was arguably the clumsy and unsuccessful Dutch military 
expedition of January 1884 which had driven the Raja to 
move the prisoners into the interior in the first place. 
The Dutch, it seems, had failed to foresee and prevent this 
predictable course of action. Again, Van Dedem's 
sensitivity reflects the Dutch sensitivity regarding the 
colonial prestige of the Netherlands and the fear that the 
Netherlands would be seen to be unable to keep its colonial 
house in order. 
Further negative perceptions of Britain can be found 
in the Indische Gids. In the second of his three articles, 
Van Kesteren referred to the hostile attitudes of Lord 
Derby (Britain's Colonial Secretary) and Sir Frederick Weld 
(former Governor of the Straits Settlements). The letter 
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had adopted this stance as soon as the Nisero had become 
stranded and, assured of Lord Derby's support, persisted in 
this attitude. Weld's anti-Dutch attitude was not simply a 
result of the Dutch government's attitude in the Nisero 
question. He was strongly opposed to the way in which the 
Dutch were attempting to control Achin. He also resented 
the Dutch shipping regulation (scheepvaartregeling) in 
Achinese waters, which he believed was designed to attract 
trade to Olehleh and away from Penang, hitherto the centre 
of Straits trade. "' 
As evidence of Weld's attitude, Van Kesteren cited 
Weld's sending of H. M. S. Pegasus to Tenom, the content of 
his letters to Derby, and his letter to the Raja of Tenom. 
The letter to which Van Kesteren refers here is probably 
the letter of December 1 883 from Weld to the Raja, of which 
Van Kesteren says in a footnote: 
This also shows, in our opinion, that Sir 
Frederik Weld, familiar with Dutch authority 
with respect to the Raja, has not taken on a 
loyal attitude. The English reads: "And that my 
friend may be judged and stand or fall by his 
own acts before God and before the Queen". 102 
It could be seen that Weld `was continuously out to 
humiliate the Netherlands, to make the Netherlands appear 
suspect, to make England's superiority felt in the 
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Netherlands, and that Weld would listen to any individual, 
no matter how untrustworthy, if they could blacken the name 
of the Netherlands. 
Van Kesteren believed that during the six months 
preceding the joint action proposal, much had happened to 
give reason for concern. He criticised the `spineless' 
(`zenuwloze') government of Jacob, Governor General of the 
Dutch East Indies, claiming that the latter's ingratiating 
attitude towards Britain far exceeded the bounds of 
international courtesy. History had taught that: 
in order to enjoy a long-lasting friendship with 
the spirited English, one should never bring 
one's own spirit into doubt; this lesson has 
been ignored in the Indies, and the injurious 
intervention proposal is the punishment for 
this. 104 
Van Kesteren clearly believed that the British 
government would take advantage of any chinks in the armour 
of Dutch national pride in order to assert its superiority. 
But there is no clear evidence that the British 
government took this attitude in the Nisero question. It 
was indeed guilty of pressurizing the Dutch government, but 
the failure of the Dutch government to release the 
prisoners justified this to some extent. It does not appear 
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to be the case that Britain exploited the circumstances in 
order to belittle or bully the Dutch government simply from 
a need to assert its superiority or, as had been claimed, 
to avenge its colonial disappointments in other parts of 
the world. 
The united action agreed upon by the British and Dutch 
governments was ultimately successful. The Annual Register 
for 1884 reports: 
[... ] before the Anglo-Dutch ultimatum, 
threatening him with war if he did not give up 
his prisoners, reached him, the rajah of Tenom 
submitted to the will of the two nations, and on 
11 September the Governor of Atchin conducted 
back to Kottaradja all the survivors of the crew 
of the Nisero. 'os 
Pauncefote had hoped all along that the mere threat of 
joint action would bring the Rajah to submit, and his hopes 
had been fulfilled. 106 
In his third and final article on the Nisero question 
in the Indische Gids, Van Kesteren was no more sympathetic 
towards the British government. He cast suspicion on the 
owners of the Nisero, Messrs. Pinckney & Sons of 
Sunderland, referred again to Derby's injurious memorandum 
(in which Derby compared the hitherto unsuccessful Dutch 
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attempts to suppress the Achinese to British success in 
Malakka), and criticised the British government's treatment 
of the Dutch government. 107 He also made clear the position 
of the Netherlands as a small power: 
Small powers should not be indifferent towards 
the public opinion of other countries. Small 
powers should seek support and protection 
against violence in that opinion, and will find 
it therein. In earlier times this was also 
understood in the Netherlands [.., ], 108 
Commenting more specifically on the status of the 
Netherlands with respect to Britain, Van Kesteren claimed 
that Dutch policy was dictated by the need to `spare the 
sensibility of England'. Britain had always been one of the 
Netherlands' rivals in the Indonesian Archipelago and had 
always `plotted and schemed' (`gestookt en geintrigeerd') 
against the Dutch, in the nineteenth century no less than 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The 
Netherlands had nevertheless `faint-heartedly submitted to 
many a humiliation because we wanted to spare English 
sensibilities. r109 The door had thus been left open for many 
English connivings (`kuiperijen'). Van Kesteren concluded: 
However valuable England's goodwill, the price 
appears to us to be too high, when the 
Netherlands must lower itself to such an extent 
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that one may justifiably quote Beaconsfield's 
jeering words and call our nation an 
extinguished people. "' 
This confirms the underlying irony of the Anglo-Dutch 
relationship, namely that the two nations were at the same 
time European allies and colonial rivals. Because the 
Netherlands' interests in Europe were largely supported by 
Britain, successive Dutch governments judged it wise not to 
anger their more powerful neighbour, whose protective wing 
could be useful against the political and territorial 
ambitions of its European neighbours. 
A further anti-British article was published in the 
Indische Gids, written in July 1884 by Van Langen 
(Assistant Resident of Meulaboh). According to Van Langen, 
Britain was exploiting the Nisero question in order to 
force the introduction of free trade between the Straits 
Settlements and Achin. He claimed - as many of his 
contemporaries had - that British intervention had made 
matters worse and prolonged the whole affair. Originally, 
the Raja had required nothing more than the settlement of 
a pepper debt. But, hinted Van Langen, British intervention 
had given him other ideas. "' Maxwell had stated that had it 
not been for the policy of the Netherlands, the freedom of 
the Nisero crew would not have been endangered. Quoting 
this passage from Maxwell's report, Van Langen commented 
that the incident would never have occurred, had it not 
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been for the questionable seamanship of that crew. "' Here, 
Van Langen's tactics resemble those of Van Bylandt: Van 
Langen met reproachful remarks by Britain about Dutch 
conduct (probably containing an element of truth) with 
counter-accusations in an attempt to deflect blame and 
possibly to soothe a guilty conscience. In a judgement 
consistent with the Dutch resentment of foreign 
`intervention', Van Langen condemned British actions as 
`thoroughly ill-considered and a dangerous antecedent for 
their colonial realm'. 113 
Conclusion 
Some of the issues which arose during the Nisero question 
also surfaced during the Borneo dispute, in particular the 
status of the Netherlands, and Dutch attempts both 
simultaneously to come to terms with and preserve that 
status. In general, the mutual perceptions evident in the 
Borneo dispute also prevailed during the Nisero question, 
particularly the perception of Britain as a colonial rival. 
Mutual resentment was rife: the British government resented 
the Dutch government's failure to release the prisoners, 
and the apparent slowness with which it acted. The Dutch 
government, in turn, resented the pressure exerted upon it 
by the British government and, while acknowledging the 
influence of public opinion, continued to perceive the 
British government's actions as interference. Such meddling 
21 1 
was unacceptable because it gave the impression that the 
Dutch government was unable to keep its own affairs in 
order, which in turn was detrimental to its colonial 
prestige, the main source of Dutch national self-esteem. 
This had not gone unnoticed in Britain. Storey, commenting 
in the House of Commons on the mediation proposal, 
observed: 
[... ] the Dutch government did not consider so 
much the interests of our British subjects as 
its own interests in connection with the Rajah 
of Tenom. It absolutely declined the mediation 
of England. And why? Because the presence of the 
British as mediator might have a pre-judicial 
effect upon the prestige of the Dutch 
authorities. "' 
The Dutch also accused the British government of being 
motivated by less than humanitarian interests, namely by 
those of the Straits traders. The Dutch government was also 
accused of acting out of less than humanitarian interests. 
It was claimed in the House of Commons that the Dutch 
government was exploiting the situation in order to achieve 
- with Britain's help - the pacification of Achin, 
something which it had hitherto been unable to achieve 
alone. This claim appears harsh, but is somewhat justified 
in the light of the following comment by Van Kesteren in 
the Indische Gids: 
21 2 
If the shipwrecked crew had been put to death, 
it would of course have been distressing, but 
no-one could have blamed the Netherlands for 
this. The lives of our own soldiers are valuable 
too and a colonial power must above all have the 
respect of those native rulers who have 
recognised her authority. 15 
Procrastination, continued Van Kesteren, would 
endanger far more lives than those of the captives; the 
lives of hundreds of soldiers would be endangered, and the 
prestige of the colonial power would be damaged. "' Such a 
remark confirms once again that preservation of the 
Netherlands' colonial prestige was a priority for the Dutch 
government. Van Kesteren's defensive remark (that the 
Netherlands would not have been to blame had the prisoners 
been put to death) seems somewhat short-sighted. As the 
British government had stated from the beginning of the 
Nisero question, the Dutch claimed sovereignty over the 
territory in which the men were captured, and should 
therefore accept responsibility. There is some 
justification in the remark made in the House of Commons on 
3 July 1884 by Mr J. Slagg (Member for Manchester) that: 
`they [the Dutch government] had assumed sovereignty over 
the country without discharging the responsibilities of 
that position'. "' 
It is true that the British government had pressurised 
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the Dutch government during the Nisero question. However, 
it could be argued that it was not abusing its position 
within the Anglo-Dutch relationship in doing so. The 
British government had simply observed the proceedings 
during the first few months, but when the Dutch government 
failed to secure the release of the prisoners, it had no 
choice but to press for action. The situation was made more 
difficult by the pressure of public opinion, itself 
provoked by reports of illness and lack of food among the 
prisoners. The failure of the Dutch military expedition in 
January 1884, followed by the refusal of the Dutch 
authorities to accept Maxwell's recommendations, further 
delayed the release of the prisoners and prompted Granville 
to make - in good faith - the proposal of mediation which 
met a further rejection from the Dutch on the grounds that 
it was injurious to their colonial prestige. 
It is probable that the British government was 
motivated less by a desire to put the Dutch government in 
its place, than by sheer frustration at the apparent 
intransigence of the Dutch government. This intransigence 
was itself due - at least in part - to the Dutch 
preoccupation with the status of the Netherlands. Although 
not all the Dutch shared this preoccupation, it was 
nevertheless general enough to cause the Dutch government 
to act with less determination than it should have done to 
free the Nisero captives. The attitude of the British 
government in the Nisero question was certainly more 
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commendable than its attitude in the Borneo question. In 
the latter dispute, it was guilty of hypocritical behaviour 
(for example by claiming that the settlement in North 
Borneo was not political), and of confronting the 
Netherlands government with a fait accompli on more than 
one occasion. The attitude of the Dutch government, by 
comparison, was fundamentally the same in both the Borneo 
dispute and the Nisero question, and can be explained to a 
large extent by the need to protect the Netherlands' 
colonial status. The frequent references to `colonial 
prestige, `national pride' and the like support this. 
Kuitenbrouwer concludes that the Nisero question did 
not fundamentally alter the Dutch government's policy 
towards Britain. 118 The sources examined for this study of 
the Nisero question appear to support rather than refute 
this conclusion, and even yield possible answers to the 
question which naturally arises from Kuitenbrouwer's 
conclusion: why did that policy remain fundamentally 
unchanged? 
One possible explanation is that Dutch policy towards 
Britain remained essentially unchanged because the Dutch 
perception of the Anglo-Dutch relationship remained 
essentially unchanged. A second possible explanation is 
that the status of the Netherlands with respect to Britain 
had altered little, if at all. It could be argued that, had 
the status of the Netherlands improved or diminished in 
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some way, then the Dutch government would have needed to 
adapt its foreign policy accordingly. 
Returning to the question of Dutch perceptions, these 
can be said to have evolved as follows. During the time of 
the Dutch Republic the relationship was characterised by 
colonial competition and naval alliance. According to E. S. 
van Eyck van Heslinga: 
The Dutch Republic could do nothing more than 
tack carefully between the Scylla of naval 
alliance and the Charbydis of maritime 
competition. 19 
Van Sas characterised the relationship during the 
early nineteenth century as one of patron and client (see 
above, Chapter 2) . According to Van Sas the `special' 
quality of the relationship was lost after 1830, when the 
British government failed to support the Northern 
Netherlands in the Belgian Revolt. 120 De Moor, also writing 
on the nineteenth century (from a colonial perspective), 
concludes that: 
To describe this relationship as a form of 
partnership seems incorrect. From their former 
position of Lords of the Eastern Seas the Dutch 
were reduced to the status of a dependent `ally 
of a kind'. "' 
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The Dutch naturally resented such dependency, and 
Dutch perceptions of Britain were inevitably coloured by 
that resentment. These perceptions explain, to a large 
extent, the attitude of the Dutch government in the Nisero 
question. When the British government took initiatives 
designed to bring the whole painful question to an end as 
soon as possible, it was widely condemned in the 
Netherlands for interfering and exerting undue pressure on 
the Dutch government. The British offer of mediation was 
immediately perceived as an affront to Dutch colonial - and 
therefore national - prestige. On a more individual level, 
diplomatic relations were dogged by an atmosphere of 
mistrust. Dutch ambassador Van Bylandt did not trust 
Pauncefote, who - initially at least - was unsympathetic 
towards the Dutch. Yet Van Bylandt was equally suspicious 
of Pauncefote when the latter became more sympathetic 
towards the Dutch in the Nisero question. It seems that, 
for Van Bylandt, the British could do no right. 
The Nisero question did not lead to an irretrievable 
breakdown in that marriage of convenience known as the 
Anglo-Dutch relationship. However, it can be said that the 
mutual respect of the partners was diminished as a result. 
For the Dutch, the Nisero question reinforced long-held 
negative perceptions and emphasised the need for caution 
within the relationship. Despite such difficulties, the 
Dutch and British diplomats who managed the relationship 
were apparently motivated more by mutual interest than by 
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differences, and managed to prevent relations from 
foundering even at the most difficult of times. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE FOUNDATION OF THE KONINKLIJKE PAKETVAART MAATSCHAPPIJ 
Introduction 
In 1891, the Dutch Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij 
(KPM, Royal Packet Company) came into operation in the 
Dutch East Indies. The company's contract (to expire in 
1905), stipulated that it would provide intra-Asian 
steam-packet transport on thirteen lines, which served 154 
ports (see Map 4). ' Historians of Indonesia are familiar 
with the subsequent economic success of this Dutch 
monopoly, which enjoyed considerable financial support from 
both the government and commerce. Until now, historians 
have dealt mainly with the economic aspects of the KPM. The 
most recent work on the subject, written by J. a Campo, 
also deals with the economics of steam-packet transport in 
the Netherlands Indies, placing the emphasis on the KPM's 
role in the integration of the colonial state. ' 
Steam-packet transport in Indonesia was important socially 
as well as economically, and in this excellent study A 
Campo examines the interaction between steam-packet 
transport and state-formation from the perspective of the 
development of a social and technological system. This 
chapter will not therefore deal with the economic aspects 
of the KPM, but with the non-economic motives surrounding 
its creation. We intend to ascertain first, whether the 
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creation of the KPM affected Anglo-Dutch relations and, 
second, what this tells us about relations between the two 
countries at this time. The basic sources for this study 
are parliamentary, since these reveal most clearly the 
motives behind the Dutch government's decision to create 
such a monopoly in 1888. It has been generally acknowledged 
that one of the motives was fear of foreign encroachments 
during a period of European imperial expansion; ' this study 
seeks to determine how the Anglo-Dutch relationship fits 
into this scenario. 
Dutch historians recognise that the creation of the 
KPM in 1888 was a triumph of national interests. This must 
have been the case, since the contract with the KPM did not 
come cheap; it was heavily subsidised and although this 
raised doubts in the Second Chamber, these were voiced by 
a minority. Kuitenbrouwer sees the establishment of the KPM 
as `the first, defensive shift towards Dutch imperialism', 4 
and in an article preceding the publication of his book, 
A 
Campo comments that, from 1888 onwards, the Dutch 
government had resigned itself to monopolistic tendencies. 
It had even consciously chosen a monopoly situation by 
opting for a private contract rather than a public tender, 
and for one contracting party instead of several. 
Furthermore: 
It was a conscious choice based on the 
consideration of expected advantages and the 
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curtailment of dis- advantages. ' 
The Netherlands Indies government had first given 
financial support to private steamship companies in 1850. 
The Nederlands-Indische Stoombootmaatschappij received an 
advance and a temporary agreement was concluded with Mr 
Cores de Vries, who was subsequently granted a contract 
until 1865. The contract was for the operation of two lines 
from Batavia: the first via Benkoelen to Padang, and the 
second via Samarang to Makassar, Amboina, Ternate and 
Menato. In July 1863 the contract was put out to tender. 
The lowest bidder was H. O. Robinson from London, who was 
granted the contract from 1866 to 1875 and which he then 
transferred to the Nederlands-Indische 
Stoomvaartmaatschappij (NISM). Robinson won the contract 
again when it was put out to tender in 1874 for the period 
1875 to 1890.6 
The Bill of 1888 
As the end of Robinson's contract approached, the Dutch 
government had to decide what course to take after 1890. 
One thing was certain: it must retain control of 
steam-packet transport in the Indonesian Archipelago. An 
efficient transport network was crucial to the effective 
government of Indonesia. The Dutch government did not wish 
to be at the mercy of companies, foreign or Dutch, which 
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could restrict their services or levy unreasonable tariffs 
for the transport of government passengers and goods. The 
Dutch government was faced with three possibilities. First, 
it could renew its contract with the NISM. Second, it could 
put the contract out to tender or, third, conclude a 
private contract. Minister for Colonies Sprenger van Eyk 
initially opted for a public tender, but later he changed 
his mind as he became convinced that a public tender would 
not guarantee that Indonesian steam-packet transport would 
remain under Dutch control. Heavily subsidised foreign 
shipping companies could easily win the packet transport 
contract by public tender. Moreover, although the 
Netherlands possessed the technology and skill to operate 
such a network, Dutch companies would not be familiar with 
the extensive network of steam-packet lines built up by 
Robinson and his NISM, and would therefore be unable to 
compete against him in a public tender. Under public 
tender, the chances were very great that the contract be 
granted either to a foreign undertaking, or once again to 
the NISM, which would be able to submit the lowest bid. 
Given the predominance of Dutch national interests at the 
time, these factors persuaded Van Eyk that a private 
contract (`onderhandsche overeenkomst') between the 
newly-created company and the government would best answer 
the requirements. ' 
Sprenger van Eyk argued further. The Netherlands 
Indies was a kingdom of islands, the outermost of which 
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were only accessible by sea. A regulated steam-packet 
service was therefore essential to the administration of 
those possessions. The present arrangement was 
unsatisfactory since the Nederlands-Indische 
Stoomvaartmaatschappij was in fact an English company, 
although it had the appearance of a Dutch one. Its 
directors were English; shareholders' meetings were held in 
England, and even the Dutch director resident in the 
Netherlands was subject to the authority of his English 
colleagues. In addition, the Queen's Bench had pronounced 
that the company's ships were English. It was, stressed Van 
Eyk, of paramount importance that steam-packet transport 
should become a purely Dutch undertaking, not only in the 
interest of the Dutch government, but also in the interest 
of trade, both in the Netherlands and the Netherlands 
Indies. 
The government favoured the bid of Messrs Jan 
Boissevain, Petrus Emilius Tegelberg and Willem Ruys. The 
debate on the need for a Dutch national steam-packet 
enterprise in Indonesia intensified during the 1880s, and 
Dutch shipping companies were approached and `canvassed' as 
to their opinions on the subject. Jan Boissevain, a 
director of the Stoomvaart Maatschappij Nederland (SMN) 
believed, given the extent of the existing NISM network, 
that a merger between the SMN and the Rotterdamsche Lloyd 
(RL) was necessary to create the national enterprise which 
would replace the NISM. A merger between the two companies, 
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which were based in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, would also 
unite the two cities' shipping interests. But there were 
problems, not least the fact that the RL relied heavily on 
British capital. The directors of the RL, not wishing to be 
pushed out of the market, reluctantly agreed to go along 
with the merger plan. If they did not agree to the plan, 
the SMN might well win the contract for itself. But later 
the SMN also came to doubt the wisdom of the merger; it 
feared that it would lose out on the allocation of voyages 
(`vaarbeurten'), and that the formation of such a large 
company would provoke political resistance and also 
encourage competition to a greater extent than would 
otherwise be the case. ' Nevertheless, the directors of the 
companies drew up a bid and agreed that there would be 
co-operation between the three sister companies (SMN, RL 
and the KPM). 
By now the NISM realised that the chances of a foreign 
company winning the contract were very slim indeed, and a 
rival bid was consequently submitted by Mr F. Bogaardt. On 
12 January 1888 Bogaardt informed the government that he 
had set up a company, the Stoomvaartmaatschappij Holland 
(SMH), which would meet the government's requirements. He 
pointed out that the NISM was merely a co-shareholder and 
requested that the government either continue with the 
tender or give him the opportunity to negotiate for a 
private contract, in which case he could propose tariffs 
considerably lower than those of Messrs. Boissevain & Co. 
" 
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Sprenger van Eyk dismissed this bid, claiming that Bogaardt 
had not submitted concrete proposals, but had intended 
simply to prevent the acceptance of other proposals. " He 
also pointed out that keeping Indonesian packet transport 
as a Dutch national enterprise was the least of Bogaardt's 
priorities. If his proposals were accepted, the government 
would still in effect be dealing with the NISM, despite 
Bogaardt's assurances that the NISM would only be a 
co-shareholder in the SMH. " L. W. C. Keuchenius 
(Anti-Revolutionary member of the Second Chamber) was 
sharply critical of the government and defended Bogaardt's 
bid. His criticisms will be dealt with in more detail 
below. Although both Van Eyk and Keuchenius had been 
members of the Council of the Indies (Raad van Indie), they 
held opposing views on certain colonial matters. While Van 
Eyk, for example, supported the blockade of the entire 
Achin coast during the Achin war, Keuchenius took an anti- 
government stance on the matter. 12 Keuchenius also attacked 
conservative-liberal policy and the Dutch government's 
possession of the Indies. " It is, then, not so surprising 
that they held opposing views on the matter of Bogaardt's 
bid for the new contract. 
The bill for the conclusion of an agreement with the 
KPM was first brought before the Dutch Second Chamber on 4 
February 1888.14 If the bill was successful, Messrs 
Boissevain, Tegelberg and Ruys would together form the KPM. 
Sprenger van Eyk explained why he favoured their bid: 
234 
An agreement with the three named bidders, whose 
good character removes all doubt as to their 
purpose, and who are already assured of the 
support of the foremost Dutch financial 
institutions and capitalists, would ensure that 
packet-boat transport in the Indies does indeed 
become a national matter. " 
Dutch political circumstances were less than stable 
when the KPM bill was introduced. The Heemskerk cabinet's 
term of office was drawing to a close. Heemskerk (a 
conservative liberal) was replaced in April 1888 by the 
Anti-Revolutionary A. E. Mackay. Heemskerk's Ministers for 
Colonies and Foreign Affairs (Sprenger van Eyk and Van 
Karnebeek) had both been liberals. They were replaced by 
the Anti-Revolutionary, L. W. C. Keuchenius (Colonies) and 
the conservative, C. Hartsen (Foreign Affairs). In Europe, 
too, the political atmosphere was tense and there was 
intense colonial competition among the Powers. Anglo-Dutch 
relations were problematic: the long-standing Borneo 
dispute was still unresolved, and the memory of the 
traumatic Nisero question had not yet faded from the minds 
of British and Dutch politicians and diplomats. 
The Dutch government, then, wanted to retain control 
of steam-packet transport in the Indies Archipelago by 
creating a purely Dutch company. How did it propose to 
ensure that the company remained Dutch? The bill contained 
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two main provisions designed to ensure this: the company 
directors should be Dutch; and the company should be based 
in the Netherlands or in the Netherlands Indies. If based 
in the Netherlands, its representatives in the Indies 
should be Dutch. A further clause, this time in the draft 
agreement, stipulated that the company's ships should be 
built in the Netherlands. 
It is understandable that the Dutch government should 
take measures to protect its colonies against European 
intrusions, hence the desire to exclude as far as possible 
all foreign influence from the KPM. Yet the government was 
especially fearful of British influence. Traditionally in 
the Anglo-Dutch relationship, the Netherlands had looked to 
Britain to protect Dutch colonies from other powers with 
colonial ambitions. But now, in the late 1880s, Britain 
herself posed an unacceptable threat to Dutch colonial 
prestige. The Dutch government's perception of Britain had 
therefore become more negative. The perceived colonial 
threat from Britain was now so great that any British 
involvement in the KPM was unacceptable to the Dutch 
government. As A Campo observes: 
The English nationality of the shipping company 
[NISM] was certainly no obstacle to good service 
from a commercial point of view, but was not a 
good basis for economic, political, governmental 
and military co-operation. 16 
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The reaction in Parliament 
Two weeks after the bill had been introduced in the Dutch 
Second Chamber, an interim report was published giving 
members' views on the bill. " It was customary for such a 
survey to be carried out in order to gauge the reception of 
a draft bill. Although this report does not refer to 
members by name, it is a reasonable indication of how they 
the KPM bill was received in the Second Chamber. There was 
criticism of the fact that the bill had not been put 
forward sooner, given that there was so much to be 
organised. Interested parties in Indonesia should have been 
given the opportunity to put their case. Although some 
members were decidedly against a hurried settlement by the 
departing cabinet, the majority would not resist this if 
the government had good reason for doing so. Virtually all 
members agreed that the steam-packet service should 
continue to be regulated on the present basis. Very few 
members favoured a government-managed undertaking; the 
present arrangement yielded certain advantages for the 
Dutch government which it could continue to enjoy after 
1890. The majority of members shared Van Eyk's preference 
for a private contract, although there were some in favour 
of public tender if the conditions would ensure that the 
successful company was a Dutch undertaking. 
There was also doubt concerning the ways in which the 
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government proposed to protect the KPM from foreign 
influence. It was pointed out that directors could be voted 
out of office by shareholders, and replaced by non-Dutch 
directors. The stipulation that all directors should be 
Dutch was generally considered inadequate; this should 
apply to all persons in managerial or supervisory 
positions. Furthermore, appointment of directors should be 
subject to government approval. Members were divided on the 
stipulation that the company's ships should be built in the 
Netherlands. Those against claimed that the exclusion of 
foreign competition in that industry would attract workers 
who could only be given short-term employment. 
The strongest criticism came from L. W. C. Keuchenius 
(Anti-Revolutionary member for Amersfoort) . In a memorandum 
dated 15 February 1888, he set out his objections to the 
proposed contract with Messrs Boissevain & Co. Keuchenius 
felt that the bill could have been introduced earlier; the 
government had ample opportunity during its term of office 
to put forward its proposals on the subject. Keuchenius 
defended the NISM, stating that it had served the 
government well for twenty-two years, and that the 
government had not even informed the company that its 
services would be unconditionally dispensed with after 
1890. He strongly advised members to reject such hasty 
action by the government. As to the Dutch nationality of 
the company, Keuchenius found it strange that the condition 
regarding the building of ships in the Netherlands was not 
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mentioned in the bill, and only in part in the draft 
agreement. He pointed out that the NISM had also employed 
Dutch crews, except for the English engineers who had been 
recruited in the interest of general safety (here, 
Keuchenius probably means that there were no Dutch 
engineers of sufficient calibre) . The government's fear of 
foreign shareholders was greatly misplaced in the light of 
twenty-two years of experience with the NISM. Keuchenius 
defended the bid made by Bogaardt & Co: 
In the persons of Mr Bogaardt and his 
co-founders, the government would find no less a 
guarantee of earnestness and loyalty in the 
execution of the task, which these Dutchmen are 
also prepared - and will even lower their 
requirements - to take on in the Netherlands. "' 
The interests of the Indies and its inhabitants would 
not be served in any way if the Boissevain proposals were 
accepted and the Bogaardt proposals rejected. Keuchenius's 
argument was powerful and logical, yet it still failed to 
convince members of the Second Chamber for whom national 
interests - embodied in the status of the Netherlands as a 
colonial power - were paramount. 
Minister for Colonies Sprenger van Eyk answered the 
criticisms of the bill in a memorandum of reply (Memorie 
van Antwoord) enclosed with a letter dated 20 February 
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1888. Van Eyk's reply was comprehensive and detailed; only 
those statements relating to the questions addressed in 
this chapter will be discussed here. On the question of 
guaranteeing that the company would remain Dutch, Van Eyk 
admitted that it was not possible to be completely certain 
that all shares would remain in Dutch hands, but stated 
that a very high degree of certainty was surely also 
desirable. Was it not better to have a company that was 
almost completely Dutch, than a company that was not Dutch 
at all? 19 
On the question of monopoly, Van Eyk reasoned as 
follows. If the transport market were divided among several 
companies, it was possible that, in the fight for survival, 
none would be able to afford the high expenditures 
necessary to meet the prescribed standards and 
requirements. Private passengers would then be offered an 
inferior service. In the case of insufficient competition 
it was possible that one company would forge ahead of the 
rest. Naturally the government would patronise this 
company, which would then be in a position to drive out the 
other competitors. Therefore, the absence of a monopolistic 
agreement - such as the proposed agreement between the 
government and the KPM - would not ensure the healthy 
competition which was advantageous for private passengers 
and trade - even on the better lines. In the case of the 
KPM, a monopoly would be advantageous, not detrimental, to 
private interests. An absence of healthy competition in the 
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Indonesian archipelago was not due to the existence of a 
monopoly, but to the fact that one particular client with 
a high demand for transport (i. e. the Dutch government) 
would favour the company which best served its interests. "' 
It is clear that the Dutch government wanted to shut 
out, as far as possible, all foreign influence which could 
hinder its colonial progress in the Indonesian Archipelago. 
As A Campo has observed: `[... ] the aim of the undertaking 
was, in a word, to unfurl the national flag'. " The 
government's fear of losing control or having to depend on 
foreign undertakings was not new. As we have seen in the 
Borneo dispute and the Nisero question, the protection of 
Dutch colonies was uppermost in the minds of Dutch 
politicians and diplomats. The colonies gave the 
Netherlands the status of a first-rank colonial power, 
which compensated for its loss of status in Europe. The 
Dutch government was thus determined to preserve that 
colonial status and was alert to any potential threats. 
The reaction in the media 
The liberal Indische Gids had already discussed the matter 
of packet transport in the Indonesian Archipelago in 1885. 
It drew readers' attention to an article by H. M. Chapelle, 
published in De Economist of July/August 1885. The author 
pointed out that the NISM discouraged all competition, and 
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he indicated what the government should do: 
Let the government lift the embargo on the 
transport of goods by foreign ships between the 
ports of the Indies, and steam shipping 
companies will sprout like toadstools. ' 
La Chapelle also observed that the Indonesian 
Archipelago was in danger of becoming eclipsed: 
The present situation has this further 
disadvantage, that the transit trade of our 
Archipelago is shifting more and more towards 
Singapore. " 
This was a very real concern. Most British-dominated 
trade routes radiated from two points: Singapore, and 
Penang further north. Singapore was already an important 
British-dominated trade centre, and became even more 
important after the Suez canal was opened. The Straits of 
Malakka became the main passage for trade between Europe 
and the Far East, and Singapore benefited at the expense of 
Dutch Batavia. The port of Penang attracted much of Achin's 
trade, and later became the entrepöt for the KPM's Achin 
trade. According to Reid, as long as this situation 
persisted `[... ] the British colony would remain a magnet 
drawing the Achinese away from submission to Batavia' . 
'^ But 
the situation did change as a result of Dutch efforts to 
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transform Sabang (a port on the island of Pulau We at the 
entrance to the Straits on the northern tip of Sumatra) 
from a supply station into a free port, and although not 
all Achinese traders switched allegiance from Penang to 
Sabang, its development rendered the Dutch more independent 
of Penang and its anti-Dutch traders. 25 The KPM was 
ultimately successful in driving British competition out of 
the Indonesian Archipelago. A Campo describes how this was 
achieved with a strategy of tariff, line and transit 
policies, combined with horizontal integration (with other 
shipping companies) and vertical integration (increased 
control over secondary services and industries). Horizontal 
integration took place in the form of co-operation with 
English and German companies within the framework of the 
multi-national discussions at the Batavia Freight 
Conference and the Deli Freight Conference. Also, services 
outside the Archipelago (the so-called `buitenlijnen') were 
shared with Japanese, British-Indian and Australian 
steamship companies. Z" In early 1888, when the Dutch 
government's intentions became known, an author writing in 
the Indische Gids made it clear that he favoured a Dutch 
company above a foreign company. But he did not agree that 
the colonies in question should foot the bill: 
But to let the Indies pay for the satisfaction 
of the patriotic spirit is, we believe, unjust. 
Such protectionism is the most illiberal thing 
of all. 27 
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Such patriotism could only be considered honourable if 
the successful company - chosen by public tender - was 
granted a subsidy by the Dutch, and not by the Indies 
treasury. Later that year, the author of an article on the 
introduction of the KPM bill cynically commented that many 
voters favoured some degree of protectionism, especially if 
the Indies paid. 28 
This was indeed the case, and protectionism won the 
day. Even Keuchenius, who had so sharply criticised the 
bill and the financial burden it placed upon the Indies 
government, was soon obliged to help implement that bill 
when he replaced Sprenger van Eyk as Minister for Colonies 
in April 1888. 
The KPM debates were reported in detail by newspapers 
of all denominations. The Roman Catholic De Maasbode 
acknowledged the advantages of a national steam-packet 
company in the shape of the KPM, and recognised the 
protectionist nature of the proposals. ' It did not 
explicitly object to these, but simply wondered why the 
Dutch Government did not apply the same principles to other 
national industries which were equally important - 
agriculture, for example. Protection for agriculture or 
industry in the Dutch provinces was a different matter, 
claimed De Maasbode. Whenever this was discussed, the 
objection was raised that the interests of a small number 
of producers could not be protected at the expense of the 
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vast majority, i. e. consumers. This, claimed the author of 
the article, was a double standard (`[... ] meten met twee 
maten'). 30 The conservative Dagblad van Zuid Holland en 's 
Gravenhage also supported the KPM proposals. Dutch industry 
and Indonesian trade would once more feel that the Dutch 
government was supporting them. The only matter for concern 
was whether the Second Chamber would approve the draft bill 
before the impending election, given that many members 
would feel drawn towards their constituencies and be absent 
from the Chamber. It concluded that this `[... ] important, 
truly national proposal by the government deserves a 
positive and speedy reception'. 31 
The author of an article in the liberal Arnhemse 
Courant stated that, given the lack of time, the draft KPM 
bill could only be approved. It regretted the fact that 
this lack of time limited the possibilities for amendments. 
The author went on to claim that the KPM proposals were 
neither protection nor privilege, since trade legislation 
was not involved in any way. This is a strange reaction 
from a liberal newspaper, given that the tendency in the 
Netherlands at the time was not to deny the protectionist 
nature of the KPM, but to question whether or not this was 
acceptable. It was concluded, nevertheless, that `[... ] the 
political interest of the State is worth a sacrifice from 
the treasury', in other words that the higher subsidies 
which the KPM would receive were justified. " Another 
liberal newspaper, the Algemeen Handelsblad, also supported 
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the KPM. An article in the 9 February edition of 1888 
echoed the national preoccupation with the Dutch colonial 
empire: 
In an area as extensive as the island sea in 
which our colonial authority has been 
established for almost three centuries [... ] ,a 
steam-packet service which is as complete as 
possible is just as necessary as a good railway 
network on the mainland. " 
Monopoly was the best alternative, claimed the author 
of the article, since open competition for the contract 
would not generate sufficient competitors to guarantee the 
best possible situation for the government. Relations with 
the NISM had not been problematic until now, but who could 
say what would happen in the future? 
With regard to the colonial situation, we are in 
a period of transition. Other European powers 
have come forward with tendencies towards 
colonial possessions: competition in that area 
is enormously increased, and many surprises may 
still await us. 34 
A third liberal newspaper, the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche 
Courant (NRC) revealed its support for the KPM in its 
unsympathetic attitude towards the bill's critic 
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Keuchenius. Keuchenius' speech in the Second Chamber on 23 
February 1888, it was pointed out, lasted from eleven 
o'clock in the morning until almost half-past four in the 
afternoon, leaving little opportunity for other speakers. 
Keuchenius often digressed and was repetitive. The NRC also 
criticised Keuchenius for concentrating on the financial 
aspect of the bill. `Is everything, for a colonial power 
like ourselves, to be brought down to money? ' asked the 
author. 35 Keuchenius was described as `an obstructionist ad 
absurdum' and, as an advocate of the NISM, he had `provided 
the worst possible service,. " 
The liberal Het Vaderland was equally critical of 
Keuchenius: 
The policy of the Government may give cause for 
criticism, but an opposition which is so grossly 
exaggerated, and always assumes the worst, is 
more damaging to itself than to the matter it 
opposes . 
37 
The position of this newspaper is less explicit. The author 
of the article recognised the potential difficulties of a 
foreign steam-packet company, but stated: 
The fact cannot be concealed that Dutch 
interests are furthered above foreign interests, 
at the expense of the treasury. 38 
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It may well be that the burden on the treasury was 
minimal, but only a public tender would establish the most 
economical means of serving the country. Furthermore, the 
author disagreed - in a truly liberal fashion - with the 
stipulation for building KPM ships in Dutch shipyards. 
Shipbuilders should reject this `in the strong conviction 
that they are able and willing to compete in freedom with 
other countries'. 39 The author was not opposed to the draft 
bill, but merely wished to draw attention to its less 
favourable aspects. 
The views expressed on the KPM bill in the Dutch press 
thus echoed those expressed in parliament. In the media 
too, then, there was a conviction that the national (and 
therefore colonial) interest would be best served by a 
Dutch company such as the KPM, albeit a monopoly. Some 
commentators, as we have seen, had brief crises of 
conscience but - as in parliament - protectionism won the 
day. Only one of Keuchenius' thirteen amendments, put 
forward during his lengthy speech on 23 February, was 
approved; the other twelve were rejected by very decisive 
votes. It is then, perhaps, hardly surprising that 
Keuchenius resigned himself to implementing the KPM 
proposals when the new cabinet came to power in April 1888. 
He surely felt that he had done all he could to oppose the 
bill, and given the overwhelming defeat of his proposed 
amendments, saw that he had no choice but to implement the 
bill. Moreover, as Kuiper has pointed out, the main reason 
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Keuchenius had accepted his portfolio was in order to 
prevent a Catholic becoming Minister for colonies. "' 
The perceived colonial threat to the Netherlands 
during the last decades of the nineteenth century was not, 
then, confined only to those in government. It had 
penetrated the Dutch national consciousness to such an 
extent that the media largely accepted the protectionism 
inherent in the creation of a national monopoly such as the 
KPM. Although, from the 1860s onwards, the Dutch became 
ardent free-traders, and liberal principles triumphed, the 
late nineteenth-century imperialist threat could not be 
ignored and protectionist measures once again became 
attractive with regard to the colonies. In the words of 
Kossmann: 
In the mother country itself the liberal 
conception of freedom had more positive 
significance; it meant the free development of 
all national resources and of all members of the 
community. But even in the Netherlands this 
principle was of limited effectiveness, and it 
was totally irrelevant in the colonies. In 
purely economic terms too free enterprise in its 
initial form soon proved unsatisfactory. " 
The second KPM agreement 
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In October 1898, ten and a half years after the 
introduction of the first KPM bill, a second bill was 
introduced proposing a ten-year extension of the 
government's contract with the KPM (i. e. until 31 December 
1915), and a reduction in the subsidies on certain 
specified routes. " 
The Minister for Colonies, J. T. Cremer (serving in 
N. G. Pierson's liberal cabinet which had come to power in 
July 1897), wanted to reduce the colonial budget, one 
method being to cut the subsidies granted to the KPM 
(amounting to HF1 660,000 under the terms of the 1888 
contract), thereby saving HF1 250,000 each year from 1 
January 1899. Since the KPM contract still had seven years 
to run, this represented a total saving of 1 . 75 million 
guilders . 
43 
The report of a survey among members of the Second 
Chamber recorded the following misgivings. Above all, 
members found it difficult to judge whether it was in the 
country's interest to conclude a further agreement. The 
directors of the KPM had agreed to a reduction in subsidies 
of Hfl. 200,000 per year for a period of seven years. The 
company was prepared to make this sacrifice if this would 
secure an extended contract while its existing one still 
had seven years to run. However, not all members were 
convinced that these terms were more favourable than those 
which would be obtained if the decision was postponed until 
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the KPM's current contract expired. Would this, they 
wondered, prevent unnecessarily high subsidies? Some 
members were against the extension of a contract which 
still had a number of years to run. Others suggested a 
sliding-scale subsidy, which varied with the revenue on 
individual routes. It was also pointed out that, if the 
contract were extended, tariffs for the transport of 
government goods and passengers could not be reduced before 
1915. Those who believed that the proposed extension was 
premature did so on the grounds that even greater 
advantages would be possible if the volume of transport 
were to increase in subsequent years. If the government 
were bound by an extended contract, it would not be able to 
profit from these. 44 
Those members in favour of the bill had been convinced 
by Cremer's estimated budget savings, and doubted that more 
favourable terms could be obtained from the KPM by 
postponing the decision to extend the contract. The bill 
should be approved in the interests of this transport 
sector. 45 The bill was debated in the Second Chamber on 28 
February 1899. Social democrat member H. H. van Kol and J. M. 
Pijnacker Hordijk, a liberal, spoke against it. Van Kol was 
anti-protectionist, while Pijnacker Hordijk criticised its 
premature introduction, and commented that tariffs, not 
subsidies, should be reduced. In May 1899, C. Pijnacker 
Hordijk (Governor-General of the Indies from 1888 to 1893 
and brother of J. M. Pijnacker Hordijk)) also argued against 
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the proposed extension in the First Chamber. 46 
Ten years after the first KPM bill, protectionism (as 
far as colonial transport was concerned) was still a 
dominant economic philosophy in the Netherlands. The bill 
was approved in the Second Chamber by 59 votes to 11, and 
in the First Chamber by 38 votes to 2. The victory had not 
even been marginal, suggesting that parliament at least was 
still fearful of foreign influence. Protectionism was the 
response to a perceived threat. In the Dutch case, the 
creation of the KPM was the response to the threat of 
foreign competition in the Netherlands Indies. The votes to 
extend the KPM contract indicate that, even in the late 
1890s, the Dutch government still perceived a threat. 
Certainly the European powers were still competing for 
colonies and it is possible that the crises in Anglo-Dutch 
relations in the 1880s (the Nisero question and the Borneo 
dispute) were not yet forgotten. The Dutch government 
would, therefore, still be suspicious and wary of British 
ambitions and continue to protect its vulnerable and 
precious colonial status. 
The British response 
The creation of the KPM and its continued existence were of 
paramount importance to the Dutch government. Given the 
government's preoccupation with the preservation of Dutch 
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colonial prestige, this is not surprising. The creation of 
a colonial monopoly such as the KPM is therefore consistent 
with the Dutch attitude in the Borneo dispute and the 
Nisero question. As we have seen, the colonial status of 
the Netherlands strongly influenced the Dutch government's 
attitude to these issues. During the Borneo dispute (which 
was still unresolved in the late 1880s), the Dutch 
government protested against the dictatorial attitude of 
the British government which, it claimed, continually 
presented it with faits accomplis and failed to recognise 
Dutch claims in Borneo. In the mid-1880s, the Dutch 
government complained that the colonial reputation of the 
Netherlands was being damaged by British intervention in 
the Nisero question, because that intervention suggested to 
the outside world that the Dutch government could not keep 
its own house in order. 
The motives for the establishment of the KPM were more 
xenophobic than Anglophobic, attributable to a more general 
fear of foreign influence rather than a specific fear of 
British influence. Nevertheless it is important to examine 
the reaction of Britain to the creation of the KPM, since 
this should provide some insight into the British 
perception of the Anglo-Dutch relationship, and enable us 
to compare this with the Dutch perception. 
It would be reasonable to expect that this move by the 
Dutch government to form the KPM would, at the very least, 
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have caused some unease among British politicians. But this 
was not the case. On examining contemporary sources, the 
overriding impression is of a singular lack of reaction; 
indeed the British reaction is conspicuous by its absence. 
The creation of the KPM, and the subsequent renewal of 
its contract, did not create a stir in the British 
parliament; the Hansard volumes for the period in question 
contain no reference to the subject. The Annual Register, 
a respected nineteenth-century chronicle of events, made no 
mention at all of the KPM, despite the fact that it 
included a regular section on the Netherlands and Belgium. 
Neither was the matter discussed in prominent journals and 
reviews of the late nineteenth century such as The 
Nineteenth Century, The Edinburgh Review and The 
Contemporary Review. Apparently, there was no significant 
diplomatic discussion between the Dutch and British 
ministries on the subject of the KPM, since the volumes of 
foreign affairs documents (published in the Dutch series 
Rijksgeschiedkundige Publicatieen) contain no references to 
this. " 
Neither was there much reaction among diplomats at the 
Foreign Office in London. On 6 April 1888 H. P. Fenton, 
Secretary of the British Legation at The Hague, forwarded 
to Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury a translation of the 
1888 KPM bill. This was forwarded by Salisbury to the Post 
Master General, but the bill did not provoke any lengthy 
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correspondence. 
The first and second KPM contracts were treated with 
equal disinterest by The Times. There is only one brief 
reference to the KPM, on 5 March 1888. It reads: 
The Monopoly of Steam navigation in the Indian 
Archi- pelago, which has been conferred upon a 
Dutch company, is stated to be injurious to the 
interests of Indian trade. 48 
This item is unhelpful and vague, since it does not 
tell us where or by whom the monopoly was stated to be 
injurious. Neither does it tell us how the Dutch monopoly 
would be injurious. It can only be assumed that, had the 
KPM been considered a very great threat to the interests of 
Indian trade, this would have occasioned much lengthier and 
more animated discussion in parliament, in the media, and 
among diplomats. 
Conclusion 
The lack of British reaction to the creation of the KPM by 
the Dutch was surprising, given that Britain was a 
free-trade power closely involved with the Netherlands. 
What, then, is the reason for this lack of reaction, and 
what does it tell us about the Anglo-Dutch relationship at 
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this time? 
There are two possible explanations for the British 
silence on the matter of the KPM. The first is that the 
British government's reaction was deliberately suppressed 
in order not to cause further complications in the 
relationship with the Dutch government. The second 
explanation is that the matter simply did not interest the 
British government to any great extent. 
Let us consider the first possibility. At this time it 
is very likely that the British government would seek to 
avoid any further diplomatic disputes with the Dutch 
government, given that both governments were still 
embroiled in the Borneo dispute. Moreover, it is likely 
that the bitterness caused by the Nisero question had not 
yet subsided. The British government was concerned with 
other, more pressing colonial matters such as the scramble 
for Africa and the occupation of Egypt. The Foreign Office 
correspondence registers for 1888 show that Foreign 
Secretary Salisbury was also greatly preoccupied with the 
`Sugar question' (and the International Sugar Conference in 
London planned for that year) and the liquor trade tax. If 
the British government were really trying to avoid further 
differences with the Dutch government, this at least 
suggests that it was not constantly preoccupied with 
putting the Netherlands in its place, as the Dutch 
government often claimed. The Dutch perception of the 
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British government was, therefore, sometimes too negative. 
Arguably the Dutch government felt itself put down more 
often than was actually the case. Such over-sensitivity has 
been noted in previous chapters. 
The second possible explanation for the British lack 
of reaction, namely straightforward disinterest, implies 
that the KPM was not perceived as a threat to British 
interests in the Indian Archipelago, or that any threat was 
not large enough to cause any great concern. This could 
explain the vague item in The Times, which simply stated 
that the KPM monopoly was `injurious' to the interests of 
Indian trade. Had the KPM posed a considerable threat to 
those interests, the wording of the item would surely have 
been stronger. The fact that the KPM was not perceived by 
the British government to be a great threat also implies a 
certain confidence in its own position in the area 
concerned. This is borne out by statements made in the 
Dutch parliament in 1899 when the bill for the extension of 
the KPM contract was introduced. In a report on a survey 
carried out among members of the First Chamber, members 
referred to the fact that not all the advantages predicted 
in 1888 had been obtained, and that Singapore remained the 
largest harbour for the Archipelago. 49 Dutch Minister for 
Colonies, Cremer, answering the issues arising from this 
survey, pointed to the favourable position of Singapore 
with relation to Europe and East Asia, and stated that this 
was why it was not possible for a company such as the KPM 
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to carry exclusively via Batavia. 50 It is very likely that 
the British government was confident in the supremacy of 
Singapore as a trading port, and did not believe that this 
could be seriously undermined by a company - albeit a 
monopoly - such as the KPM. 
The second explanation has more to commend it than the 
first. If there had been a concerted effort to suppress the 
British government's reaction to the creation of the KPM 
for the sake of diplomatic relations, there would at the 
very least be some reference to this in parliamentary or 
diplomatic sources. The minimal reaction in parliament and 
in diplomatic circles makes this a less plausible 
explanation. Therefore the most likely reason for the lack 
of British reaction is disinterest. 
But there is a third possible explanation for the lack 
of British reaction which must be considered. Reid points 
out that, as a result of the Dutch blockades of north 
Sumatra during the Achin war, the merchants of Penang and 
Singapore began to lose interest in Achin. In addition, the 
dramatic development of the Malay peninsula provided 
further opportunities for Straits merchants. "' Before the 
KPM came into operation in 1891, then, these merchants from 
the English Straits were already moving to pastures new. 
Arguably, therefore, their interests would be less 
threatened by the KPM - hence the lack of reaction. The 
NISM itself was also able partly to withstand competition 
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from the KPM by transferring ships to other lines in south 
Asia and the Far East. It had begun doing so after the 
Achin war (1873-1904), when the demand for military 
transport fell and its returns decreased accordingly. 
The Dutch government's decision to establish a 
steam-packet monopoly in the Indonesian Archipelago was not 
solely due to a fear of British intervention but rather to 
a more general fear of all foreign influence at a time of 
intense colonial competition. The creation of the KPM is an 
indication of two things. First, the fact that the British 
background of the NISM - after twenty-two years of loyal 
service, indispensable during the Achin war - suddenly 
became unacceptable is an indication of the pressure on the 
Dutch government to protect its colonies from the competing 
European powers. Second, it is an indication that the Dutch 
perception of Britain at this time was no more favourable 
than its perception of the other European powers. Clearly, 
where colonial rivalry was concerned, the Dutch government 
made no distinction between Britain and the other European 
powers. This negative perception could itself be the result 
- in part at least - of the heated exchanges with Britain 
during the late 1870s and 1880s over the Borneo dispute and 
the Nisero question. Increasing Dutch resentment towards 
British activity in South Africa may also be a factor. 
The creation of the KPM by the Dutch government can 
therefore be seen as a defiant act of colonial 
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protectionism, which, although it must be placed within the 
context of late nineteenth-century European colonialism, 
nevertheless points to an increasingly negative perception 
of Britain, and Dutch dissatisfaction with the Anglo-Dutch 
relationship. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
During the last decades of the nineteenth century European 
imperialism reached its climax as the European powers raced 
to acquire the last remaining territories. Rivalries 
between the powers were heightened and the Anglo-Dutch 
relationship also became increasingly fragile as a result. 
As circumstances forced both Britain and the Netherlands to 
re-assess and, where necessary, consolidate their colonial 
interests, sensitivities were heightened and heated 
colonial debates ensued. The case studies which have been 
examined here are examples of such debates. 
The second half of the nineteenth century was 
particularly difficult for the Netherlands. Not only did it 
have to protect the Dutch colonies on all fronts, but it 
was also attempting to come to terms with its diminished 
status within Europe, following Belgian independence in 
1830. The colonies gave the Netherlands a status which the 
country no longer enjoyed in Europe, and this colonial 
prestige therefore had to be preserved at all costs. This 
preoccupation greatly influenced Dutch attitudes in the 
disputes examined here, and is most evident in the Nisero 
incident. 
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The Borneo dispute was essentially a long drawn-out 
boundary dispute which lasted from 1876 until 1891. Dutch 
protests against British territorial expansion on North 
Borneo were initially based on alleged British 
contravention of the 1824 London Treaty which had, 
ironically, been designed to prevent such disputes. 
However, the Borneo question proved that the treaty was not 
watertight. Too much had been expected of the treaty, and 
certain stipulations now proved ambiguous, allowing for 
different interpretations by the British and Dutch 
governments. Although the 1824 Treaty itself falls outside 
the scope of this study, it would be interesting to examine 
the reasons for that ambiguity, and the extent to which the 
ambiguity was deliberate. The debate was essentially about 
the rights of the Dutch on Borneo and British intentions 
there. Neither government behaved impeccably. The Dutch 
argued amongst themselves as to whether they actually had 
any rights to the disputed territory at all, while in 
Britain the government was criticised for its treatment of 
the Dutch government. The British government was reluctant 
to consider Dutch protests concerning its activities in 
North Borneo. But the Dutch remained steadfast and the 
protests became more persistent. This suggests that the 
Dutch had considerable confidence in their position and 
that they were optimistic about their chances of success. 
However, the response of the British government, 
characterised by impatience, ambiguous behaviour, and lack 
of co-operation, leads us to conclude that this optimism on 
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the part of the Dutch was sadly misplaced and relatively 
ineffectual. In 1882, after years of debate surrounding the 
1824 Treaty, the Dutch government finally realised that the 
British government would not agree to its interpretation, 
and decided to accept a favourable border settlement. The 
compromise eventually reached in 1891 left the Dutch 
government with the feeling that it had made all the 
concessions. Furthermore, during the dispute the British 
government had presented the Dutch government with faits 
accomplis: in 1881 it had granted a charter to the British 
North Borneo Company, and in 1888 it had declared the 
contested territory a British Protectorate. Worse still, 
the suspicions of the Dutch government were later shown to 
be justified: the Dent & Von Overbeck enterprise was indeed 
more than a commercial settlement. 
The charter granted to the British North Borneo 
Company was, then, an attempt by the British government 
informally to extend its influence. Perhaps the British 
government had not envisaged that the Dutch (and Spanish) 
opposition would be so strong. Thus, although the Dutch 
government could not ultimately prevent this British 
expansion on Borneo, it did exert sufficient pressure to 
oblige the British government to declare the disputed 
territory a British protectorate. If Dutch protests had 
been less forceful, this would probably not have been 
necessary. Presumably the British government had reasoned 
that the informal protection of a charter would suffice at 
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a time when it was preoccupied with colonial competition in 
more immediately important territories in Africa and India. 
The protests on Borneo, however, forced the British 
government to pay more attention to Borneo than it had 
initially thought necessary. 
In the Nisero incident the British government 
protested to the Dutch government about its failure to free 
the prisoners captured on Dutch colonial territory in 
Tenom. The failure of various missions to negotiate the 
prisoners' release led to British Foreign Secretary 
Granville's offer of mediation, which was met in the 
Netherlands with the utmost indignation and disapproval, 
showing how sensitive the Dutch government had become. The 
offer of mediation provoked heated debates in the British 
and Dutch parliaments. The Nisero question shows how an 
essentially straightforward issue (i. e. the rescue of the 
Nisero captives) was greatly complicated by considerations 
of national interest and pride, themselves emphasised by 
the intense colonial competition of the time which 
threatened the status of the Netherlands as a colonial 
power. The release of the captives would have been more 
straightforward if the Dutch government had not been under 
pressure to control Achin in order to secure trade routes 
and exclude competition from other European powers. 
The third case study, the foundation of the KPM, was 
not a bilateral dispute, but a unilateral action by the 
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Dutch government. By creating a company which was 
essentially Dutch, the government aimed to exclude foreign 
influence from South-East Asian shipping networks. The 
significant factor here is that the foundation of the KPM 
was also designed to exclude British influence. The 
Netherlands had a closer relationship with Britain than 
with any other European power, yet in the eyes of the Dutch 
the territorial threat from Britain in the colonies was as 
great as that from other colonial powers. The Dutch 
government probably overestimated the threat of British 
competition in the Indonesian archipelago. Had this not 
been the case, the foundation of the KPM would have caused 
a much greater stir in Britain. Had the trade routes 
concerned been as valuable to the British as the Dutch 
suspected, the foundation of the KPM would have brought a 
great deal of protest from trading interests in the area, 
and the matter would have been more widely discussed in the 
press and parliament. The foundation of the KPM was also 
symbolic of the age of imperialism: a deliberate exclusion 
of foreign competition in the Dutch East Indies, a source 
of Dutch colonial prestige and national pride which had to 
be protected. 
All three case studies show similarities: the Dutch 
tendency to overestimate their influence (and thus their 
status) within the relationship; the tendency of the Dutch 
government to allow the preservation of its colonial status 
to influence certain foreign policy decisions, and the 
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difficulties caused by ambiguities in the 1824 Treaty. This 
treaty was still in force to a certain extent, and had only 
been partly superseded by the 1871 Sumatra Treaty, in which 
Britain effectively gave the Dutch a free hand on Sumatra. 
Dutch misconceptions inevitably influenced the course of 
events in the cases examined here. The Borneo dispute was 
a painful reminder of the Netherlands' true (i. e. 
subordinate) position within the Anglo-Dutch relationship. 
The Dutch protests did not halt British activity on Borneo; 
at most they could be said to have made things difficult 
for the British and prolonged the dispute. In the Nisero 
question the Dutch government's preoccupation with colonial 
status became an obstacle which prolonged the prisoners' 
ordeal. Ironically, the Dutch government's procrastination 
brought about the situation it most wanted to avoid (i. e. 
British intervention leading to joint action). The 
importance of Dutch colonial prestige clouded the 
government's judgement and this fuelled British resentment 
and impatience still further. The escalating frustration 
and resentment in the Nisero question could very probably 
have been avoided if the Dutch government had acted with 
more expediency and objectivity. 
As Kennedy has pointed out, when explaining one country's 
policy towards another, one of the features to be examined 
is the perceptions of the governing classes about their 
nation's place in the world. ' This study has shown that, at 
least with relation to Britain, the Dutch government 
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overestimated its position. In general it could be said 
that the most obvious consequence of the Dutch government's 
overestimation of its influence within the Anglo-Dutch 
relationship was a tendency to be more assertive and to 
protest more vociferously than it would otherwise have 
done, particularly with regard to Borneo. Clearly the Dutch 
government, although aware of the importance of good 
relations with Britain, was at the same time confident the 
relationship was based on mutual respect. Without such 
confidence, Dutch reactions to any perceived misdemeanours 
on the part of the British government would arguably have 
been more modest. At times those reactions appear to have 
been somewhat exaggerated and over-sensitive, but in some 
cases they were clearly justified. 
How, then, does this empirical study contribute to the 
historiography of the Anglo-Dutch relationship? Most 
studies of Anglo-Dutch relations have emphasised aspects of 
rivalry inherent in the relationship. Earlier generations 
of writers, such as Carter and Wilson, ' concentrated on the 
Anglo-Dutch Wars and other aspects of economic and 
commercial rivalry up to the nineteenth century. Van Sas's 
work constituted a break from this tradition, emphasising 
as it did the `special relationship' between Britain and 
the Netherlands, which was based on mutual strategic and 
political needs. 3 For once, economic interests were 
secondary. Van Sas also modified the traditional concept of 
rivalry into a `patron-client' relationship. 4 As Van Sas's 
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contemporaries began to examine the nature of Dutch 
expansion in an attempt to define it as either 
imperialistic or colonial, and then, inevitably, to make 
comparisons or contrasts with the other European powers, 
they (notably Kuitenbrouwer and Wesseling) began to look 
more closely at Anglo-Dutch relations in more detail within 
the context of foreign and colonial policies. " The 
empirical findings of this study show that Van Sas's 
`special relationship' did not endure much beyond the 
period he examined, and support Kuitenbrouwer's claim that 
the Anglo-Dutch relationship moved into a period of 
transition during the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. 6 Relations at this time were far from `special'. 
This study has provided additional insights into the 
mechanics of the relationship between the Dutch and British 
governments, thus adding further substance to 
Kuitenbrouwer's findings as to the nature of the 
relationship. There is no doubt that the relationship 
survived the diplomatic turbulence of the age of 
imperialism, but the subsequent relationship could no 
longer be described as `special' in the sense in which Van 
Sas referred to it. This study has highlighted 
preconceptions which governed interpersonal relations 
between ministers and diplomats, as well as certain 
personal shortcomings among the protagonists. 
However, caution must be exercised in emphasising the 
negative aspects of the relationship between Britain and 
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the Netherlands. We must not overlook the fact that the 
foundations of the Anglo-Dutch relationship remained 
largely intact, although the superstructure did sustain 
some damage. In reviewing the work of Raven and Rodger on 
Anglo-Dutch relations through the ages, 7 H. M. Scott 
observes: 
If this collection has a fault it is that many 
contributors seem more aware of the undoubted 
tensions and misunderstandings that existed than 
of the religious, dynastic, political and 
colonial interests that sustained the alliance. 
Had the Anglo-Dutch partnership been as fragile 
as is occasionally suggested, surely it would 
have been less enduring? 8 
This view, although dealing with a single work, could 
equally well be applied to the whole body of historiography 
of Anglo-Dutch relations. In this light it is interesting 
to contrast Scott's review with Jonathan Israel's review of 
the same work: 
What comes across most strikingly is the 
sustained, uncompromising efficiency, not to say 
arrogance, of British power over many centuries 
as reflected in the continuous strategic 
domination - at any rate after 1692 when British 
power outstripped that of the Dutch - of a small 
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but important neighbouring power with major 
maritime, colonial and commercial interests. The 
Anglo-Dutch relationship emerges as having been, 
right down to the 1950s, one of the pillars of 
the British imperial system. ' 
The difference in emphasis between Scott's and Israel's 
views illustrate a particular methodological problem in the 
writing of history, namely the extent to which the process 
of selection employed by the historian `colours' or 
influences the final product. In the words of Arthur 
Marwick: 
[... ] whether they are aware of it or not, 
historians will pick out, from the opening into 
the past offered them by the sources, what they 
find interesting, important or significant. 
Historians impose order, possibly pattern, 
define relationships and interactions; they 
decide what to put in and what to leave out; 
even if aiming at no more than a coherent 
narrative, they are still contributing form or 
shape to that narrative. " 
And in the words of Julian Barnes: 
You can define a net in two ways, depending on 
your point of view [... 1. You can do the same 
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with a biography. The trawling net fills, then 
the biographer hauls it in, sorts, throws back, 
stores, fillets and sells. Yet consider what he 
doesn't catch: there is always much more of 
that. " 
Here, for `a biography' and `biographer', read `history' 
and `historian', respectively. Biography is, after all, 
history: personal history. 
The trawling net of Anglo-Dutch historians seems to 
contain predominantly negative catches; at least this is 
what is ultimately `stored, filletted and sold'. 
Unfortunately, the results of this study are hardly more 
positive. Certainly Israel's `continuous strategic 
domination [by Britain] of a small but important 
neighbouring power' is a more accurate explanation of 
Anglo-Dutch relations during the Borneo dispute than 
Scott's less forceful `undoubted tensions and 
misunderstandings'. Seen in this light, Dutch attitudes 
concerning the Nisero question and the foundation of the 
KPM are best explained as the Netherlands' reaction to that 
continuous British attempt to dominate. 
As John Mackenzie has observed: 
[... ] relations among the European powers, 
notably Britain and Germany, have been 
275 
repeatedly modified by the experience of empire, 
through creating jealousies, tensions and 
yearnings for mutual instruction and imitation. " 
The Borneo dispute, the Nisero question and the foundation 
of the KPM are all part of the Anglo-Dutch experience of 
empire. These case studies show that, although Anglo-Dutch 
relations at the beginning of the century had been 
particularly close, they had indeed, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, been modified by the experience of 
empire. Here it is necessary to emphasise the word 
`modified'; the Anglo-Dutch relationship was not destroyed 
by the experience of empire. 
The findings of this study point to possible areas for 
future research into Anglo-Dutch relations. The first area 
suggested is an examination of other bilateral issues 
arising during the same period, in order to establish to 
what extent these were influenced by the interpersonal 
relationships discussed here (for example the mutual 
antagonism between Van Bylandt and Pauncefote evident in 
the Borneo dispute). 
A second possible area is a comparative study of other 
bilateral relations between large and small European 
powers, in order to establish whether the Anglo-Dutch 
relationship was typical of the late nineteenth century, 
and whether colonial competition influenced those 
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relationships in the same way. As we have seen in Chapter 
3, there is a possible parallel with Anglo-Portuguese 
relations. Van Bylandt recognised the need for caution in 
dealing with the British government, given that the result 
of Portugal's assertive position regarding her territorial 
claims in Africa led to a decrease, rather than in an 
increase, in her rights there. A condescending entry in the 
Annual Register for 1877, under the heading `Holland' is 
also indicative of the British attitude towards the 
Netherlands and other small European powers: 
Of the minor countries of Europe very little can 
be said, for, in the presence of the more 
exciting topics of the Russo-Turkish war and the 
constitutional struggle in France, they seem to 
have been relegated to insignificance, and they 
furnish no continuous political history, or not 
any of sufficient importance to interest foreign 
readers. Hence only a few notes can be 
attempted. 13 
A third area concerns historical methodology, and can 
be expressed in the words of A. N. Wilson: 
[... J for then the criterion of selection sets 
the focus and the picture becomes like one of 
those strange productions of artistic 
photographers where everything in the foreground 
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is out of focus and all attention is fixed on 
small details in the middle distance. 14 
Without wishing to suggest that the negative aspects of the 
Anglo-Dutch relationship discussed in this study (and its 
predecessors) are `small details in the middle distance', 
a useful contribution to Anglo-Dutch historiography could 
be made by directing the focus of future research towards 
the sustaining factors within the Anglo-Dutch relationship, 
namely, in the words of Scott: `(... ] the religious, 
dynastic, political and colonial interests that sustained 
the alliance. '15 If these had not existed, the case studies 
discussed here would have had a destructive rather than a 
modifying influence during the period in question. 
Anglo-Dutch historiography by and large confirms that the 
Anglo-Dutch relationship survived its various low-points. 
It would be useful to identify precisely which factors were 
instrumental in that survival. 
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